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ABSTRACT
Since the 1960's, there has been a growing consensus among health
professionals and philosophers that psychotherapy involves a question of values.
During that time, most contemporary work has been directed at two questions: 1)
What are the values that therapist's make use of when treating a client? and 2) What is
the justification for the presence of and reliance on these values? Current debate in
this arena has been fueled by differing responses to these questions. As a result, little
agreement exists regarding the number, nature, ordering and grounding of these values.
The aim of this dissertation is to encourage some consensus in this arena by
clarifying a proper locus for a discussion of values in therapy. In contrast to authors
that establish a basis for values in various philosophical or religious ideologies, I
argue that scholars need to look to the school of thought to which a therapist adheres.
I believe that if scholars analyze the philosophical assumptions implicit in paradigms
of psychotherapy, including notions of mental illness, view of reality, etc., they may
begin to see the normative force that these assumptions create both within the
therapeutic context and as the goal of therapy. It could be agreed, then, that while
values in therapy are relative to a school of thought, universal prescriptions and
prohibitions are made use of by the therapist and transmitted to the patient. In this
way, psychotherapists and clinical ethicists could generate a consistent, rational plan of

vii

action for the benefit of the client.
Three historically significant paradigms of psychotherapy are analyzed in this
dissertation, namely Freud's psychoanalysis, Sullivan's interpersonal theory of
psychiatry and Frankl's logotherapy. Their implicit philosophical assumptions are
explored along with considerations of their normative force for the client who seeks
this kind of treatment. A final concluding chapter considers the contemporary state of
psychotherapy and a modem school of thought, short-term dynamic therapy.

viii

INTRODUCTION

And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a
shield or any other instrument of war springs up on that
very day a competent combatant in heavy armor or in any
other form of warfare -- though no other tool will make a
man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor
will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired
the science of it nor sufficiently practiced themselves in its
use? 1
Where pity is preached today -- and if you listen closely,
this is the only religion preached now -- psychologists
should keep their ears open: through all the vanity,
through all the noise that characterizes these preachers
(like all preachers) they will hear a hoarse, groaning,
genuine sound of self-contempt...... The man of "modem
ideas," this proud ape is immeasurably dissatisfied with
himself; that is certain. He suffers -- and his vanity
wants him to suffer only with others, to feel pity.---2
Since the 1960's, there has been a growing consensus among health
professionals and philosophers that psychotherapy involves a question of values.
During that time, most contemporary work has been directed at two questions: 1)
What are the values that therapist's make use of when treating a client? and 2) What is
the justification for the presence of and reliance on these values? Current debate in

1

Plato. The Republic, in The Collected Dialogues including the Letters, ed. by
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, (New Haven: Princeton University Press,
1961), II, 374d, 621.
2

Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil, trans. and with commentary by
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), 149-150.
1

2

this arena has been fueled by differing responses to these questions. As a result, we
presently find ourselves with little agreement regarding the number, nature, ordering
and grounding of these values.
The aim of this dissertation, as originally conceived, was to attempt to achieve
some consensus in this arena by clarifying a proper locus for a discussion of values in
therapy. In contrast to authors that establish a basis for values in various
philosophical or religious ideologies, I wished to argue that those who wish to write
on this topic needed to look within the paradigm/school of thought to which a therapist
adheres. I believed, then, that if one were to sufficiently analyze the philosophical
assumptions implicit in schools of thought, an analysis if you will of their notions of
mental illness, view of reality, etc., one could begin to see the normative force that
these assumptions created both within the therapeutic context and as the goal of
therapy. If the normative force of these philosophical assumptions could be
established, then it could be agreed that while values in therapy are relative to a
school of thought, universal prescriptions and prohibitions are made use of by the
therapist and transmitted to the patient. In this way, psychotherapists and clinical
ethicists could generate a consistent, rational plan of action for the benefit of the
client. In sum, I believed that if values could be discussed as intra-paradigm
phenomena, at the very least, consensus could be achieved regarding values based
upon the commitment of the therapist - if one were to identify themselves as a
Freudian, Sullivanian, Frankelian Logotherapist, etc. To my knowledge and to date,
no study exists on the nature of norms within paradigms of psychotherapy. Not only
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for its benefit to clients, but also for its novelty, I pursued this idea.
So conceived, the thesis itself depended upon two assumptions only. Since
these assumptions still operate in this work, I will address them now. The first
assumption is that there are such things as "schools of thought" or paradigms as I
choose to call them, firmly established and adhered to by psychotherapists. The use of
the term, paradigms, is inspired by Thomas Kuhn. In the Function of Dogma in

Scientific Research, Kuhn articulates both the definition and the main features of
scientific paradigms. He says:
A paradigm is a possession of which enabled scientists
to take the foundation of their field for granted and to push
on to more concrete and recondite problems. Features: 1)
A paradigm is a fundamental scientific achievement and one
which includes both a theory and some exemplary applications
to the results of experiment and observation. 2) A paradigm is
an accepted achievement in the sense that it is received by a
group whose members no longer try to rival it or create
alternatives for it. 3) A paradigm is an open-ended achievement,
one which leaves all sorts of research to be done. 3
In terms of definition as well as the main features, most importantly that paradigms

articulate a "theory and some exemplary applications" of it, I believe that there are
identifiable paradigms in psychotherapy. While presently, there is much debate as to
the number and kinds of legitimate forms of psychotherapy are operative in the
disciplines, the fact that there are schools of thought in psychotherapy, conceived of
broadly, as Kuhn articulated them is sufficient to generate my thesis. For the purposes

3

Thomas Kuhn. "The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research," in Readings
in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Baruch Brody. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970),
368-71.

4

of this dissertation, I have chosen to confine my analysis to four such paradigms, of
which all share the features of Kuhn's paradigms. They are: Freud's Psychoanalysis,
Harry Stack Sullivan's Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry and Viktor Frankl's
Logotherapy. In addition to meeting the requirements of Kuhn's paradigm, all are
sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate competing metaphysical and normative
commitments. But also, the most currently accepted and widely practiced form of
therapy, Short-Term Dynamic Therapy has its historical and philosophical foundations
in these schools of thought.
The second assumption of the project has to do with my attempt to derive
normative assumptions from philosophical assumptions. By declaring to do so, I

have automatically chosen a side in the continuing debate on the fact/value distinction.
Historically, it is David Hume who forged the distinction between descriptive claims
and prescriptive claims, which commonly falls under the rubric of the Naturalistic
Fallacy. He says:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with,
.I have always remark'd that the author proceeds for some
time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human
affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought,
or ought not. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be
observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason
should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which
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are entirely different from it.4
While Hume rightly was attacking the metaphysicians, or the zealots, when he wrote
this, today, I would argue that in the absence of metaphysical truths, Hume's
naturalistic fallacy is a rather mute point. There is a large and growing tradition, those
who honestly and despairingly are forced to acknowledge the death of metaphysics as
a discipline and concomitantly inspired by Kantian epistemology, upon which I can
soundly rest assured that a hard and fast distinction between facts and values must be
sufficiently blurred.
Provided that the reader could accept the two assumptions, the project itself
seemed doable and necessary. As the work proceeded, I kept myself abreast of the
current scholarly contributions to the discussion of values. Again, while most
contributors are aware of the fact that there are values in therapy; there seemed to be
a growing movement away from any base-line consensus regarding values in
psychotherapy. Much to my dismay, the growing disparity in treatment of values, I
believe, covertly contributes to a growing belief that values are arbitrary or relative.
For the sake of acquainting the reader with how values have been and are discussed, I
offer the following schematization or review of the literature.
1) Multi-Cultural Values: These authors suggest that in their practice,
therapists should take into consideration cultural or gender values of their clients. See
for example: Harry J. Aponte. Bread and Spirit: Therapy with the New Poor: Diversity
of Race, Culture and Values (New York: Norton, 1994).; Rosemarie Perez Foster,
Michael Moskowitz and Rafael Art Javier, eds. Reaching Across Boundaries of

David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed. Edited and with ~
analytical index by L.A. Selby-Bigge. With text revised and variant readings by P.H.
Nidditch. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), III, i, i, 470.
4
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Culture and Class: Widening the Scope of Psychotherapy (New Jersey: Jason Aronson,
Inc., 1996).; J. Pamela Weiner and Pauline Boss. "Exploring Gender Bias Against
Women: Ethics for Marriage and Family Therapy. Special Issue: Values and Ethics in
Family Therapy," Counselling and Values 38(1) (October, 1985): 9-23.

2) Religious/Philosophical Values: These scholars argue that the proper
foundation for a discussion of values in therapy rests with religious or philosophical
values. Examples include: Everett L. Worthington, ed. Psychotherapy and Religious
Values. (Michigan: Baker Book House, 1993).; Martin Lakin. Ethical Issues in the
Psychotherapies. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).; Allen E. Bergin.
"Psychotherapy and Religious Values," in Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 48 (1980): 95-105.; P. London. The Modes and Morals of Psychotherapy.
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).
3) Personal Values: For several decades, researches have conducted studies
which verify that a therapist's personal values do impact clinical practice. Aware of
this, some scholars have suggested that therapists explore their own personal value
system prior to practice. The literature includes: Morris B. Parloff, Norman Goldstein
and Boris Iflund. "Communication of Values and Therapeutic Change," Archives of
General Psychiatry, 2 (1960): 300-4.; Hans H. Strupp. "Humanism and
Psychotherapy: A Personal Statement of the Therapist's Essential Values,"
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice 17(4) (Winter, 1980): 396-400.
Paul Chodoff. "Ethical Dimensions of Psychotherapy: A Personal Perspective,"
American Journal of Psychotherapy, vol. 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 298-310.; Janet
A. Khan and Darryl G. Cross. "Mental Health Professionals: How Different are there
Values?" American Mental Health Counselors Association Journal, 6 (January, 1984):
32-51.; E. Weisskopf-Joelson. "Values: The Enfant Terrible of Psychotherapy,"
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 17 (1980): 459-66.; Jerry Dragan.
"An Examination of the Role of Values in Counselling and Psychotherapy," Canadian
Counsellor 8(4) (October, 1974): 272-9.; John C. Norcross and Michael Wogan.
"Values in Psychotherapy: A Survey of Practitioner's Beliefs," Professional
Psychotherapy: Research and Practice (18)1 (February, 1987): 5-7.
4) Political Values: Several scholars have argued that all therapists implicitly
transmit accepted political values to their clients. As such, therapy is construed as
"applied politics." For example, see: Peter Breggin. "Psychiatry and Psychotherapy as
Political Processes," American Journal of Psychotherapy, vol. 29 (1975): 369-87.; S.
Halleck. The Politics of Therapy. (New York: Science House, 1971).; Jonas
Robitscher. The Powers of Psychiatry. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1980).
5) Therapy as Value-Neutral: Some commentators are adamant that therapy is a
value-neutral process. If clients adopt values at the end of therapy, it is argued that
they have freely chosen to do so. In principle, though, therapists are not in the
business of advancing values to their clients. Rather, they only encourage the client to

7

become a fully autonomous agent. See: Thomas Szasz. The Myth of Mental Illness
(New York: Harper & Row, 1974).; and The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (New York:
Basic Books, 1965). H. Tristram Englehardt. "Psychotherapy as Meta-ethics," in
Psychotherapy and Ethics, ed. by Rem B. Edwards, (New York: Prometheus Books,
1982).
There is much overlap in these categories; however, I list them so as to familiarize
the reader with how values have been discussed in the past and presently.

And

presently, with this growing proliferation of views, the possibility of consensus so as

to provide a coherent, rational plan of action for the client seems sadly out of reach.
Having identified the four paradigms to be analyzed, I began the work on this
project, in the only way possible, at the beginning -- with the theoretical articulation
of these schools of thought. Guided by the view that theory is linked to practice, I
focused my research on their respective descriptions (philosophical assumptions) of
mental illness, reality (both internal and external, as conceived of by the therapist and
the client, and at various times in the course of therapy), the therapeutic techniques of
the school of thought and the purported goals of treatment. I read the secondary
literature which sought to clarify or to further develop these descriptions. In the end, I
was forced to conclude that while in the abstract my original thesis was still on target,
the theory of these schools of thought was often poorly articulated, at times
inconsistent and at its worst moments, positively confused. The implications of this
discovery were manifold.
First and foremost, it stands to reason that if the theory upon which practice is
supposed to be based is skewed, then practicing within a school of thought must be
equally ambiguous. This caused me to wonder what exactly practitioners of

8

psychotherapy purport to be "doing" in the confines of therapy and how they are
justifying the methodology behind their practice. In a very real sense, those who
claim that a therapist's personal values enter into therapy, are in the end, somehow
correctly speaking to what actually occurs in practice. However, I am not convinced
that their reasons for believing this claim rest on the appropriate arguments. In my
view, if, therapists rely on personal values, it is often because the theory to which they
adhere allows for a random selection of nonnative claims. In a very real sense,
because of the deeply entrenched meta-analytical confusion, therapists who base their
practice on these paradigms are unwittingly led to a reliance on their personal values.
This was especially the case with Frankl's Logotherapy and Short-Tenn Dynamic

Therapy.
But secondly, since the task of uncovering the philosophical assumptions
proved to be enormous; and given that there was seldom a meaning, but rather
multiple plausible meanings of these philosophical assumptions, my belief in the
possibility of establishing a clear, consistent and coherent ethic for each of the
paradigms was turning into a distant dream. The original thesis underwent a severe
modification. I decided that turning the spotlight on the theory of these paradigms
itself -- a clarification of the philosophical assumptions-- was where work needed to
be done. The project has since been construed as a meta-analysis of the philosophical
assumptions inherent in these schools of thought with the intent of understanding what
implications they might have for a nonnative ethic and/or where scholars need to focus
their attention in order to clarify the nonnative ethic. This has especially been true of

9

Chapters 1: Freud's Psychoanalysis and Chapter 2: Harry Stack Sullivan's Interpersonal
Theory of Psychiatry.
My greatest desire would be that psychotherapists would use this dissertation as
a tool by which to begin investigating the interpretation that they give to the
descriptive assumptions within their schools of thought in order to understand the
normative force that this has for their client. A more modest desire would be that
therapists use this dissertation as a tool by which to begin reflecting about the
assumptions within and behind their practice. Yet, greater or smaller, I am doubtful
that many therapists will do this. As I worked on this dissertation, I came across
many warrants in the exposition of theory that precluded therapists from rationally
examining any theory whatsoever. In sum, there are rather obvious prohibitions
directed at therapists to not think too deeply; for, to travel too far into critical thought
might risk one being labelled as "obsessional." The following passages are worth
citing and critiquing:
For obsessional neurosis "seduces" the obsessional neurotic
to a particular philosophical position, namely that world-view
of hundred-per-centness of which we have spoken above. A
case that shows the obsessional-neurotic world-view in its
incipient stages is that of a young man in late puberty. Amid
the labor pains of adolescence it became plain that an
obsessional-neurotic world-view was setting in.
The young man in question was filled with a Faustian urge
to know the roots of everything. "I want to get back to the origin
of things," were his words. "I want to be able to prove everything;
I want to prove everything that is immediately obvious -- for
example, whether I am living."
We know that the obsessional neurotic's sense of obviousness

10

is defective. 5
I fmd it fascinating that Vik.tor Frankl, trained in philosophy himself, has not the
patience to make clear distinctions between the following concepts, namely: a) one's
desire for absolute proof, b) the possibility of achieving absolute proof and c) the

pejorative and unjust labelling of someone as showing the symptoms of obsessionalneurosis. A desire to know has long been deemed the hallmark of what separates
human beings from the animal kingdom. Indeed, it is this desire which founded and
propelled the entire discipline of philosophy, also known as the most divine science,
according to Aristotle. With respect to b), whether or not it is possible to know all
things has long been debated by the greatest scholars in the halls of academia. Yet, b)
is a philosophical question and should be debated as such, not treated by therapy. By
claiming that a pre-adolescent suffers the symptoms of obsessional neurosis because he
wonders about the world around him is nothing short of an affront to the entire human

race. I would humbly urge that Frankl should rather escort this youth to the halls of
the university and out of the logotherapist's office. From Aristotle's point of view,
after treatment in this therapist's office, something less than a human being would
emerge -- and ultimately, thanks to the professional work of the logotherapist.
There is hardly a criticism that has not been leveled
at psychotherapy: it is ineffective; it is dangerous; it is
too limited, too long, too expensive; carried on in the
secrecy of the consulting room, its techniques remain
arcana unavailable to scientific scrutiny ... , etc.
The dedicated (emphasis added) psychotherapist is

5

Vik.tor E. Frankl. The Doctor and the Soul: From Psychotherapy to
Logotherapy. rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 195-6.
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undaunted by these frequently contradictory comments. He
knows from his own experience that his treatment methods
work (emphasis added), and he is aware that the demand for
rigorous proof comes from those who like their world to be an
orderly place and expect natural phenomena to conform to the
clear definitions and sharply delineated categories of ideal reason.
God is less obsessional (emphasis added), and the real world of
creation is full of stubborn facts that refuse to be marshalled or
quantified; nowhere is this more true than in the realm of human
subjective experience and the psychology that studies it. 6
Aware of the criticisms, this psychiatrist urges other dedicated psychiatrists to rest
assured that their expertise is based upon the individual practitioner's experience that
his treatment method works. This kind of reasoning is viciously circular. It is akin to
my saying that this chapter is "good" simply because I say it is good. As such, this
view makes a mockery of psychotherapy because it suggests that the theory upon
which therapists base their practice is something wholly subjective. In addition, and
much like my criticism of Frankl's remarks, it insults an individual's rationality, but in
particular it denigrates the rationality of all therapists. It precludes any attempt to
understand objectively the nature of their own expertise or profession. Individuals
who attempt to understand it, instead, are accused of trying to be God-like and/or are
guilty of obsessionality. After reading this passage, the rational reader may query:
who really is afflicted with the madness of God-like hubris?
But paradoxically, one of the most discomfiting passages I encountered was
written by an esteemed psychologist and one who is himself a critic of psychotherapy.
I call this paradoxical because given the nature of his criticism, Robyn Dawes is

6

Dr. Nemiah. Introduction to Short-Term Anxiety Provoking Therapy: A
Treatment Manual by Peter E. Sifneos. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), vii-viii.

12
clearly an individual who is quite willing to be labelled as "obsessional" and challenge
the credibility of many established principles of psychotherapy. In his recent book,

House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth, he has the following
advice for clients who seek therapy. He advises them as follows:
There is no reason, however, to seek out a highly paid,
experienced therapist with a lot of credentials. If verbal
therapy is sought, paraprofessionals are equally effective,
especially empathetic ones. If the problems appear to
require behavioral modification, as do phobias and lack
of impulse control, a paraprofessional who understands
behavioral principles is as effective as a highly credentialed
professional. But, success in therapy is far from assured,
even though it works overall in a statistical sense. Someone
who is dissatisfied with their current progress in therapy
should not be inhibited about changing therapists or mode
of treatment. (The therapist that is abandoned may attribute
this decision to the depth of the clients pathology, but so what). 7
But so what? So what is the client is not a professional therapist and does not know
if he suffers from an illness that requires "behavioral modification" such as "phobias
and lack of impulse control." And, so what if a client believes that persons who call
themselves professional therapists, require a fee, and purport to help them can not
assure them of "success" in therapy?

And, so what if a client is told that their

pathology is so severe and that this is the reason why therapy has not worked even
though the real reason may lie elsewhere? And so what if a client is so mentally
disabled that he may not even be able to believe in the truth -- let alone even to
cognize - his own so what?

7

Robyn Dawes. House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on
Myth (New York: Free Press, 1994), 73.
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What about the person who is the client?
What about psychotherapists whose sole professional
and moral justification for engaging in the work they
do is to help clients?

I conclude this introduction with two comments. First, I would like to invite
psychotherapists to peruse this dissertation. Those who are willing to invoke critical
reason and who risk being labelled as "obsessional," at the very least may personally
benefit from examining the foundational assumptions of four historically and
comprehensive theoretical paradigms of psychotherapy. These paradigms, though not
exhaustive, have served as the disciplinary bedrock of the professional status of
psychotherapists. Though the chapters do not promise a complete account of the
normative commitments implicit in these theories, as I dreamed they might, I believe
they point toward important implications for further investigating the integral role that
descriptions and prescriptions play within the paradigm of which they are a part. In
this respect, I would gladly welcome a further articulation of the thoughts presented
here -- for the sake of theory, practice and the welfare of clients treated in this
profession.
Finally, I began this introduction with two quotes: one from Plato which
emphasizes the importance between the relationship between theory and practice, but
the second was from Nietzsche. With his prophetic aphorisms, Nietzsche scorned the
history of western philosophy and Christianity because of their preaching a morality to
human beings which actually further enslaved man to a mythology and destroyed that
which is most ennobling to him. Nietzsche warns that "psychology" might- become the

14
new, modem religion -- and psychotherapists, its new missionaries. But, this is only a
warning. If psychotherapists are to accomplish what society and their professions
believe that they will do, psychotherapists must heed his warning and look critically at

their practice. He says:
In short, my dear psychologists, study the philosophy
of the "norm" in its fight against the "exception:" there
you have a spectacle that is good enough for gods and
godlike malice! Or, still more clearly: vivisect the "good
man," the homo bonae voluntatis" -- yourselves/8
I have only one additional clause to add to this warning: ... do so for your clients!

8

Nietzsche, Beyond, 147.

CHAPTER ONE
THE NORMATIVE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ANALYST IN FREUD'S
PSYCHOANALYSIS

But there is one question which I can hardly evade. If the
development of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity to
the development of the individual and if it employs the same
methods, may we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis that,
under the influence of cultural urges, some civilizations, or some
epochs of civilization -- possibly the whole of mankind -- have
become 'neurotic?' An analytic dissection of such neuroses
might lead to therapeutic recommendations which could lay
claim to great practical interest. I would not say that an attempt
of this kind to carry psycho-analysis over to the cultural
community was absurd or doomed to be fruitless. But we
should have to be very cautious and not forget that, after all, we
are dealing only with analogies and that it is dangerous, not only
with men but also with concepts, to tear them from the sphere in
which they have originated and been evolved. Moreover, the
diagnosis of communal neuroses is faced with a special
difficulty. In an individual neurosis we take as our startingpoint the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his
environment, which is assumed to be 'normal' (emphasis added).
For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the
same disorder no such background could exist; it would have to
be found elsewhere. And as regards the therapeutic application
of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct
analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to
impose such a therapy upon the group (emphasis added)? But
in spite of all these difficulties, we may expect that one day
someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural
communities. 1

1

Sigmund Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 19531974), 21: 144.
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The above quote is taken from the last pages of Freud's, Civilization and Its
Discontents. As he states, a final problem which he can "hardly evade" has to do with

the possibility of the existence and modes of understanding along psychoanalytic lines
of a culture/civilization -- indeed a whole race of mankind -- that suffers from
neurosis. It is interesting to note that as soon as he raises the thought experiment and
points out the potential difficulties in addressing it, Freud dismisses it and leaves it to
his future scholars to undertake an investigation of the pathology of cultural
communities. Only one and one-half pages later, Freud concludes Civilization and Its
Discontents.

Let me state at the outset, that in this chapter my aim is not to take up the task of
sketching out the pathology of cultural communities. Rather, I quoted Freud's thought
experiment at length because it seems to me that in later years, when his inquiries
became more philosophical in nature, Freud was the first to acknowledge that
psychoanalysts take as their starting point a vision of the environment which they
assume to be "normal." Indeed, it is this knowledge of the "environment" (or
civilization) which justifies the authority of psychoanalysts and makes its practice
possible.
Contemporary discussions of the legitimacy of psychotherapy as a discipline
could benefit from a reconsideration of Freud's claim. In a recent critical review of
the literature on psychotherapy, Stephen Logan remarks:
Modern psychotherapy is vexed with the problem of its
own authority. A number of influential therapists -among them Peter Lomas, Adam Phillips and Anthony
Storr -- have recently written books which agonize over
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the question of the kind and degree of authority a
therapist should claim. In a liberal society with an
eroded moral consensus, moral guides are likely to be
needed and resented equally. The former sources
-- religion, social tradition, literature -- are either not
available, or else the practice of consulting them has
come to feel naive. Therapists, who have often
laboriously rebuilt some degree of the moral
confidence their patients lack, are therefore apt to
be regarded as gurus. 2
I believe that Freud would have been disconcerted with Logan's
characterization of the state of psychotherapy today. Repeatedly in his writings, Freud
emphasizes the need to keep psychoanalysis firmly entrenched in the medical
community in order to avoid analysts being viewed as charlatans. It seems to me that
in light of the passage in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud was well aware of the
fact that psychoanalysis involved some normative considerations and he offered the
suggestion that civilization itself provides the proper grounding for these values. After
all, the psychoanalyst uses as his starting point a vision of the "environment which he
assumes to be normal." In this way, were he alive today, Freud might respond to
Logan's remarks by saying that the "authority" with which psychoanalysis -- indeed
any form of therapy -- is derived is from civilization itself.

In this chapter, I intend to engage in a limited excursion into the Freudian
corpus in order to elucidate his conception of the nature of this "normal environment."
This description, as offered in his later works, comes replete with an exposition of the

2

Stephen Logan, "The Charisma of Uncertainty: Challenges to Psychotherapy
in the Postmodern Age," Times Literary Supplement, (September 27, 1996), 27-28.
See also: Peter Kramer, Moments of Engagement: Intimate Psychotherapy in a
Technological Age (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 187-219.
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kinds of characters and social institutions that are found in society. By assessing the
nature of these institutions, it is hoped that readers may begin to glimpse its
normative force. I believe that it is this understanding of "reality" that serves as the
starting point for the practice of psychoanalysis. However, since there are ambiguities
surrounding the term "reality" as used by Freud, an initial portion of this chapter will
be devoted to categorizing the many meanings of this word. Having done so, I will
then limit my analysis solely to Freud's conception of phenomenal reality and
demonstrate how it is imbued with pain and misery.

It is this kind of "reality" which

functions as the horizon against which Freudian psychoanalysts treat their clients.
In order to establish this thesis, this chapter will assume the following structure:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Review of the literature: the role of the psychoanalyst
Transition
Stipulation of texts
The many meanings of reality
The nature of phenomenally shared reality
Summary and transition to private property
Private property
Considerations of religion
Conclusion

1)

Review of the literature: the role of the psychoanalyst

The Freudian corpus contains a host of passages which allow for competing
interpretations regarding the role of the psychoanalyst. In my view, there are at least .
three qualitatively different ways in which Freud characterizes this role and each
implies different normative notions. After identifying these passages in Freud's works,
I then wish to align them with three contemporary understandings of the role of the
psychoanalyst. All of these interpretations are partially correct, in my view, yet, they
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fail to take into account the ultimate "starting point" for the practice of psychoanalysis,
namely civilization itself. In this section, each contemporary view will be presented
and followed by a brief critique. This will pave the way for the normative
considerations assumed in Freud's description of civilization.
Let us begin by considering three groups of citations which allow for
competing views. Each of the passages falls under the following three headings,
namely: 1) The psychoanalyst as impartial, 2) The psychoanalyst as engaged in a
hermeneutic endeavor; and 3) The psychoanalyst as suggesting personal values.

The

reader should be aware that in these passages, Freud is not addressing the
psychoanalyst's methods per se; but rather, the analyst's demeanor that is presupposed
prior to his application of the methods, specifically of free association and dream
interpretation. In addition, it is important to note that in this chapter, I am not
concerned with the therapeutic "relationship" that is formed in psychoanalysis, but only
the normative vision of reality that is assumed on the part of the psychoanalyst.
Having made these stipulations, consider the following passages:

View 1: The psychoanalyst as impartial
But psycho-analysis has already weathered many storms
and now it must brave this fresh one. In point of fact
psycho-analysis is a method of research, an impartial
instrument, like the infinitesimal calculus, as it were. 3
Psychoanalysis, in my opinion, is incapable of creating a
Weltanschauung of its own. It does not need one; it is a
part of science and can adhere to the scientific We/tan-

3

Freud, SE 21: 43.
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schauung. 4

I cannot advise my colleagues too urgently to model
themselves during psychoanalytic treatment on the
surgeon, who puts aside all his feelings, even his human
sympathy, and concentrates his mental forces on the
single aim of performing the operation as skillfully as
possible. .... The justification for requiring this emotional
coldness in the analyst is that it creates the most
advantageous conditions for both parties; for the doctor a
desirable protection for his own emotional life and for the
patient the largest amount of help that we can give him
today. 5

View 2: The psychoanalyst engaged in a hermeneutic endeavor
But it is far from being the case that his ego is content to
play the part of passively and obediently bringing us the
material we require and of believing and accepting our
translation of it. A number of other things happen, a few
of which we might have foreseen but others of which are
bound to surprise us. The most remarkable thing is this.
The patient is not satisfied with regarding the analyst in
the light of reality as a helper and advisor who,
moreover, is remunerated for the trouble he takes and
who would himself be content with some such role as
that of a guide on a difficult mountain climb. 6
Accordingly, the first part of the help we have to offer is
intellectual work on our side and encouragement to the
patient to collaborate in it. 7
As a rule we put off telling him of a construction or
explanation till he himself has so nearly arrived at it that
only a single step remains to be taken, though that step is
4

Ibid., 22: 181.

5

Ibid., 10: 115.

6

Ibid., 23: 174.

7

Ibid., 23: 177.
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in fact the decisive synthesis. 8

View 3: The psychoanalyst as suggesting personal values:
We serve the patient in various functions, as an authority
and a substitute for his parents, as a teacher and educator;
and we have done the best for him, if as analysts, we
raise the mental processes in his ego to a normal level,
transform what has become unconscious and repressed
into preconscious material and thus return it once more to
the possession of his ego. 9
On that particular matter our knowledge will then have
become his knowledge as well. 10
However much the analyst may be tempted to become a
teacher, model and ideal for other people and to create
men in his own image, he should not forget that is not his
task in the analytic relationship, and indeed that he will
be disloyal to his task if he allows himself to be led on
by his inclinations. I I
The flavor of each of these passages suggests different understandings of the
role of the psychoanalyst and consequently, implies different values assumed in
practice. Scholars have used these passages for explaining the role the psychoanalyst
should adopt in practice.

The following is a brief list of the scholars who have

generated theories that align with the above passages: 1) has been advocated by H.
Tristram Englehardt and Thomas Szasz; 2) by Paul Ricouer, Arnold Goldberg and
Hans G. Gadamer; and 3) by Allen E. Bergin, Kerry Brace and Martin Lakin.
8

Ibid., 23: 178.

9

Ibid., 23: 181.

10

Ibid., 23: 178.

11

Ibid., 23: 175.
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Following an explanation and critique of these views, I will suggest an
alternative interpretation regarding how one can more plausibly interpret the guiding
assumptions of the psychoanalyst based on Freud's views of reality. It is hoped that
this final view will enlarge and recast prevalent ideas that the psychoanalyst is neutral,
interactive, or uses personal values within the confines of psychoanalysis.

View 1: The psychoanalyst as impartial/neutral
Relatively few philosophers have maintained that the practice of
psychoanalysis is an entirely value-neutral enterprise; nonetheless, the few that have
done so have argued quite rigorously and persuasively for this approach.

Notably,

those who have defended this view are H. Tristam Englehardt in Psychotherapy as a

Meta-Ethics 12 and Thomas Szasz in The Ethics of Psychotherapy. 13 In brief, Englehardt
conceives of the practice of psychoanalysis as a meta-ethic, aiming only at the value of
autonomy. If clients adopt values at the end of therapy, it is not because the analyst

imposes or suggests them to the client; but rather, clients freely choose to accept them.
In principle, though, Englehardt believes that analysts are not in the business of
advancing or suggesting values to clients. Thomas Szasz largely adopts this view,
modifying the language slightly by referring to psychoanalysis as a meta-education.

12

H. Tristram Englehardt. "Psychotherapy as Meta-Ethics," in Psychotherapy
and Ethics, Rem B. Edwards, ed. (New York: Prometheus Books, 1982).
13

Thomas Szasz, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (New York: Basic Books,
1965). See also: Rangell, L. "Similarities and Differences between Psychoanalysis and
Dynamic Psychotherapy," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, vol. 2
(1954): 734-44.
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To a greater degree than Englehardt, Szasz more fully develops the notion that therapy
itself is a purely contractual endeavor, made and agreed upon by two autonomous
individuals.
In many of his writings (and as evidenced in the citations), Freud seemingly
wants to align the entire discipline of psychoanalysis, as well as its methods, with the
apparent neutrality of that of the natural sciences. Accordingly, the analyst would be
viewed by analogy as a surgeon and the methods of free association and dream
interpretation would be construed as neutrally employed.

In other words, the role of

the psychoanalyst would consist of the objective application of techniques. In this
way, psychoanalysts could be conceived as neutral practitioners of an objective
discipline or science.
Several criticisms lend themselves to the Szasz/Englehardt interpretation.
First, Although Freud speaks this way, it is questionable as to whether or not he truly
advocates this view. Clearly, the passages in section 2 and 3 -- where Freud talks
about the analyst's role as an educator, advisor, confessor, etc. -- seem to indicate that
he was anything but certain about the possibility of an objective practice of
psychoanalysis. Conflicting textual evidence alone warrants suspicion regarding the
neutrality of the psychoanalyst.
Second and more importantly, what these authors fail to address is that even if
one were to align psychoanalysis with the natural sciences, it is difficult to conceive of
an objective or "impartial" application of a technique in any discipline whatsoever.
Even if most commentators agreed that Freud's psychoanalysis was absolutely like the
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objective sciences, in light of the work of Thomas Kuhn, 14 objective science itself is
replete with values. In other words, natural science is just one paradigm, or one way
of choosing to portray the world amongst many. By default, those who choose to
practice within one paradigm as opposed to another are themselves making a valueladen decision. 15
By way of combining the first and second points, one might note that the
methods of psychoanalysis 16 may, in and of themselves be considered "neutral," that is,
by definition or in an abstract, conceptual form. However, the methods when
practiced -- involving an individual's application of theory -- opens up the door to
normativity in psychoanalysis. Contemporary philosophy of language supports this
view. Recognition of the personal and unconscious aspects of language reveals that
the methods of psychoanalysis have an inescapable value-laden dimension. 17
Thirdly, and more specific to a refutation of the views of Szasz and Englehardt,
both believe that psychoanalysts only encourage one value in the course of therapy,
namely "autonomy."
14

As a result, if the client adopts any other value at the end of

Kuhn, Function of Dogma, 368-371.

15

Support for this view also comes from within the psychoanalytic community
For an example, see: Howard B. Levine. ''The Analyst's Participation in the Analytic
Process," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol. 75, (1994): 665-676. See in
particular p. 667: whether or not a value-free psychoanalysis is possible or even
desirable is widely debated in the psychoanalytic community.
16

The reader should note that when I refer to the methods of psychoanalysis, I
primarily refer to the methods of free association and dream interpretation.
17

Ferdinand Saussure. Course in General Linguistics (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1959). See also: Jacques Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan.
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977).
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therapy, they claim that the client alone bears responsibility for this decision.
However, passages in the Freudian corpus directly undermine this view. Freud was
aware that at the outset and during treatment, client's are not fully autonomous agents
and consequently, are not fully responsible for their choices.

At the very least, Freud

himself would appear to acknowledge that clients are "susceptible" to an analyst's
suggestion of values. For instance, one might consider the following passage in An
Outline of Psychoanalysis:

The method by which we strengthen the weakened ego
(emphasis added) has as a starting point an extending of
its self-knowledge. That is not, of course, the whole
story but it is a first step. The loss of such knowledge
signifies for the ego a surrender of power and
influence;(emphasis added) it is the first tangible sign that
it is being hemmed in and hampered by the demands of
the id and the super-ego. Accordingly, the first part of the
help we have to offer is intellectual work on our side and
encouragement to the patient to collaborate in it. 18
If autonomy is compromised to begin with, as Freud says it is, this is sufficient to

raise a serious question as to whether or not the analysand is capable of discriminating
effectively between the those interpretations that are truly his and those that are
suggested by his analyst, both during and at the end of treatment. This point could
even lead one to the paradoxical conclusion that the supposed "objective practice of
psychoanalysis may be highly suggestive of values to the client in the course of
treatment. 19

18

19

Freud, SE 23: 177.

Ernest Wallwork. Psychoanalysis and Ethics (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1991), 210.
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Finally, construing the role of the psychoanalyst as neutral ignores Freud's
understanding of the inherent asymmetrical relationship between analyst and analysand.
A cursory consideration of Freud's text, On Beginning the Treatment, is sufficient to
say that he was well aware of this imbalance of power. In that text, Freud was careful
to privilege psychoanalysts with a special fund of knowledge, certain professional
norms etc. In short, he expounded upon the moral obligations that are required in the
professional practice of psychoanalysis. 20

The norms listed in this text transcend an

understanding of the therapeutic relationship as one agreed to by two, autonomous
agents. In direct opposition to Englehardt's and Sz.asz's view, Freud seems to suggest
that the psychoanalyst is, in a very real sense, a moral agent of some sort.
In conclusion, and as I have tried to argue, both external to and internal to the
Freudian corpus, the views expressed by Englehardt and Sz.asz may be rendered
seriously questionable in light of the above considerations. If this is the case, then
while the methods of psychoanalysis may be neutral, the practice of psychoanalysis is
not.

°For an example, see Freud, SE 12: 134. There, Freud says that
psychoanalysts may wish to sit out of the sight of the patient during analysis. Not
only for practical purposes is this recommended (i.e. the fact that it is tiring to look at
persons for eight hours a day and that it enables the client to free-~ociate and thus
engage in the method of psychoanalysis); but also, this recommendation, I would
argue has a moral dimension to it as well. He says: "I insist on this procedure,
however, for its purpose and result are to prevent the transference from mingling with
the patient's own imperceptibly, to isolate the transference and to allow it to come
forward in due course sharply defined as resistance." Arguably, the moral dimension
of this "practical" prescription is to enable the analyst to avoid imposing his own
suggestions/interpretations on to the analysand. See also: SE 12: 139-141 for a similar
example in which Freud encourages therapists to avoid early interpretation.
2
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View 2: The psychoanalyst as engaged in a hermeneutic task
Midway between these extremes one finds the literature by the
hermeneuticians. Psychoanalytic truth, as argued by Ricouer and Gadamer, lies in the
interpretative process or the movement of the dialogue within the analytic encounter
between the analyst and analysand. 21 Such an account admits of a general description
of the therapeutic endeavor as an encounter which is inherently subjective, or better
stated inter-subjective, and dependent upon the two individuals involved in the
dialectical exchange. 22
There is one major assumption underlying the hermeneutic view of
psychoanalysis, namely, the aim to obliterate the subject/object distinction within the
therapeutic relationship. Because of this it follows that the therapeutic relationship is
portrayed by an overarching "intersubjectivity" between the analyst and the analysand.
As one can see, for either party to claim neutrality in terms of knowledge or values is
a mute point. Goldberg succinctly explains the role of the psychoanalyst on this view:
In contrast to Rubovitz-Seitz and Hirsch is the claim of
Hans Georg Gadamer (1965), who states that a fusion of
horizons between interpreter and interpreted, or between
one person trying to understand another, necessarily and
inevitably changes both. Thus, interpretation is not the

21

H.G. Gadamer, "The Historicity of Understanding," in The Hermeneutics
Reader, K. Mueller-Vollmer, ed., (New York; Continuum, 1989). See also: Paul
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). For similar
views advanced in the psychoanalytic community, see: O.H.D. Blomfield, "The
Essentials of Psychoanalysis," Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry,
vol. 27, (1993): 86-100.
22

See A. Goldberg's, "Farewell to the Objective Analyst," International Journal
of Psychoanalysis, vol. 75, (February, 1994): 21-30.
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study of a static or fixed object, but a process of
participation: the creation of a shared meaning. 23
Given the aforementioned passages from the Freudian corpus, there does seem to be
evidence that he saw the truth of analysis as a mutual product -- involving as it does
dual participation and interaction between the analyst and analysand in the sharing and
creation of meanings. However, and in spite of this, two objections based on the
Freudian corpus itself, seem seriously to undermine the strength of the hermeneutic
view. They are: 1) the hermeneutic view seems to rest upon a confusion between the
method and the role of the psychoanalyst in the therapeutic situation; and most
importantly 2) I believe that if a psychoanalyst were to adopt the hermeneutic
approach to treatment, he could not actually be consistent with the nature of the
methods of psychoanalysis.
With respect to the first issue, when Freud speaks about what the analyst learns
in the clinical encounter, typically it is to indicate what he learns about the theory of
psychoanalysis in general. 24 Hence, when Freud speaks in general about the
importance of practicing psychoanalysis -- the importance of looking to and learning
from the clinical case -- it is really not due to the fact that the actual interaction
between analyst and analysand will together yield new data which are of significant
interest to the analyst; but rather, the data coming from the analysand will reveal to the

23

24

Ibid., 24.

For an excellent example, see the opening pages of Freud's On Narcissism,
SE 14: 73-75. There, one will find Freud addressing how individual clinical
encounters aided in the development of his theory on narcissism.
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analyst new truths or ideas about the theory upon which the technique of
psychoanalysis rests. 25
Even in its most suggestive form, when Freud does speak as if the truth of
psychoanalysis is intersubjectively constituted, one must always remember that for him
the relationship between analyst and analysand is asymmetrical. Hence the truth that is
established in this sort of relationship is biased, for it is the analyst's knowledge that is
privileged above and beyond all. I believe that this underlying vantage point or onesided perspective affects the actual degree to which a true bi-partisan notion of shared
meaning can result. For example, in numerous texts Freud cautions the analyst not to
impart knowledge (that he possesses) too quickly to the analysand who has yet to
discover this knowledge on his own. 26 Such passages are key to discerning the
different and more extensive knowledge that the analyst possesses in contrast to the
analysand. Inter-subjective truths may ultimately constitute some of the knowledge
that is achieved at the end or as the goal of analysis. However, knowledge as a
mutual product is not the sole kind of knowledge to be considered in analysis. This

25

One might consider any one of Freud's process notes of his clinical
encounters in order see the force of this point. For example, consider his notes on the
Rat Man, SE 10: 318. Typically, Freud will cite the specific facts of the case; but
these tend to be immediately followed by another statement which indicates how this
specific material corroborates or challenges established theory. Here is but one of
many examples: "There was suppressed anger against his friend Springer, whose
authority thus originates from this, and against another man who betrayed him and
whom, in return, he had later helped at the cost of sacrifices. Thus we fmd everincreasing suppression of the instinct of anger, accompanied by a return of the
erotogenic instinct for dirt."
26

Ibid., SE 12: 134, 139-141.

30

being the case, what hermeneuticians fail to recognize is that it is possible through
suggestive questions/interpretations that the prior knowledge of the analyst actually
configures what is to be learned in analysis to a greater extent than what the
analysand contributes.
In a slightly different vein, what I think the hermeneuticians have a tendency to
overlook, and frankly what Freud did not, is that characterizing the knowledge gained
in analysis as a mutual product actually undermines the expertise of the psychoanalyst.
Granted that to some degree, the analyst and analysand inevitably work together in the
creation of meanings; however, the shared meaning which accrues in the end, will be
radically different for each of the parties, both in degree and content. To fully realize
this point, hermeneuticians need only consider what kind of knowledge would result if
one considered treatment of a psychotic and a neurotic. 27 Presumably, the more severe
the mental illness of the client, the less the client can meaningfu,lly contribute to and
even be said to understand the "shared truth" derived from analysis. The two
participants in the analytic situation are of an unequal status.

View 3: The psychoanalyst as suggesting personal values
In contrast to this extremist position, other scholars have maintained that the
perspective of reality and the concomitant values assumed are of a highly personal
27

See SE 14: 74. There, Freud reminds us that psychoanalysis is incapable of
treating the paraphrenic because he has so "loosened his connections with external
reality -- people and things." Because of this, Freud says: "In consequence of the
latter change, they become inaccessible to the influence of psychoanalysis and cannot
be cured by our efforts."
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nature. Such a position has been advocated by Lakin, 28 Brace, 29 Bergin. 30

This view

mitigates the possibility of an intradisciplinary agreement as to the view of reality
employed by therapists and the values they rely upon. Overall, it implies that all
patients are affected by the worldviews and normative notions of the individual
therapist. Not surprisingly, such a thesis lends itself to these authors' superimposition
of ethical justifications and/or a hierarchical ordering of the values that therapists
should make use of within therapy. Typically, antiquated philosophical and religious

ideologies have been appealed to for such an ordering of values.
In many passages, Freud warns psychoanalysts to avoid making use of or
advancing personal values in the analytic session. A technique recommended by
which to overcome this tendency to rely on personal values was for the psychoanalyst
to undergo his own analysis. If this could not entirely eliminate the transmission or
suggestion of personal values, at the very least it could a) make the analyst self-aware
of the values that he holds and by doing so, b) diminish the possibility or degree of

28

Martin Lakin. Ethical Issues in the Psychotherapies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988).
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Kerry Brace, "Nonrelativist Ethical Standards for Goal Setting in
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their transmission to the patient.
Contemporary scholars typically have a mixed reaction to Freud's desire for
objectivity on this point. Many claim that psychotherapists invariably rely on personal
values, for better or for worse. Others, attempting to move beyond this view,
encourage psychoanalysts to be consciously aware as to the selection of the kinds of
values they advance to their patients. Attempts have been made to hierarchically order
these values in terms of their importance and universality and to argue for their
relevance in the clinical encounter. As mentioned earlier, these values often have as
their justification arguments extrinsic to psychoanalysis itself (i.e. in major ethical or
religious theory, etc.)
In agreement with these individuals, and again aligning myself with Kuhn, it
seems probable that some of the analyst's personal values are transmitted to the patient
within therapy -- whether consciously or unconsciously. In some sense, then, efforts
made by these commentators to acknowledge these values and provide a justification
for them does seem laudable. However, my contention with such efforts is simply that
personal values are not -- indeed, can not be -- the only values with which analysts
must be concerned.

As I will argue later in this chapter, not only are personal values

a concern; but what should take precedence is those values which are implicit in the
paradigm of psychoanalysis itself.
Ironically, these author's attempts to identify values are in my view, both too
limited and too broad. For example, Bergin claims that the value of "respect for
persons" advanced in therapy is justified in light of Kant's moral philosophy. In order
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to determine if indeed the principle of "respect for persons" is advocated in any form
of therapy and in order to determine what its justification is, I would claim that one
should rather look to the paradigm in which this principle may be said to play a role.
In other words, Freud (while developing his account of psychoanalysis) might have
advocated a respect for persons within the therapeutic situation, but the justification
more properly may be said to follow from claims internal to the theory of
psychoanalysis itself. In this respect, then, when commentators appeal to traditions
external to the school of thought, they have a tendency unduly to broaden the range of
justifying the presence of these values. On the other hand, by choosing to overlook
justifications for values internal to the theory of which they are a part, these
commentators run the risk of failing to identify other values operative in the practice
of psychoanalysis.

2)

Transition

Having seen what is problematic or incomplete about contemporary accounts of
normative notions assumed by the psychoanalyst, in this section I wish to tum to a
consideration of Freud's later, sociological works in order to see what the appropriate
"starting point" for a consideration of values might be in psychoanalysis.

First, we

will tum our attention to unpacking the varied meanings of "reality" in the Freudian
corpus. Categorizing his use of the term is foundational to understanding what kind
of knowledge of reality is assumed as the starting point for the practice of
psychoanalysis. Having established this, we will then consider Freud's broader
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understanding of society as explained in his works, Civilization and Its Discontents and
The Future of an Illusion. By doing this, I will attempt to glean out important

"descriptive" aspects of how individuals function in society and why this is the case
according to Freud. The descriptive project then will be shown to carry normative
force in the sense that the external world embodies values that are reflective of an
individual's instinctual nature. In attempting to fulfill our pleasure-seeking nature,
society thwarts these natural desires and drives. 31 If we assume that the therapist
possesses knowledge of this kind of reality and this concomitant theory of human
nature, then we can presume that this vision provides the backdrop against which the
analysand is treated. Given this thesis and the enormity of the Freudian corpus, let me
begin with a brief justification for the texts that I will use.

3: Stipulation of texts
Although often cited as speculative works on the origin of society, I have
chosen to look at Civilization and Its Discontents and The Future of an Illusion for
several reasons: 1) they were written toward the end of Freud's life when his interests
turned to more philosophical speculations and he was able to reflect, in a broader
sense, on the contribution of his psychoanalytic theory to other disciplines, and 2) I
think they illustrate quite nicely his hopes for the future.

31

Much has been made about Freud's understanding of the term "instincts." In
this chapter, I refer to instincts as basic human drives. For an excellent analysis of the
role of instincts and morality, see Donald C. Abel. Freud on Instinct and Morality
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1989).
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4: The many meanings of "reality
Assessing Freud's distinctions of external and internal reality from a philosophical
perspective is in some sense unjust. Freud never aimed to do philosophy per se; but
rather, his psychoanalysis grew out of his observations of clinical cases.

Nonetheless,

throughout his theoretical works and possibly within his psychoanalytic practice, Freud
relied upon decidedly philosophical concepts, notably his notions of external and
internal reality. In order to determine how Freud understood these concepts, I suggest
it is useful to look at them from the point of view of the history of philosophy that he
inherited. Again, though not a philosopher himself, Freud was well aware of the
western philosophical tradition. 32
Ever since philosophy took the reflexive tum with Descartes, philosophers have
been concerned with the existence of objective reality. While Descartes moved from a
position of radical skepticism to having "proven" the existence of being, his knowledge
of the existence of external reality was based on specious proofs for the existence of
God. For it was only in his having shown that God exists and lacks a deceiving nature
which enabled him to trust the clarity and distinctness of his perceptions -- one of
which was that objective reality exists and has a certain definable nature. The
Cartesian wave of optimism did not last long. Soon thereafter, David Hume seemed to
have shown definitively that the nature of our mind is such that it can never know the
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For an excellent summary of how Freud was influenced by the western
philosophical tradition, see: Lewis A. Kirshner, "Concepts of Reality and Psychic
Reality in Psychoanalysis as Illustrated by the Disagreement Between Freud and
Ferenczi," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, vol. 74, (1993): 219-230.
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natural world, let alone demonstrate the existence, of external reality. It was left to
Immanuel Kant to resolve the apparently contradictory positions of these two
philosophers. This he accomplished by drawing the distinction between phenomenal
and noumenal reality.
Kant's own stance as to the nature of noumena was rather obscure: noumena
are inherently unknowable, yet, persons must presume the existence of things-inthemselves because phenomenal reality has to be caused by something from without.
However, phenomenal reality, was ultimately the only thing that persons could be said
to know.
I took the liberty of this brief excursion into modem philosophy to point out the
tradition that Freud inherited and with which he was apparently familiar. Although
Freud sometimes slips into talking like a realist (in the sense that there is an objective
reality that is knowable in itself), there are enough passages to suggest that Freud
really aligned himself with the Kantian tradition. Consider for example the following
passage in The Future of an Illusion. When extolling the virtues of science, Freud
claims ...
Finally an attempt has been made to discredit scientific
endeavor in a radical way, on the ground that, being
bound to the conditions of our own organization, it can
yield nothing else than subjective results, whilst the real
nature of things outside ourselves remains inaccessible.
But this is to disregard several factors ... (namely), that the
task of science is fully covered if we limit it to showing
how the world must appear to us in consequence of the
particular character of our organization.... and, the
problem of the nature of the world without regard to our
percipient mental apparatus is an empty abstraction,
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devoid of practical interest. 33
I suspect it is safe to say that given Freud's optimism for natural science, he may have
been inconsistent with his language and sometimes fell into the trap of talking like a
realist; yet, overall, as the above passage indicates, I think Freud truly believed in the
Kantian resolution to the problem of human knowledge of reality. Noumena are
inherently unknowable; all that persons can be said to know is a subjective experience
of reality.
Interestingly, there is yet another basis of comparison between Freud and Kant.
Kant certainly wanted to avoid the conclusion that our mental life is radically
subjective. Rather, given the structure of the human mind and the faculties for
knowing, the data of phenomenal experience are necessarily structured accordingly.
Kant's categories allow, then, for a high degree of similarity between human ways of
knowing. Persons structure experience in regular ways, namely, by means of cause and
effect, temporality, etc.
I believe that Freud roughly had the same idea as Kant's in mind. In other
words, though he did not advocate the same transcendental structures of the mind that
Kant did, by positing a theory of human nature of basic and fundamental instinctual
drives, stages of development, etc. Freud believed that phenomenal experience was not
something radically subjective. By and large, for him, there is a horizon of experience
that tends to get structured by individuals in certain concrete, predictable ways.
In some sense, although there is good evidence as I have tried to show between
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Kant's bifurcated sense of reality and Freud's adoption of this and their view that the
mind somehow structures phenomenal reality, these points are rather peripheral to the
thesis that I wish to develop in this chapter. The main point to note, though, and what
will be helpful for this chapter is that in most cases where Freud refers to external
reality it is best to interpret him as referring to phenomenally shared reality. As
external reality tends to be used in his later works, namely in Civilization and Its
Discontents and The Future of an Illusion, external reality refers to this intersubjective

vision of the world or of society --- replete with its institutions, political forms, other
persons, etc. It is this vision of a phenomenally shared reality that is charged with
normativity in my view. This should not be surprising, given Freud's adherence to the
Kantian tradition in which the knower is said to contribute to the object known. For
Freud, and as I will argue in this chapter, because of our human nature, persons infuse
their perception of reality with the twin values of pain and misery. 34
At this point, someone might object and claim that in the above account I have
confused Freud's notions of internal (psychic) reality and external reality
(phenomenally shared understanding of reality). Some might claim that individual
psychic reality (private reality) already implicitly contains a sense of "external reality."
Such a criticism is not entirely unjust.
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Although there is debate about what Freud

As a note to the reader, I chose to use the terms "pain and misery," because
Freud himself often uses these words in Civilization and its Discontents. At ,times, he
replaces them with the term "suffering." For the purposes of this chapter, I simply
intend to show that our perception of the world is colored for Freud, with "negativity."
This alone is what "pain is misery" is intended to refer to.

39
actually understood by psychic reality, 35 in general most scholars agree that there are
two broad ways of construing this term. They are: 1) psychic reality as an individual's
private subjective experiences; and 2) psychic reality as consisting of the unique
aspects of our internal mental structures of the unconscious-preconscious-conscious
system. 36
So as to avoid the above criticism and with an attempt to be clear and
consistent with Freud's usages of the term, "reality," I believe that there are at least
four different meanings he assigns to this term. They are: 1) objective reality (things
in themselves); 2) phenomenally shared vision of reality or external reality as intersubjectively understood; 3) an individual's own inner psychic reality (private reality)
inclusive of unconscious data that will become known in the course of the analysis;
and 4) the general structures of the mind. 37 With these categorizations in place, let us
now turn to the thesis of this chapter.

5: The nature of phenomenally shared reality

In some sense, if this section were simply intended to be a brief overview of the
35

See for example: Modell, A., "A Confusion of Tongues or Whose Reality is
It?" Psychoanalytic Quarterly, vol. 60, (1991): 227-44.
36

For an excellent overview of Freud's notions of reality, see Robert Michels.
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the American Psychoanalytic Association, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic
Association, vol. 33, no. 3, (1983): 515-19.
37

Specific passages in the Freudian corpus which seem to support this
categorization are: SE 21: 66-68 (for definitions 1, 2 and 4); SE 23: 76-8 (for
definitions 1, 3 and 4); SE 23: 201 (for definitions 1, 2, and 4).

40

general patterns in which individuals relate to each other and/or their modes of actions
within broader society, we would be retracing familiar ground. Yet, if there is one
theme that will be my Archimedean point in this section, it is the recurrent references
that Freud makes to our "life" or our vision of the environment (definition 2, above) as
permeated with pain and misery. Perceiving reality in this way as charged with
normativity, is caused by persons' inner psychic reality (definition 4, above). In other
words, a person's phenomenal reality and actual structures of the mind are in a
dialectical relationship. 38 Persons perceive external reality as imbued with pain and
misery in virtue of, even in spite of, their natural and internal psychic structure.
Interestingly, I believe that this thesis has an important implication for what the world
is in-itself (definition 1). For Freud, social institutions that exist over and against
individuals (i.e. private property) come to be as they are because of this operative
dialectic.
In order to develop this view and to show how it relates to the broader thesis of
this chapter, two tasks need to be accomplished. First, it is important to "reconstruct,"
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For examples which indicate what this dialectic might look like in other
contexts, consider SE 6: 257-9: "In point of fact, I believe that a large part of the
mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into most modem religions,
is nothing but psychology projected into the external world. The obscure recognition
(the endopsychic perception, as it were) of psychichal factors and relations is mirrored
in the construction of a supernatural reality, which is destined to be changed back one
more by science into the psychology of the unconscious." See also SE 14: 136: "For
the pleasure ego, the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable which it
has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated
off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile.
After this new arrangement, the two polarities coincide once more: the ego-subject
coincides with pleasure, and the external world with unpleasure ... "
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if you will, Freud's vision of this phenomenally shared reality or description of
civilization so as to describe wherein this pain and suffering exist in society. This is a
central task, because as we know, it is the knowledge of this "environment" itself
which serves as the starting point for psychoanalysts. Having accomplished this, we
can then move to the second part of this chapter, namely demonstrating how this
vision of external reality may be said to enter into the therapeutic encounter because it
is already assumed on the part of the therapist. Presumably, having been trained in the
theory of psychoanalysis and adopting this vision of external reality as their starting
point, psychoanalysts may subtly and legitimately, according to Freud, to be fostering
these values in the course of treatment and as an implied goal of therapy.
When turning to Freud's account of the environment in Civilization and Its
Discontents, one might wonder how it is possible to "see normativity" in a very

incomplete account of society. In spite of its incompleteness, one does receive a rather
good impression of the general modes or patterns of civilization's operations,
predictions of its future development and types of observable human behaviors. In
what follows, we shall examine three different societal institutions that Freud describes
rather thoroughly in order to explain his general "sense" of external reality. By
exploring these institutions, one will come to see that for Freud, this reality is
perceived by humans as replete with pain and misery. These latter values are
inescapable elements of human reality. I believe this is caused by the dialectic that I
referred to earlier: human nature has created reality to be this way and is, at some
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point in time, destined to be frustrated within it. 39 In the end, what will emerge and
be important within the confines of psychoanalysis is that life has the "feel" of a
perpetual struggle due to the demands of our instinctual nature. A stoic resolve is
encouraged for persons in order to effectively cope with life in their society.

Early on in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud takes up the question: what
is the purpose of human life? Clearly, he claims, religion falsely professes that it
knows the purpose of life; yet, Freud retorts "...the question of the purpose of human
life has been raised countless times; it has never yet received a satisfactory answer and
perhaps does not admit of one. "40 Nevertheless, he proceeds by raising an admittedly
more modest but similar question:
We will therefore turn to the less ambitious question
of what men themselves show by their behavior to be
the purpose and intention of their lives. What do they
demand of life and wish (emphasis added) to achieve
in it. The answer to this can hardly be in doubt. They
strive (emphasis added) after happiness. 41
In the following pages, Freud continues by assessing the unique paths or patterns of
behavior that individuals choose in order to find happiness. Among the many different
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how persons are said to "realize" or even "experience" this pain and misery. Rather,
my thesis is restricted solely to the fact that invariably persons will "see" reality as
imbued with negativity. However, the reader might like to know that in the
forthcoming discussion of the intellectual and the artist, I do believe one can be
somewhat specific about when those persons will truly "experience" reality in this
way.
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paths that individuals may wish to pursue are the following:
The path of quietude, science, intoxication, yoga/the
mystical life, controlling one's instincts, the intellectual,
the artist (retreat into illusion), the hermit, establishing
love as the center of one's life, contemplation of beauty. 42
While Freud does not claim to have provided the reader with an exhaustive list
of the paths to happiness, historically and at the time he was writing, Freud saw these
ten paths to happiness as the most common routes that persons follow.

While to

some extent this claim rests upon empirical observation for Freud, the ultimate
justification for persons' pursuit of happiness is derived from a previously inferred
principle of the mind, notably the pleasure principle. 43 Operating within each of our
minds, Freud says:
What decides the program of life is the pleasure principle.
This principle dominates mental life from the start. There
can be no doubt about its efficacy and yet its program is
at loggerheads with the whole world, with the microcosm
as much as with the macrocosm. There is no possibility
at all of its being carried through... 44
By identifying the ten paths to happiness and the inner, psychical principle that Freud
claims lies behind this, through their conduct persons evidence a pursuit of happiness

42

Ibid., 21: 78-83.

43

For the purposes of this chapter, it is not imperative that I be very clear
about what Freud means by happiness. Nor do I wish to engage in the debate as to
whether or not Freud thought persons are naturally hedonistic or egoistic. For an
excellent analysis and overview of scholarly interpretations on these issues, see
Wallwork, Psychoanalysis and Ethics, Ch. 5: Overview of Psychological Egoism and
Ch. 6: The Pleasure Principle and Psychological Hedonism.
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as a main goal of life. 45 It is important for the reader to note that by acknowledging
this point, one-half, so to speak, of the dialectic has been established. In other words,
in virtue of the structure of our mind, all persons seek happiness in this world. And
yet, Freud goes on to say ...
It is no wonder if, under the pressure of these possibilities
of suffering, men are accustomed to moderate their claims
to happiness -- just as the pleasure principle itself, indeed
under the influence of the external world, changed into
the more modest reality principle -- if a man thinks
himself happy merely to have escaped unhappiness or to
have survived his suffering, and if in general the task of
avoiding suffering pushes that of obtaining pleasure into
the background. 46
Admittedly, this quotation strikes one as odd when compared to Freud's previous
construal of the pursuit of happiness. In the previous quotation, one has the
impression that happiness is to be understood as the obtaining of positive satisfactions
and not merely, as is here·the case, the avoidance of suffering. The oddity of these
two claims seems to hinge upon the respective roles and importance assigned to the
pleasure and reality principles. On the one hand, it is the pleasure principle which has
established (indeed, phylogenetically, historically and experientially) pleasure or
happiness as the goal of our conduct in the external world; and yet, it is the reality
principle, under the influence of the external world, which appears to limit or alters its
fulfillment.
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By saying that happiness is a main goal of life, I do not mean to imply that
this is the only goal of life for Freud. Other ends, may be sought as well. St?e
Wallwork, Psychoanalysis and Ethics, Ch. 5 ..
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The point may cause some concern to the reader. My point is that for Freud
persons invariably come to see reality in terms of pain and misery. If, under the
influence of the reality principle, persons are naturally accustomed to modify their
pursuit of positive satisfactions, then my thesis would no longer hold. In a very real
sense, then, my thesis can be maintained only if it is the case that the pleasure
principle can be granted a foundational and more important role than the reality
principle.
Ernest Wallwork, in his book, Psychoanalysis and Ethics, offers a concise and
useful way of categorizing the evolution and multiple meanings of Freud's pleasure
principle. The categorizations offer a useful schema for resolving the above dilemma.
When exploring the plausibility of viewing Freud's ethical theory as a version of
psychological hedonism, he says:
However, those who take this position seldom probe very
deeply the multiple ways in which Freud uses the concept
of the pleasure principle: first, as the regulatory principle
of the primary process of the unconscious entire mental
apparatus; second, as the regulatory principle of the
primary process of the unconscious or id, where it is
defined in part by contradistinction to the reality
principle; and third, as the ultimate goal served by the
reality principle's regulation of the of the ego's secondary
processes. 47
Ultimately, Wallwork identifies these distinctions in order to debunk the popular
portrayal of Freud as advocating psychological hedonism. Rather, Wallwork argues
that Freud does believe that persons can "find satisfaction in the pursuit of non-egoistic

47

Wallwork, Psychoanalysis and Ethics, 108.

46

goals. "48

This thesis is made plausible by arguing that the reality principle usurps the

role of the pleasure principle in the mature adult. In this way, individuals are said to
endure immediate displeasure for some longer term pleasures.
This brief digression of Wallwork's thesis will enable the reader to see more
clearly my interpretation of the role of the pleasure and reality principle as explained
in Civilization and Its Discontents. In this text, Freud is clear regarding the importance
and foundational role accorded to the pleasure principle in determining our wishes or
striving for pleasure. These brute "desires" are never tempered or defeated by the
replacement of the reality principle. Instead, Freud is saying that persons are
biologically determined always to wish for, strive after or simply want positive
pleasures. Before turning to the passage in Civilization and Its Discontents which
suggests this view, support for my interpretation also comes from Lewis K.irshner's
analysis of this topic. He says:
In fact, the concept of the reality principle has nothing to
do with objective reality, but refers simply to the ego's
capacity to determine whether a given mental content
derives from inner fantasy or rather, from an external
perception. Fantasy-making, Freud (1911) insisted,
remains a function of thought kept free from reality
testing and subordinated to the pleasure principle alone. 49
As Kirshner suggests, the reality principle need not be construed as usurping the role
of the pleasure principle. Even when the reality principle is in place, at least in
fantasy, persons may still be said to desire positive satisfactions. Furthermore, there is
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strong evidence that this is how Freud wants to construe the role of the pleasure
principle in Civilization and Its Discontents.

Comparing the role of the principles of

the mind to the excavation of archaeological ruins, Freud there says:
This brings us to the more general problem of
preservation in the sphere of the mind. ... in mental life
nothing which has once been formed can perish -- that
everything is somehow, preserved and that in suitable
circumstances (when, for instance, regression goes back
far enough} it can once more be brought to light... Now
let us, by a flight of the imagination, suppose that Rome
is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a
similarly long and copious past -- an entity, that is to say,
in which nothing that has once come into existence will
have passed away and all the earlier phases of development
continue to exist alongside the latest one... ... The fact
remains that only in the mind is such a preservation of
all the earlier stages alongside of the final form possible,
and that we are not in a position to represent it in pictorial
terms. ... We can only hold fast to the fact that is rather
the rule than the exception for the past to be preserved in
mental life. 50
If one were to take this quote as one's starting point for interpretation, then, literally it

is because of our phylogenetic or historical heritage that the pleasure principle is seen
to persist alongside the reality principle. In addition, it is due to the fact that the
pleasure principle is more primitive and hence, foundational in our nature that it's
effects are not diminished and hence, still to some extent establish our search for
pleasure and positive satisfactions. I do not think that it is an arbitrary point that a
discussion of civilization (phenomenally shared reality) begins with this reminder that
the pleasure principle is temporally, phylogenetically, that which importantly underlies
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the reality principle.
Additional evidence for the precedence that Freud grants to the pleasure
principle, and by implication the fact that persons strive for positive satisfactions, can
be found in his descriptions of the lackluster achievement of happiness in each of the
ten character types. When Freud discusses the ten paths of happiness, irrespective of
which of the above paths persons pursue, at some point, he believes they all will
inevitably come to see their reality as imbued with pain and misery. Because of
human nature, the various paths persons choose to find happiness will always result in
their perception of reality as somehow mitigating the real satisfactions derived within
this world.
Consider for example, the interesting, even if extreme, example that the case of
the hermit provides for us. By a complete removal of himself from the external world
and relations with men, the hermit opens himself up to private delusion; in short,
Freud claims that the hermit becomes a "madman." 51 Ironically, one might think this
to be the best possible path to happiness since it is a complete turning away from the
two main sources of suffering, according to Freud. It is also important to note that in
his description of the hermit, Freud says nothing about this person's psyche not being
sufficiently regulated by the reality principle. Hence, even if we are to assume that
the hermit is in touch with the reality principle, Freud goes on to say that in this way,
the hermit becomes mad precisely because "reality is too strong for those who wish to
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advance private delusions of their own." 52 Presumably, Freud is referring here to this
phenomenally shared reality inclusive of our relations with others and the institutions
found in society. Ironically, the hermit's attempt to reduce suffering and/or find
satisfaction is destined to be met with suffering no matter which option he chooses:
private delusion, or entering back into relations with others which is itself a cause of
suffering. In either case, pain and misery permeate this life path.
Even when Freud explores other more "admiral paths to happiness," such as the
professional life of the artist or the intellectual, 53 the overall potential level of
dissatisfaction as a consequence of this life-style choice is highlighted. This is so
because the very attempt to defy sources of suffering by choosing this path to
happiness carries with it the paradoxical consequence that persons have actually
managed to open themselves up to more actual or potential sources of suffering. I
would even venture to say that the potential sources of suffering carry with them a
greater amount of potential harm than if these individuals had chosen not to pursue
these paths to happiness.
Evidence for the above claims comes from the following considerations: In the
case of the intellectual, in choosing to pursue higher pleasures (pleasures of the mind),
Freud claims that they actually run the risk of thereby loosening their "connection with
reality," i.e. relations with others, with the world. Such a psychical retreat, although
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Again, I think it is important point to note that these individuals also may
have passed on to acceptance of the reality principle.

50
offering pleasures to the few who could obtain them, says Freud, actually carries with
it the unpalatable consequence that intellectuals "create no impenetrable armor against
the arrows of misfortune" and as such, this lifestyle "habitually fails when the source
of suffering is a person's own body." In the end, when speaking of all the advances
of science, Freud concludes that "man is not happy in his God-Like character." 54
In the case of the artist the situation is predominantly the same and even proceeds
to a greater degree. Like the intellectual, the artist further loosens his connection with
reality and enters into the realm of illusion. 55 Indeed, entering into illusion is the
"intrinsic aim of art." The artist, like the intellectual, will come to see reality in terms
of pain and misery when his/her physical nature suffers. 56
At this point, it should be acknowledged that the only possible exception to these
"paths of happiness" (which as I have tried to argue must inevitably lead to an
acceptance of pain and misery), is the path of the scientist. It is the path that indeed
Freud himself had chosen to follow. The scientist, according to Freud, "works with all
for the good of all." In Civilization and Its Discontents there is scarcely a mention
that this life-style could lead to pain and misery.

Yet, even so, Freud says that
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It is safe to say that inevitably, the artist or the intellectual will come to see
reality this way when one considers that as physical beings we are prone to illness and
will all someday die. Even if an artist or intellectual is extraordinarily healthy and
will have the good fortune of a swift death, surely the mere contemplation of possible
physical ailments is sufficient for this kind of person to come to see reality as imbued
with pain and misery.
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science is a "powerful deflection" which causes us to make light of our misery. 57
In the end, Freud's paths to pleasure are a double-edged sword. In our search for
the path to follow, and in our attempt to follow it for an attainable purpose, we are
consistently led to the conclusion that. ..
Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too
many pains, disappointments and impossible tasks. In
order to bear it, we can not dispense with palliative
measures. We can not do without auxiliary constructions.
We cannot do without powerful deflections, which cause
us to make light of our suffering; substitutive satisfactions,
which diminish it and intoxicating substances, which make
us insensitive to it. 58
Some scholars might wish to object to this argument and claim that an
individual's substitutive satisfactions counteract the experience of pain and misery.
However, one should remember that, for Freud, substitutive satisfactions only diminish
an already, existent, pain and misery. As I have tried to demonstrate, by citing
Freud's own remarks, in pursuing any one of these paths of life, even though they may
afford substitutive satisfactions, are invariably accompanied by pain and misery.

6: Summary and transition to private propertv
In the above section, I have tried to argue that at least in one aspect of his
account of society, namely, the overall aim to which all human activity is directed
(happiness), persons are bound to be greeted with the inescapable elements of pain and
misery. It is because of this fact that disappointment seems invariably to accompany
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most observed paths to happiness. Like Phillip Reiff, I do believe that Freud, using
the "normal environment" as his starting point for psychoanalysis, would strongly
encourage persons to adopt a rather stoic stance toward life in this world. 59
Someone might wish to object to my above interpretation by arguing that
naturally my thesis would hold if one compares this world to some perfect, possible
world In other words, some might say that I am naively assuming a kind of perfect

world as a backdrop against which to judge Freud's theories. Given such a perfect
world as an assumption, then of course it would follow that by comparison to this
world, persons must come to see reality as imbued with pain and misery. They might

add that even most hedonists would admit that persons will experience some kind of
pain and misery in this world.
Such an objection would have some merit. However, let me respond to this
possible charge as follows. Individuals who would react to my thesis would have a
stronger argument in refuting my thesis and even be more consistent if they talked
about Freud himself as having appealed to a perfect criterion against which to judge
human pursuits in this world. For Freud, this "perfect" criterion60 lies within our
actual human nature. It is the pleasure principle. In other words, viewing reality as
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imbued with pain and misery is inevitable because of the primacy that Freud himself
grants to the pleasure principle in configuring what persons wish for, strive for, etc.
Of course, because it is phylogenetically the oldest, the pleasure principle is actually
the standard according to which Freud himself judges the successful attainment of
one's pursuit of happiness. It is the pleasure principle that in primitive times,
throughout history and today has set the agenda for individual behavior. 61
In sum, critics of my thesis would do better to attack Freud himself on this
point. For, far from presupposing a perfect possible world against which to judge
individual's perceptions of this world, Freud himself suggests that the criterion against
which to make such judgements lies within human nature itself. In this way, the pain
and misery of phenomenally shared reality would be judged to be so given our
species-determined, constitutional nature and not something extrinsic to it.
But a second and more devastating objection could be levelled at the thesis of
this chapter. Perhaps some readers might be willing to accept that persons pursue
positive satisfactions and yet, their pursuits are inevitably thwarted in reality.
Nonetheless, we are left trying to reconcile this with the following claim: "Integration
in a human community is necessary before the aim of happiness can be achieved."
With this comment, Freud seems to be saying that "relations with men," previously
characterized as a main source of suffering, are a prerequisite to the attainment of
happiness. This, indeed, is a forceful objection and one that demands a response.
In order to formulate an adequate response, I suggest that at this point we need
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to shift our perspective from that of the individual (or, individual psychic reality) to
the perspective of "reality itself' (or the nature of civilization itself). In this way, we
can begin to examine one important way in which persons actually do become
"integrated in a human community." Fortunately, what was true in Freud's day holds
true of our present society: namely, under capitalism, private property is a societal
institution around which persons form communities. By shifting our perspective to
Freud's account as to why private property is a social institution, I believe that my
thesis will still hold; namely, society as it is structured, with this institution of private
property, further frustrates one's pursuit of pleasure. But more than this, private
property reflects back to the individual a principle which is operative in his/her nature,
namely the aggressive instinct. Because persons are integrated into community in this
way, this still affords for the general perception of reality as imbued with pain and
misery.

7: Private property
To begin the development of this second point, and thereby more fully completing the
dialectic referred to earlier, let me begin by suggesting that perhaps one reason why
external reality comes to be perceived in negative terms has to do with the role of the
aggressive instinct. I believe that Freud strongly insinuates in Civilization and Its
Discontents that it is the aggressive instinct which supersedes the erotic impulse in the

formation of communities.
Although in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud does not develop at length
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an account about relations with others (i.e. business relations, professional, etc.), there
are enough passages to suggest that the further persons are removed from the family
(i.e. acquaintances, strangers, etc.) and in the event that they are not functioning as our
"sexual objects," other human beings function only as objects of our hostility or
aggression. 62 Outside of these general descriptions, Freud does not say much more
about human modes of relating.
However, in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud puts forth a polemic against
communism, and in opposition defends the institution of private property. Several
questions leap to mind: Why? Why this seeming digression into a socio-political
question? Did Freud merely see communism as a threat and if so why?
As Freud himself notes in his later works, the inner tendency toward aggression
was something that he reluctantly had to accept as part of his theory of instincts. With
the continued manifestations of sadism, masochism and war-time trauma and neuroses
in clinical encounters, Freud became aware of this inner tendency toward a depletion
of energy -- a movement toward a state of non-being/non-existence. 63 This instinct
ultimately would culminate in his theory of the Nirvana Principle. Given the subject
matter of Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud is naturally inclined to talk about the
manifestations of this death instinct in the outer world. And, the manifestations of this
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See Richard Wollheim. Sigmund Freud (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1971), 205-213, for a further analysis of the death instinct.
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death instinct are aggressiveness and hostility. 64 Consider the following seemingly
contradictory passages from Civilization and Its Discontents. When explaining the
origin of his theory of the death instinct, Freud states:
Starting from speculations on the beginning of life and
from biological parallels, I drew the conclusion that,
besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to
join it into ever larger units, there must exist another,
contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to
bring them back to their primaeval, inorganic state. That
is to say, as well as Eros there was an instinct of death.
The phenomena of life (emphasis added) could be
explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing
action of these two instincts. 65
The element of truth behind all this, which people are so
ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures
who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend
themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary,
creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be
reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result,
their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or
sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to
satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity
for work without compensation, to use him sexually
without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate
him. Homo Homini Lupus. Who, in the face of all his
experience of life and of history, (emphasis added) will
have the courage to dispute this assertion ?66
The communists believe that they have found the path to

64
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deliverance from our evils. According to them, man is
good and is well-disposed (emphasis added) to his
neighbor; but the institution of private property has
corrupted his nature... If private property were abolished,
all wealth held in common, and everyone allowed to
share in the enjoyment of it, ill-will and hostility would
disappear among men. [Freud's response:] ... I am able
to recognize that the psychological premisses on which
the system is based are an untenable illusion (emphasis
added). 67
As noted in the first section, when considering the phenomenon of life, Freud quite
often paints it in terms of a struggle between Eros and Death. Given these two
instincts, it would seems as if there are two viable ways in which persons naturally
may be led to integrate in human communities. Both would of course represent these
natural drives. To be fair to Freud's theory, let us consider how our natural erotic and
libidinal interests forge this integration in society. In Civilization and Its Discontents,
Freud claims that the outward manifestations of the erotic instinct are: "the binding
double individuals" in terms of love and marriage. Such individuals are said to be
"libidinally satisfied in themselves." 68 Yet, in such a pure form, Freud proceeds to say
that "this desirable state of things does not, and never did, exist."69 Rather, at least in
outer reality, it is civilization that forces the continued expression of the erotic instinct

in a much modified way by means of aim-inhibited libido; precisely so as "to
strengthen the communal bond by relations of friendship. "7° For the aims for which
67
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we truly strive, namely sexual gratification, society imposes "a restriction upon sexual
life" that "is unavoidable." 71
In the canvas of reality as we find it, Freud tells us that the erotic instinct only

exists in a modified way. How then, does this view get reconciled with his other
claim that "love and necessity are the parents of civilization?" 72

I would suggest that

such a claim is to be construed as stated. What accounts for the origin of society is
indeed the erotic instinct; however, society as it exists today (and as it has historically
developed) allows for only this modified expression of the erotic instinct. I think this
claim is especially important when compared and contrasted with Freud's
developmental account of the aggressive instinct. He says:
(Aggressiveness) ... reigned almost without limit in
primitive times, when property was still very scanty, and
it already shows itself in the nursery almost before
property has given up its primal, anal form; it forms the
basis of every relation of affection and love among
people (emphasis added). 73
The above quotation is interesting for two reasons: First, by claiming that "it forms,"

(present tense) I take Freud to be saying that still, in our present-day reality, the
aggressive instinct is allowed full (and not modified) expression. But more interesting,
one should note the foundational dependence that Freud seemingly grants to the
aggressive instinct. For, it is this instinct which acts as the basis for the very
expression of the (modified) erotic interests (friendship, affection, etc.) in society. It is
71
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precisely the aggressive instinct that is said to give life to the libidinal ties that now
exist. In fact, as we shall see in the next section, it is religion, society's delusion, that
fosters modified and inauthentic expressions of our instincts.
Having worked through the first of the above series of quotations, it is now
possible to understand fully the nature of the subsequent two cited passages. In the
second and third citations, Freud is still speaking about reality as we find it; yet, in
these passages, Freud sounds more like a philosopher than a psychologist advocating
psychoanalytic theory. There is something very weighty about those passages, for
Freud clearly seems to be making some general claims about human nature that are
specifically not to be construed as a phase (among many) of individual development.
Rather, he seems to be making claims as to what a human being's innermost essence
is really like (even if the reality principle regulates the person's psyche). When all is
said and done, not only is it apparent that my thesis holds, but even more boldly, in
this passage Freud appears to be saying that persons essentially are aggressive and
hostile creatures. Is it no wonder, then, that private property is the logical and
necessary expression of this?
What seems to be even more interesting about the second quotation is that typical
behavioral expressions related to the erotic instinct (sex and affection), seem to be
tied intimately to human beings' aggressive nature. For, one's neighbor tempts human
beings and are seen ultimately as objects of sexual gratification. The third citation
which contains Freud's critique of the communist position on human nature only
serves to buttress this point. Theories of human nature which claim that "men by
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nature are essentially good and well-disposed to their neighbors," seem to be as unreal
as the claims of religion, according to Freud. Such theories overlook the fundamental
presence and strength, indeed the "indestructible feature of human nature; namely
aggression.
In the end, and as I have tried to show, Freud's polemic against communism's

notion of communal property contains within it far more than a mere critique of
political ideology. Private property, as a social institution is a constant reminder of the
ultimate hostility of persons. Indeed, perhaps "integration in a human community is a
necessary prerequisite of happiness," however, the integration itself reinforces a
perception of reality in terms of pain and misery. In the end, Freud's discussion of
private property is not simply a necessary consequence of his theory of human nature,
nor of an internal struggle between two opposing instincts; but rather, it is our
culture's symbol of the pain and misery of which we must endure in this world.

8: Considerations of religion
A brief consideration of the role of religion seems to be necessary before
concluding this chapter. Religion, in Freud's view, is an avenue which one could
choose in order to escape the perception -- perhaps the feeling -- of viewing their
environment in the way that I have portrayed it thus far.

For Freud, religion is one of

the main "institutions" which is present in almost every culture. It also is an aspect of
culture that Freud deals with extensively in his later works. Most often, people focus
on his critical comments towards religion. There certainly are an abundance ?f these
and it is clear that it is one of Freud's great hopes that in the battle between the
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scientific weltanschauung and the religious, the former will be victorious. For this
reason, this chapter would be incomplete without at least addressing the role that
religion plays in society.
Thus far, I have been painting outer reality as imbued with pain and misery.
Both of these features are inherent in society's institutions and this is so because of the
psychological nature of human beings (i.e. the dominance of the pleasure principle,
and the aggressive instinct). However, what I wish the reader to note in this section is
Freud's view that religious believers are those who have not successfully passed
through an important individual stage of development. In addition, even though
religion may afford them an escape from perceiving reality as imbued with pain and
misery, it is clearly stated that this is not the path for individuals, let alone for society
at large, to pursue.
Religious believers, for Freud, are those persons who still are truly fixated at
a phase of infantile development, namely the Oedipal Complex. 74

These individuals

have not moved on to acceptance of the reality principle. Freud notes repeatedly, that
a mere stage of development (and not an innate biological principle of inner psychic
reality) namely, the Oedipal Complex has actually and perversely been manifested in
civilization by means of religion. A vast majority of people subscribe to some kind of
religious belief and look to a Godhead both for protection and ethical precepts.
Religion offers a primitive kind of retreat from the pain and suffering inherent in
civilization. However, according to Freud, religion offers a feeble path toward social
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progress and better individual prospects for the attainment of happiness. For Freud, all
religion can afford is a further retreat into "group delusion and obsessional neurosis."
Such a retreat is nothing less than an illusion. In a very real sense, religion is the
false (primitive) promise of happiness that Freud actually wants us to avoid.
One might very well wonder why Freud wants individuals so desperately to avoid
the traps of religion. This is especially true when Freud himself claims that one may
embrace religion as a narcotic and hence, as a deflection against negative perceptions
of reality. 75 This is especially curious when one considers that Freud truly seems to
want persons to perceive reality in more positive terms. Optimistically, Freud says

that this can only occur in "a distant, distant future, but probably not in an infinitely
distant one. "76
Whether or not, Freud himself completely understood how this perception of
reality could be construed in more positive terms is open to speculation. At times, he
strongly suggests that it is pursuing the path of science that affords most individuals
their best hope. 77

Even so, there are other passages in which Freud expresses doubt

that this path can afford a lessening of this vision of reality. 78 However, Freud is
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uncompromising regarding the following issues: 1) society will not be happier by
retreating into untamed expression of its developmental impulses, namely the Oedipal
Complex; 2) "group agreement" is not the criterion by which to judge what is
objectively real nor does it afford the most successful path to happiness; and 3)
Religion only offers a seeming path to happiness, yet, like a narcotic, it really only
opens up the door to more potential pain and misery in the end.
Perhaps the sole conclusion to be drawn from the above considerations is that
it is only by adopting a "stoic resignation" to this present life, that there will be even a
glimmer of hope for founding a society which will allow for "a love of man and a
decrease of suffering."
Ironically and in conclusion, I think it is by means of Freud's thoroughgoing
critique of religion that we actually discover a rather optimistic and pragmatic theorist.
For Freud, life is certainly not forevermore destined to be perceived as consisting of
pain and misery. There is hope that we can live in a world where there exists a "love
of man and a decrease in suffering." However, this would require modifications in
human nature that could, in time, be expressed outwardly in civilization.

9: Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to take seriously Freud's claim that a vision of

the "normal environment" functions as the ultimate starting point for the practice of
psychoanalysis. Having presented some evidence to demonstrate that Freud himself
thought that the phenomenal view of reality is imbued with pain and misery, I hope to
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have recast and enlarged a proper foundation by which to consider the assumptions
behind the practice of psychoanalysis.
While it would be more convincing to conclude this chapter by having
demonstrated how Freud himself made use of this vision of reality in his clinical
cases, it is unfortunate that his case studies shed minimal light in demonstrating the
force of this claim. Rather, the majority of Freud's clinical cases read as the
presentation of mere facts. Very little of his interpretation of the normal environment
is afforded to the reader. One can only surmise what was actually conveyed to the
analysand during and as a consequence of treatment by Freud himself. For these
reasons, I can only conclude this chapter by offering some final suggestions to present
commentators who purport to assess what the role of the psychoanalyst is or should
be.

First, I would urge scholars to abandon viewing the role of the psychoanalyst
as "value-neutral." My aforementioned criticisms of this view suggest that viewing
any form of therapy as lacking a normative dimension is but a mere pipe-dream. In

this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that psychoanalysis itself presupposes a
distinct and value-laden view of reality. Once one has considered the values implicit
within the view of reality that psychoanalysis ultimately adopts, this should be
sufficient to see that any non-normative practice of psychoanalysis simply can not be
considered.
Second, I would advocate that hermeneuticians begin to take seriously what the
aged Freud had to say after his many years of treating a variety of patients.
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Hermeneuticans implicitly and subtly would have us believe that both the analysand
and analyst are learning new "truths" about reality itself after treatment in therapy.
Freud's final works demonstrate that rather than consistently learning new truths, the
analyst is more persuasively led to the adoption of a unified and consistent vision of

reality.
Finally, with respect to those who portray analysts as advocating values that are
ultimately derived from systems extrinsic to the theory itself, I would simply ask: how
is it possible to justify, let us say, a religious value in terms of psychoanalysis? Freud
himself would most likely portray such a justification as stemming from a stunted
nature -- a psychoanalyst trapped at an early stage of human development.
It is hoped that this interpretation -- for it is only an interpretation -- may be of
some constructive use to the contemporary discussion of Freud's ideas regarding the
role of the analyst and how this may be said to impact, in a very real sense, the client
who is treated.

CHAPTER TWO
HARRY STACK SULLIVAN'S INTERPERSONAL THEORY OF PSYCHIATRY

Since his death in 1949, much has been made about both the person and the
theories of American psychiatrist, Harry Stack Sullivan. Famed during his lifetime for
his novel clinical work with male schizophrenics, today Sullivan is widely recognized
as the founder of the Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Because Interpersonal
Theory is presently a main theoretical orientation for practicing psychotherapists, 1 the
contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan are a suitable and an important focus for this
dissertation.

Background
Sullivan's Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (ITP) developed from his work as
a clinician. Born in 1892 in New York, he managed to put himself through medical
school. His interest in psychiatry emerged when he was assigned to work under the
supervision of psychiatrist William Alanson White at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in

1

Council for the National Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology,
National Register, I-13, identifies six "primary" theoretical orientations that
psychologists may use to identify their practice. These are: Behavioral, Cognitive/
Cognitive Behavioral, Existential/Humanistic, Interpersonal, Psychodynamic, Social
Learning Systems.

66

67
Washington, D.C. During those years, White encouraged Sullivan's growing interest
in psychiatry. 2 After leaving St. Elizabeth's, Sullivan went to Sheppard and
Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, Maryland where he began a ward for research in
male schizophrenia. By the end of the decade, Sullivan began to formulate many of
the ideas of his Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry.
In the 1930's, Sullivan moved to New York City and began a private practice.
He continued to work with schizophrenics, but also became interested in treating
obsessional neurotics. His desire to work in the clinical setting never waned and in
1937, he became affiliated with the Chestnut Lodge Sanitarium in Rockville,
Maryland. While there, he did much supervisory work and held informal
conversations with colleagues and students -- much of which was to become the basis
of later books published posthumously by colleagues and friends. Today, six texts in
all constitute the Sullivan corpus. Interestingly, while Sullivan published many articles
and later became the first editor of the journal, Psychiatry, he reluctantly authorized
the publication of only one book during his lifetime, Conceptions of Modem

Psychiatry. Apparently, he was never satisfied with the content nor the exposition of
his work.
Toward the end of his life, Sullivan became actively involved in issues of
world mental health. He participated in conferences with social scientists and other

2

Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1953), 177. Sullivan was later to acknowledge that White, Adolf
Meyer and Freud were the three figures who most considerably influenced his
thinking.
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psychiatrists both in the United States and abroad. While in Paris in 1949, Sullivan
died of a cerebral hemhorrage. 3

Much of the secondary literature that one finds on ITP has been written by
Sullivan's colleagues and friends. Their goal is to clarify the main tenets of ITP in
"nontechnical and concise" language. 4 Other literature on Sullivan recognizes the
importance of his work, but tends to explain his theory as a mere extension and
complement to Freud's psychoanalysis. 5 Irrespective of their purpose, almost everyone
who comments on Sullivan's thoughts tends to remark at some point on the difficulty
of interpreting his theory. His many neologisms and awkward writing style makes any
commentary on Sullivan a difficult endeavor.6
In this chapter, we will consider the philosophical assumptions of ITP with the
intent of uncovering the normative assumptions of this school of thought. Having
worked through Sullivan's writings -- replete with his detailed accounts of the
development of the self, his categories of mental illness, his long account of the
psychiatric interview and goals of treatment -- it is my belief that the ethic of ITP has
3

David Lawson. The Teaching of Values: From Ethical Idealism to Social
Psychology: Adler, Dewey, Sullivan, Fromm (Montreal: McGill University, 1970), 5960.
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many similarities to the moral theory of eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment
philosopher, David Hume. 7

By the end of this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that the

main goal of Sullivan's ITP is for persons to behave as members of their "society"
behave.

Engaging in socially acceptable actions creates feelings of security within the

individual who performs them. Nonetheless, it is one's inner character (Hume) or
personality (Sullivan) that ultimately "determines"8 how persons will behave. Saying
this in another way, mental health, for Sullivan, is empirically observed in external
actions; however, these actions are causally tied to one's personality. The latter is only
known through inference.
The ethical theory in ITP has some interesting implications for understanding
the role of the psychiatrist and how he treats "mentally unhealthy" persons.
According to ITP, it is the psychiatrist who claims to have the ability to "affect"
personality. Changes in personality necessarily imply changes in living. It is my
contention that in ITP how the client lives his/her life is of paramount importance.

7

The reader should note that by forging a parallel between Hume's moral
theory and Sullivan's ITP, I am in no way undermining the thesis of this dissertation.
In this chapter, I will not argue that Sullivan's ITP is or should be a moral sense
theory. Rather, I invoke the moral theory of David Hume because it is useful in
highlighting where the normative assumptions are (and what their content is) in
Sullivan's ITP.
8

The word "determinism" has multiple meanings. As used in this context, it is
not intended to deny "free will." Most scholars agree that Hume is a soft-determinist;
namely, that a person is "free" to form their character; but once established, actions
are "caused" by character. There is good evidence, as I will show that Sullivan
implicitly adheres to this view. For an exploration of this topic as it pertains. to
Sullivan's ITP, see Patrick Mullahy. "Will, Choice & Ends," Psychiatry, vol. 12
(1949):379-386.
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Because of this, it seems to me that Sullivan must concede that what is of central
importance to the psychiatrist's expertise is his understanding of the social norms of
culture/society.

As a consequence of this view, a successful application of ITP

depends minimally on the "medical" expertise of the psychiatrist.

This chapter will

conclude with some further thoughts on what this thesis means for understanding the
role of the psychiatrist and the normative goals of treatment that ITP may be said to
have for the client.
In order to illustrate the above thesis, this chapter will assume the following

structure:
1) What is the interpersonal theory of psychiatry?: historical
background
2) Development of the self: basic needs
3) Why the "need for security?": the role of experience in the
development of the self
4) Sullivan's conception of mental illness
5) The role of the psychiatrist: the therapeutic encounter
6) The goals of therapy

1)

What is the interpersonal theory of psychiatry?: historical background

Perhaps the best place to begin is with the text that "represents the last
complete statement which Sullivan made of his conceptions of psychiatry." 9 In The
Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, consisting of a series of lectures that Sullivan gave

at the Washington School of Psychiatry in 1946-7, he defines its practice as follows:
One needs to consider psychiatry as an expanding science,

9

Harry Stack Sullivan. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, ed. Helen
Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1953),
vii.
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(emphasis added) concerned with the kinds of events or
processes in which the psychiatrist participates while being
an observant psychiatrist. The knowledge does not arise from
a special, kind of data but from the characteristic or operatioris
in which the psychiatrist participates (emphasis added). The
actions or operations from which psychiatric information is
derived are events in interpersonal fields (emphasis added)
which include the psychiatrist. The events which contribute
information for the development of psychiatry and psychiatric
theory are events in which the psychiatrist participates as a
psychiatrist, the ones which are scientifically important are
those which are accompanied by conceptual schematizations or
intelligent formulations which are communicable. These, in
tum, are those actions or operations which are relatively precise
and explicit -- with nothing significant left equivocal or ambiguous. 10
In the spirit of Freud who preceded him, Sullivan conceives of psychiatry as a

science. 11 Like Freud, Sullivan was trained in psychoanalysis and never fully
abandoned his belief in traditional categories of mental illness. He also viewed the
psychiatrist as possessing the requisite "expertise" to remedy these ailments. However,
unlike Freud, the science which he refers to is more broadly and appropriately
construed as a social science. I would argue that contrary to what some commentators
seem to suggest, Sullivan never sharply distinguished between viewing psychiatry as

10

Ibid., 13. The italicized words are intended to highlight what is both novel
about Sullivan's ITP as well as to guide this present discussion in tracing the debt that
his theory owes to previous scholars.
11

There is a passage in which Sullivan appears to contradict this view and says
that psychiatry may be conceived of as a therapeutic art. See Sullivan, Conceptioris of
Modern Psychiatry, 173. However, given the context in which he is speaking about
psychiatry, I do not think that undermines his view that psychiatry is ultimately to be
conceived of as a science. In that passage, he expresses concern about how ~apidly
the social order is changing in American society and as a result, so too the practice of
the psychiatrist may have to change. It is in that context in which he equates
psychiatry with being an art.
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an "objective" science on the one hand, and a social science, on the other.12 On the
contrary, what makes ITP a novel theory is that it makes psychiatry be a social
science. 13 Sullivan is insistent that psychiatrists, just like social scientists, have the
same object of study insofar as they "deal with living." 14 Moreover, psychiatrists can
only understand these problems if they understand how in general, persons in society
behave.
From a historical point of view, conceiving of psychiatry as a social science
demonstrates Sullivan's theoretical alignment with the Chicago School of Sociology, in
particular with the work of George Herbert Mead and W .I. Thomas. 15 Sullivan, like
Mead, believed that social psychology involves "an account of the development of the
self on the basis of reflected appraisals from others and the learning of roles which
one undertook to live or 'which live one."' 16 If the subject of psychiatry is the ailing
self and the self is formed by reflected appraisals of others, then in practice, psychiatry

12
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See Helen Perry Swick. Psychiatrist of America: The Life of Harry Stack
Sullivan, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1982, 258, for an excellent
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must be reflective of social reality. Edward Sapir, also a member of this school and
long-time friend of Sullivan, illustrates this fusion of disciplines and subject matter
when addressing both psychiatrists and cultural anthropologists. He says:
We are not, therefore, to begin with a simple contrast between
social patterns and individual behavior, whether normal or
abnormal, but we are, rather, to ask what is the meaning of
culture in terms of individual behavior and whether the
individual can, in a sense be looked upon as the effective carrier
of the culture of his group .... we then discover the field of
social psychology which is not a whit more social than it is
individual and which is, or should be, the mother science of
both the cultural anthropologist and the psychiatrist. 17
Just as the cultural anthropologist can not study his subject neutrally and
impersonally; so too, the psychiatrist must reject "the fatal fallacy" of viewing human
relations as capable of being analyzed objectively. 18

The ITP psychiatrist must, by

contrast, engage in "participant observation." While this is by no means an obvious
concept, in simple terms, this means that the psychiatrist confines himself to an area of
study, namely, the field of "human relations" between himself and the patient. Within
this field of operations -- indeed, only in this reciprocal area of relations -- data are
elicited for study. This concept will be treated at greater length in forthcoming
sections of this chapter; however, what is important to note here is the novel subject
matter of ITP's investigation. Focusing as it does on the participant observation of the
psychiatrist, ITP takes an important move away from the supposed objectivity,

17
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Personality, ed. by David G. Mandelbaum, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
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impersonality and neutrality of psychoanalysis, so advocated by Freud. This
theoretical commitment will be shown to have utmost importance as this chapter
proceeds.

2) Development of the self: basic needs
Having provided the reader with a general description of ITP and an
explanation of its theoretical ties, let us begin with the most important philosophical
assumption of Sullivan's theory, namely with an account of the development of the
self. Sullivan himself claims that we can not begin to even understand psychiatry, let
alone his version of it, "...unless we know how everyone comes to be at chronologic
adulthood. It is only in this way that we can then understand problems in living." 19
It is primarily this theme which Sullivan spent much time exploring in his earlier

works, notably, Personal Psychopathology and Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry.
For Sullivan, ITP must begin with an account of individual development, because it
foretells what this version of psychiatry intends to accomplish both as a discipline and
in practice.
Sullivan begins his account of the self with an exploration of "needs/
motivational systems." Individuals are said to have "natural needs," such as hunger
and thirst, that demand fulfillment because of physico-chemical nature. Sullivan
repeatedly claims that "persons are animals who grow up solely for the purpose of

19
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living with other people in some sort of social organization."20 Additionally,
developing infants demonstrate a basic need for tenderness. This need for tenderness
or security2 1 functions as the defining characteristic of human beings. Even at this
early stage of development, tenderness is so important, that its lack will inevitably
cause "disorders in living" (or, as we will see in the next section, mental illness). In
other words, humans only become "human," in Sullivan's eyes, by having their need
for tenderness satisfied. As such, it is accorded foundational importance in his theory
and has broad implications for the practice of ITP. The most important of these
implications are identified below.
First, for Sullivan the basic need for security can only be satisfied by and
through another human being(s). During infancy, this is typically the mother.

To

have this need satisfied requires that one be in an "interpersonal field." Mullahy
provides an excellent and comprehensive definition of this concept. He says:
Sullivan thought that interpersonal situations imply
something more than the presence of two people somewhere.
The two people are involved with each other-- they are
integrated. An interpersonal situation is brought into being
by, held together by, and the course of their events or
processes are to a certain extent determined by, something
in the two people which is reciprocal, the manifestations of
which coincide approximately in time. 22
20

Ibid., 5.
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Tenderness is the form of security demonstrated in infancy; security is the
generic term that Sullivan uses to say how this basic need is satisfied throughout the
course of one's life.
22

Patrick Mullahy and Menachem Melinek. Interpersonal Psychiatry. (New
York: Spectrum Publications, 1983), 199.
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At some point, in the development of the infant, one learns to satisfy one's own bodily
needs of hunger, thirst, etc.; however, tenderness is immune to being satisfied in
isolation. The notion of an interpersonal field has a twofold importance: a) from the
moment of birth, the infant's basic need for tenderness is satisfied by the mothering
person and at this very moment, the socialization/humanization of the self begins and
b) as the self matures, through the phases of the juvenile period and into adulthood,
this basic need for tenderness persists. In the former phase, it is recognized in the
need for "chums" and in the latter, it evolves into the need for intimacy and is
satisfied with and through a significant other.
Second, what is important to recognize in the above account is Sullivan's view
that the satisfaction of the need for tenderness is somehow broader and more important
than the satisfaction of bodily needs. Sullivan claims that if the need for tenderness is
not satisfied, all other needs are thereby frustrated. 23 Presumably, he thinks this is the
case because "anxiety," (defined as the lack of security) unlike our bodily needs, is not
confined to a specific zone of interaction/body part that requires satisfaction;" but
rather, it has "nothing specific about it." 24 And again, because the satisfaction of the
need for tenderness is facilitated by and through another or is frustrated by the feeling
of anxiety that others cause us, Sullivan claims that these states are descriptive of the
interpersonal situation. The symbiotic nature of this feeling of anxiety or the
establishment of security is crucial to note at this point; for in a very real sense, it
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Sullivan, Interpersonal, 42, 95.
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foreshadows the kind of therapeutic encounter that is encouraged in ITP. 25
Finally, according to Sullivan, the securing of tenderness or its lack (anxiety)
promotes a growing capacity of "recall" and "foresight" within the developing self.
Clearly, the infant develops by learning to engage in those actions which promote
tenderness and eliminate anxiety. It would not be completely off the mark to suggest
that Sullivan's entire theory of the growth of the self is reduced to this basic point: the
better one is at securing satisfactions from another and thereby eliminating anxiety, the
more healthy or better adjusted in society she will be.
At this point, I would like to forge the parallel that I stated in the introduction
of this chapter, namely the similarity between Hume's moral sense theory and
Sullivan's ITP. In both method and point, it seems to me that Sullivan modernizes
Hume's conception of sympathy as developed in The Treatise of Human Nature. What
Sullivan conceives of as the "need for tenderness," and traces back to infancy, Hume
referred to as a "natural propensity" found in all individuals.

While neither theorist

would claim these are observable in themselves, both would agree that they can be
inferred from their effects. Hence, both Sullivan and Hume adopt an empirical

method to establish their views. 26

The following quotes from Hume's, Treatise,

25

What will later be shown (section 4) is that the therapist-client relationship is
characterized precisely in these terms. Any interview situation for Sullivan is always
characterized by "anxiety." Yet, both parties experience anxiety which is in search of
security. See Sullivan, The Psychiatric Interview, 94.
26

For an illustration of the empirical approach in Sullivan's work, see: Lawson,
Teaching of Values, 60-1.
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illustrate this similarity. He says:
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in
itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we
have to sympathize with others, and to receive by
communication their inclinations and sentiments, however
different from, or even contrary to our own. This is not
only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every
opinion propos'd to them; but also in men of the greatest
judgment and understanding ... 27
When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first
known only by its effects, and by those external signs in
the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea
of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression,
and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to
become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion,
as any original affection. 28
One last implication needs to be addressed before moving on to the next
section, The self system, which will further develop this parallel between the
foundational role that Hume grants to the account of sympathy and Sullivan's idea of
one's basic "need" for tenderness.

Since a "perfect sense of tenderness" or "a

complete sense of anxiety" are never experienced, the self develops in such a way so
as to adjust or bring about an equilibrium between these two states. This resulting
balance will ultimately produce the "self-system" and this leads us to the next topic.

3) Why the "need for security?" The role of experience in the development of the
self-system and individual personality

27

Hume, Treatise, II, xi, 316.
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Having demonstrated that satisfying the need for security allows the self to
grow and develop, one might still be wondering why Sullivan granted such a
foundational role to this need in his theory. In order to respond adequately to this
question, two issues need to be considered, namely: 1) What is the nature of human
experience, according to Sullivan? Only by addressing this question can one come to
an understanding of why and how "the self" develops at all. But, 2) answering this
question will involve the more complicated task of discerning what the "self" really is
according to Sullivan. Anyone who glances even superficially at the Sullivan corpus
will discover that he makes use of a wide-array of terms to describe the self -- "selfsystem," "self-dynamism," "persons," "personification," and "personalities." What I
will argue, is that there is a sharp distinction between what Sullivan calls the selfsystem ("an explanatory concept and a quasi-entity" 29) and one's personality ("a
hypothetical, a merely possible entity. "30)

The importance that this has for the

practice of therapy is that it is only "personalities" which are the proper focus of
treatment. Only by affecting one's personality can the ITP psychiatrist hope to correct
behavioral problems, otherwise called, "disorders in living" (mental unhealth/illness).
Yet again, I will argue that in this respect Sullivan's ITP is decidedly Humean in its
approach. For, according to Hume, one's character is also formed by and through
society; and it is one's character that is causally connected to behavior.

However,

establishing this point will naturally lead us to the dissimilarities or, more
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appropriately, the novel aspects of Sullivan's theory in comparison to Hume. Sullivan,
in contrast to Hume, will focus his discussion on "unhealthy" personalities and the role
that the psychiatrist plays in remedying these.
Few commentators writing on ITP have expressed how it is that Sullivan's
conception of human experience acts as the ultimate justification for the existence of
the self-system. 31 In his Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, there is an interesting
passage entitled, "The Necessary and Unfortunate Aspects of the Self System."
Consider the following claim:
The origin of the self-system can be said to rest on the
irrational character of culture or, more specifically, society
(emphasis added). Were it not for the fact that a great many
prescribed ways of doing things have to be lived up to, in
order that one shall maintain workable, profitable, satisfactory
relations with his fellows; or were the prescriptions for the
types of behavior in carrying on relations with one's fellows
perfectly rational -- then, for all I know, there would not be
involved in the course of becoming a person, anything like
the self-system that we always encounter (emphasis added). 32
What is curious about the above paragraph is the way in which Sullivan seems to
characterize society or cultures in general. Implicitly, the characteristics of group
living are such that they involve an ineliminable "irrational" component. It is this idea
that group living is somehow irrational, in its very nature, that acts as the ultimate
justification for the self-system.

The very act of living together, intrinsically and

inevitably frustrates the possibility of completely satisfying the individual's need for

31

Ibid., 165. "The self-system is thus an organization of educative experience
called into being by the necessity to avoid or minimize incidents of anxiety."
32
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security. So much is this the case that when Sullivan contemplates human
development in a purportedly 'ideal" culture, he claims: "But even at that, I believe
that a human being without a self-system is beyond imagination." Given his empirical
approach, the irrationality of society is evidenced in a variety of ways: through
societal prescriptions, social rules, norms, in the mere expectations others have of us.
Yet, in spite of its irrationality, paradoxically, it is society itself that allows human
beings to become quite literally human. 33
Having seen that it is society which acts as the ultimate justification for the
growth and development of the self-system, let us now turn our attention to the second
question: What is the "self" according to Sullivan? I wish to suggest that there are
two intrinsic aspects of the self. First, there is a self-system that I believe represents
the permanent core of the self. This aspect of the self can only be known by inference
and is not the proper object of treatment in the therapeutic encounter. But, the kind of
self-system one develops is causally related to the second aspect of the self, namely,
personality. Personality, too is known by inference; but personality is linked by
necessity to behavior.
Sullivan postulates that the self-system develops by organizing experience in
the following three ways. An outline of these kinds of experience is listed below so as
to indicate what levels of experience the psychiatrist postulates in the development of
the self-system. However, it is only the third kind of experience that is both evident

33

IT psychotherapists are ironically, as it will be shown in the next section,
practitioners and experts of this irrationality.
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and operative in the confines of therapy.
- Prototaxic Experience: is the first kind of experience that
the infant has; the infant experiences reality as an undifferentiated
"cosmic" totality
- Parataxic Experience: The wholeness of experience is
broken into parts, but still not arranged in a logical fashion
- Syntaxic Experience: when the child learns the consensually
validated meaning of language. 34
A discussion of Sullivan's notion of experience would not be complete without at least
mentioning the above three modes of experience. For these are the ways, known by
inference, that all human beings develop a self-system.
As the infant moves through these various levels of experience, the infant is
said to learn; for "learning" by definition is nothing more than the "organization of
experience." This learning is brought about by means of an "other," or the mothering
one, and is accomplished according to the gradient of anxiety. 35 In this way, the self
develops and learns to organize experience by means of what either diminishes anxiety
and/or increases security.36
Once the infant begins to organize experience at the syntaxic level, the selfsystem is said to be firmly established and the transition from infancy to childhood
34

Ibid., 28.
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Ibid., 153.
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While it is tempting to suspect that Sullivan is subtly advocating a kind of
hedonistic ethic, I urge the reader not to adopt this view. One must remember that the
self-system aims at an equilibrium between anxiety and tenderness; however, the
feeling of security itself (construed of in terms of pleasure/happiness), is an.unrealistic
goal. The presence of anxiety mitigates the possibility that one could achieve pure
pleasure/happiness. And if anxiety is always present (and given the interpersonal
nature of anxiety) -- this just basically says that human relations aren't that conducive
to wholly satisfying the individual.
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occurs. When the infant begins to be educated in a consensually validated way,
specifically in terms of a language, acculturation is said to begin. The manipulation of
signs and symbols in meaningful ways with others, for Sullivan, is the most overt
empirical example of our uniquely "human" experience. These broad categories of
experience also serve as markers for Sullivan's more specific analysis of general
patterns of experience for the development of the self.
While all self-systems grow and develop according to these kinds of
experience, not all infants receive the same kinds of displays of affection. For this
reason, the self-system develops along the lines of whether its primary expressions of
tenderness were either malevolent or tender. Mullahy describes this as follows:
The undergoing of tenderness, that is, the experience
of beneficent activities of the mothering one, in tum
promotes in the development in the infant and child an
active interest in being tender as is manifested in playing
with dolls, etc. But subsequent very unfortunate experience
may compel the youngster to dissociate his tender impulses
or to disintegrate them. 37
What kind of expressions of tenderness the infant has been shown will determine to a
large extent what kind of personality one is to develop. 38 For this reason, and as
stated earlier, Sullivan calls "personality" a hypothetical (possible entity) which is
formed against the permanent, but unobservable and untreatable "self system." He

37
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Mullahy, Contributions, 45.

See, Sullivan, Conceptions, 21-22: "In other words, it (the self-system) is
self-perpetuating, if you please, tends very strongly to maintain the direction and
characteristics which it was given in infancy and childhood." And again, "Alld so the
unhappy chlld who grows up without love will have a self-dynamism which shows
great capacity for finding fault with others and, by the same token, with himself."
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says: "Personality is the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations
which characterizes a human life. 39
Personalities begin to emerge when one begins to organize experience
syntactically.

Recalling what was said earlier, the self, according to Sullivan, is only

constituted by and through relations with another (a mothering one). This
development begins at the moment of birth, follows "a" history (whatever that might
be) and forces within one "an organization of educative experience with the aim of

reducing anxiety." Personalities arise against the backdrop of the self-system.
Depending on one's developmental history, different personalities may or may not
come to fruition.
This distinction is important because it has implications for understanding what

kind of knowledge the ITP psychiatrist requires in order to accomplish the goals of
this kind of therapy. 40 First, the core of the self, the self-system, is impervious to
therapeutic change. What alone can be affected within therapy is the patient's
personality. For this reason, it is necessary that the psychiatrist have a good
knowledge of the main "patterns" along which most persons in society develop. The

39

Sullivan, Interpersonal Theory, 104, 110: also, the definition of pattern is
"the envelope of relatively insignificant particular differences."
40

I urge the reader to bear with me through this painstakingly long exposition
of Sullivan's theory. However, this paragraph in particular will be of fundamental
importance in Section 4. In that section, I will argue against the idea that the only
goal of ITP is for the client to achieve insight into their patterns of development.
Achieving insight might be a goal of this kind of therapy; but if so, it is always of
secondary importance. The main goal of ITP is for the client to change maladaptive
patterns in living.
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bulk of Sullivan's theory is devoted to sketching out this comprehensive taxonomy,
including descriptions of the phases of childhood, the juvenile era, preadolescence,
early adolescence, etc. 41

General knowledge of an individual's actions during these

phases, coupled with the knowledge of how the self-system forms, indicates a general
knowledge of the kinds of personalities that exist in society.
As stated previously, the selfs attempt to strive for an equilibrium between
security and anxiety is nothing more than growing in "knowledge in recall and
foresight." It is important to recognize that Sullivan believes that individuals learn by
doing what is "useful;" that is, by engaging in those behaviors which bring about
security and avoiding those actions which cause anxiety. He says:
When talking about the terms "useful" and "useless"
I mean them in the sense of facilitating some activity
which is vital in the business of satisfying needs or
avoiding anxiety. 42

On this point, Sullivan's theory is decidedly Humean in feel. Useful behavior,
for Hume, is nothing more than engaging in those actions which promote agreeable
experiences in the self or others. But, in addition, and a parallel that has yet to be
mentioned, is that in The Treatise of Human Nature Hume illustrates the link between
character (personality, as Sullivan calls it) and actions. He says:
There is a general course of nature in human actions, as
well as in the operations of the sun and the climate.
There are also characters peculiar to different nations and
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particular persons, as well as common to mankind. The
knowledge of these characters is founded on the
observation of an uniformity in the actions, that flow
from them; and this uniformity forms the very essence
of necessity. 43
The more one observes the regularity and patterns of human behavior, the better
inferences one can make regarding individual character. And since there is "a general
course of nature in human actions," it would follow that there is a regularity of kinds
of character.
Yet, despite Hume's insistence that actions are patterned, he is aware that
human beings engage in seemingly capricious or anomalous behaviors. Hume's
remarks on this issue are of importance to ITP because it is the psychiatrist who must
know what is regular and patterned about human nature in order to decipher and treat

clients that act in anomalous ways. Consider the following passages from Hume's
Treatise in which he addresses two possibilities for interpreting seemingly random

actions:
When any phenomena are constantly and invariably
conjoin'd together, they acquire such a connexion in the
imagination, that it passes from one to the other, without
any doubt or hesitation. But below this there are many
inferior degrees of evidence and probability, nor does one
single contrariety of experiment entirely destroy all our
reasoning. The mind ballances the contrary experiments
and deducting the inferior from the superior, proceeds
with that degree of assurance or evidence, which remains.
Even when these contrary experiments are entirely equal,
we remove not the notion of causes and necessity; but
supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the
operation of contrary and conceal'd causes, we conclude,
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that the chance or indifference lies only in our judgement
on account of our imperfect knowledge, not in the things
themselves, which are in every case equally necessary,
tho to appearance not equally constant or certain. 44
'Tis commonly allowed that mad-men have no liberty.
But were we to judge by their actions, they have less
regularity and constancy than the actions of wise-men,
and consequently are farther remov'd from necessity.
Our way of thinking in this particular is, therefore,
absolutely inconsistent; but is a natural consequence of
those confus'd and undefin'd terms, which we so
commonly make use of in our reasonings, especially
on the present subject. 45

These two possible responses to anomalous actions conveniently afford us a
subsequent structure for this chapter. I believe that these conclusions are helpful in
clarifying some of the most important and interesting aspects of ITP. First, Hume
acknowledges that if human behavior appears to be random, the explanation for this
rests with the observer's "imperfect knowledge," of the agent (and possibly, his
culture, station in life, etc.) but not with the agent himself. Since psychiatrist's know
patterns of behavior (and confront persons who behave in capricious ways), ITP must
offer an explanation regarding the degree to which practitioners have or should have
an adequate knowledge of character-types (replete with knowledge of the culture in
which a person grew up, now works, etc. )46

Interestingly, in spite of Sullivan's

comprehensive exposition of the patterns of human development, he, like Hume, has
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the following comment to make on this point:
In our civilization, no (emphasis mine) parental

group actually reflects the essence of the social
organization for which the young are being trained
in living; and after childhood, when the family
influence in acculturation and socialization begins
to be attenuated and augmented by other influence,
the discrete excerpts of the culture which each family
has produced as its children come into collision with
other discrete excerpts of the culture -- all of them more
or less belonging to the same cultural system, but having
very different accents and importances mixed up in them
(emphasis mine). 47
The extent to which ITP psychiatrists adequately understand these "very different
accents and importances" of various "cultures" of which his client is a member
determines the extent to which treatment and the goals of ITP are successful or not.
But the second conclusion to be drawn from Hume's passage is that an
observer's understanding of the actions of mentally disturbed individuals is "absolutely
inconsistent," because it rests upon "confus'd ideas and undefin'd" terms. It is to this
issue, namely, how --- and if--- ITP psychiatrist's understand mental illness that we
will now turn our attention.

4)

Sullivan's conceptions of mental illness

I will begin this section with an account of what characterizes the normal,
"mentally healthy" or "mature" adult according to Sullivan. According to Sullivan,
one can only understand this concept by studying what is empirically observable. For,

47
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if experience is the origin of and justification for the self-system, and the self-system
accounts for the formation of personality that ultimately "determines" behavior, then
experience is necessarily the place by which to begin an account of what constitutes
both "mental health" and "mental illness." In this section, I will argue that Sullivan's
conceptions of "mental illness" are not reducible to fixed categories; but rather,
"mental illness" is best understood broadly -- in terms of a continuum and as
manifested in various kinds of behavior. This claim has an important implication,
namely that all persons may, at various times in their lives, suffer from "disorders in
living" or "mental illness." Because of this, and unlike Hume, Sullivan does not think
that one's understanding of mental illness rests upon "confus'd ideas and undefin'd
terms." Rather, one understands persons' behavior to the degree that they
conform to how the majority of persons in society behave. Yet, Sullivan's conceptions
of mental illness raise the interesting and important question as to whether or not it is
possible for the psychiatrist to possess truly adequate knowledge of manifest
"disorders in living."
Establishing the above claims will highlight interesting aspects of ITP; namely,
Sullivan's extraordinarily optimistic view of the persons' ability and natural striving
toward mental health. Ironically, Sullivan's optimism about individuals does not
translate to societies at large. Rather, he is wary of the health of societies. It is as
this point where the psychiatrist may be said to have a responsibility to play the role
of the social critic and shift his focus from the individual to the state of societies in
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general. 48
For Sullivan, the end of the juvenile phase signifies the beginnings of maturity.
At this point, sufficient socialization has occurred in the development of the self that
something akin to a relatively stable personality is established. While it is difficult to
identify exactly when a person reaches full maturity, evidence of this threshhold is
observed when:
One is oriented in living to the extent to which
one has formulated, or can easily be led to
formulate (or has insight into), data of the
following types: the integrating tendencies
(needs) which customarily characterize one's
interpersonal relations; the circumstances
appropriate to their satisfaction and relatively
anxiety-free discharge; and the more or less
remote goals for the approximation of which
one will forego intercurrent opportunities for
satisfaction or the enhancement of one's
prestige. The degree to which one is adequately
oriented in living is, I believe, a very much
better way of indicating what we often have in
mind when we speak about how "well-integrated"
a person is, or what his "character" is in the
sense of good, bad or indifferent. 49
I believe that the basic idea Sullivan wants to establish is that a "mature" individual is

a "directional" being -- one who has a sense of his basic needs, a knowledge of what
situations have fulfilled these in the past and an ability to bring this knowledge to bear
on future actions. All of this establishes the self as "well-integrated." Irrespective of

48
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the various personalities that individuals possess in the world, I think these are the
basic features that one must display in order to be deemed "mature."50
But what is curious is that Sullivan seems to acknowledge how a psychiatrist's
investigations of "mature" persons are severely restricted. Consider the following
claim:
... the actual fact is that an understanding of
maturity eludes us as psychiatrists who are students
of interpersonal relations, for the people who manifest
the most maturity are least accessible for study;
and the progress of our patients toward maturity
invariably removes them from our observation before
they have reached it. Thus, a psychiatrist, as a
psychiatrist, doesn't have much actual data. But
one can guess a few things. I would guess that
each of the outstanding achievements of the
developmental eras that I have discussed will be
outstandingly manifest in the mature personality.
The last of these great developments is the need
for intimacy .... (emphasis added, mine) 51
The italicized qualification, as a psychiatrist, speaks volumes; for Sullivan is implying
that a psychiatrist may have personal experiences with mature adults but not clinical

50

It is important to note that the concept of "maturity" is independent of
normative notions such as "goodness" or "badness." In other words, given the
definition of maturity, it is logically possible for a person to be a "directional being"
and yet, have an evil character. But, Sullivan seems to think that this could only
happen in one of two ways: a) as noted in previous sections, the mother may have
shown the infant affection in "malevolent ways." See Sullivan, Interpersonal, 214215. This would produce a damaged self-system. But such individuals would find
their way into therapy, for their actions would not be socially approved. b) Entire
cultures, (i.e. Nazi Germany) may have evil social rules, and hence, a well-integrated
person, in Sullivan's view, might do evil deeds if they are justified by the society. In
this respect, one can see how important it will be for the psychiatrist at times to
assume the role of the social critic.
·
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experience. In their personal life, most everyone has encounters with mature adults.
However the "cultures"52 in which individuals associate are limited; and also, when
encountering mature adults in the sphere of private life, they tend not to be viewed as
"objects of study."

In addition, Sullivan intimates that while "educated guesses" may

be useful for the psychiatrist to have a sense of what constitutes maturity in general,
as this concept actually functions in the very real therapeutic encounter, he might not
have adequate knowledge of how his clients evidence their maturity in their particular
"cultures."
At this point, those who are familiar with Sullivan's work might object and
claim that I have unfairly depicted his account of mental illness by basing it solely on
empirical observation of human behavior. Some might say that Sullivan's training as a
medical doctor and in psychoanalysis mitigates any concern that a psychiatrist might
possess inadequate knowledge of human behavior. After all, what is important is the
knowledge of mental illness itself as a medical diagnosis. Certainly, one must not
overlook how Freudian thought and medical expertise buttress ITP.
Admittedly, there is a clear sense in which Sullivan seemingly incorporates

52

What I mean by this is only that in our personal lives, our involvement in
and knowledge of "cultures" is limited. For example, a person may be an American
and hence may be viewed as part of American society; but if they have lived in the
Midwest their entire life, they may not be familiar with "mature individuals" from the
South, the East Coast, etc. Sullivan is quite right in eluding to the fact that the
psychiatrist, as a psychiatrist and as a person, has a limited knowledge of all of the
manifest "cultures"/manifestations of maturity that individuals may display.
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Freudian53 categories of mental illness. In addition, there is evidence that Sullivan
even attempted to expand upon the classic, objective understanding of mental illness
for he introduces his own array of terminology, ranging from mental deficiency,
mental disorders, mental deviancy, etc. More than just an "immature character" or a
disorder in living, Sullivan seems to want to construe mental illness in classical and
medical terminology. 54
To such a counter-argument, I would suggest that if one pays very close
attention to Sullivan's terminology, one will see a decided move toward "objective"
descriptions of mental illness and towards describing mental illness solely in empirical,
socially observable terms. As stated at the outset of this section, there is an
abundance of terminology: in part, this is due to the various stages in which his texts
were written and in part I think it is because Sullivan did not want to disown the
Freudian legacy nor deny the scientificity and specialness of the medical
establishment.
We might begin exploring my claim by examining his account of "mental
illness" as offered in Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry. An entire section is devoted
to what Sullivan calls, "developmental syndromes." In this chapter, ten syndromes are
defined and classified into two general types. Sullivan subdivides these into two
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Also, Kraeplin's objective-descriptive formulations of diagnoses are important
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See Harry Stack Sullivan, Personal Psychopathology, with an introduction
by Helen Swick Perry, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), Ch. 10, 308326; See also, Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry.
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groups. The first group of syndromes is described below:
... these first five of our syndromes are of
early origin in the development of personality.
They all come from the time of predominantly
autistic verbal behavior. They are deviations
of growth that are not chiefly a result of
verbal communication between parent and child,
teacher and pupil. They occur before the
mediate acculturation of the juvenile era... 55
The second category of syndromes, by contrast, occur "after this spread of
acculturation takes on a greater complexity ... "56 The point to note from his list of
syndromes is that the first five bear a remarkable resemblance to those traditionally
construed along psychoanalytic lines. With respect to two of these syndromes, namely
the psychopathic personality disorder and the self-absorbed person, Sullivan even
acknowledges the indebtedness of this classification to Kraeplin and Freud's
psychoanalysis, respectively. 57 Sullivan calls these first five syndromes, "diagnoses of
personality" in contradistinction to the second five, empirically described, "disorders of
personality."
In his later book, The Psychiatric Interview, Sullivan abandons talk of "mental

illness" in terms of syndromes. The new classifications that he introduces, namely
mental deviancy, mental deficiency and mental disorder, seem to accomplish the same
goal. When discussing the more extreme "mental disorders," Sullivan says the
following:
55
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I come finally to a group of mental disorders which

are probably of most intense interest to the
psychiatrist who is concerned with the theory and
practice of psychotherapy. The older nosology in this
field is undergoing dissolution, and one may hope that
something much better will arise out of the disappearance
of ancient errors. I think, however, that the following
rubrics still represent important distinctions:
1) those who suffer anxiety attacks; 2) the hysterical,
3) the obsessional, etc. (emphasis added, mine)58
Through these examples, I hope to have demonstrated that Sullivan's appeal to
objective, medical classifications for his descriptions of mental illness in no way
serves as a "corrective" to the psychiatrist's imperfect knowledge of "the mature adult."
While it is true that Sullivan inherited a rich classificatory history and probably did
not want to undermine the authority of psychiatry as a "science," this in no way
destroys the idea that his real method for understanding mental illness rests with
empirical observation. This shows his true understanding of psychiatry as a social
science. So much is this the case, that when describing mental unhealth, Sullivan
says:
It is, I believe, perfectly correct to say with

Bridgman... "I act in two modes ... my public mode
and in the private mode (in which) I feel my
inviolable isolation from my fellows ... "
Psychiatry studies, as I see it, activity in
the public mode and also that part of activity
in the private mode which is not in any sense
inviolably isolated. Let me say that insofar
as you are interested in your unique individuality,
in contradistinction to the interpersonal activities
which you or someone else can observe, to that extent
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you are interested in the really private mode in
which you live -- in which I have no interest
whatsoever. The fact is that for any scientific
inquiry, in the sense that psychiatry should be,
we cannot be concerned with that which is inviolably
private.59
Here it is clear that only what is empirically observable -- and not what is repressed,
suppressed, sublimated, in the unconscious, etc. -- is of interest to the ITP psychiatrist.
Leaving the above account aside, I want to tum my attention to a more
substantive account of Sullivan's notions of mental health. Because Sullivan largely
understands mental illness in terms of mental health, the optimism that he has
regarding the individual drive toward "health" is apparent in his very approach. Yet,
in spite of his optimism, Sullivan remains rather skeptical regarding the nature of
societies in general. Let us begin with a consideration of the manifold definitions that
Sullivan uses to characterize his understanding of mental health:
Mental health is interpersonal adjustive success. 60
... still the experience of the school may head the selfdynamism in another direction which will make for much
greater opportunity for contented living, for mental
health. 61
Healthy development of personality is inversely
proportionate to the amount, to the number of tendencies
which have come to exist in dissociation. Put in another
way, if there is nothing dissociated, then whether one
be a genius. or an imbecile, it is quite certain that he
will be mentally healthy.
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If on the other hand, a person be very talented but be
required by his experience, by the significant people who bear
on him at various stages in his development, to dissociate from
his awareness a considerable number of powerful and durable
motivational systems, then that person will be markedly disposed
to mental disorder. He will be maladjusted in some of the situations
through which his life must develop, and that maladjustment will
come about quite certainly, the partition being between those
activities of which he is aware versus those which he does with
no awareness. 62

Otherwise, I shall have little or no valid basis for
observing the interpersonal processes and formulating
an impression of the complexities in them which constitute
his maladjustment or mental disorder. 63
There is nothing unique about any mental disorder
except its pattern and perhaps the emphasis laid on
various of its manifestations. Thus, we all show
everything that any mental patient shows, except for
the pattern, accents and so on... 64
...patterns of mental disorder and related personality
types (involve) recurrent eccentricities in interpersonal
relations... 65
I do not wish to make this an unduly complex account. I believe that in light
of the various definitions we find above, the best way to conceive of "mental illness"
according to Sullivan is in terms of a failure of mental health. Clearly, as in the case
with his "diagnoses of personality" -- because they occur earlier in life -- some failures
in mental health may be severe while others, such as the "disorders of personality,"
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may be milder in form. The point is, though, that for Sullivan there are gradations of
"mental health."
Why did Sullivan conceive of mental illness in this way? Is there a
justification in his theory for viewing mental illness in terms of mental health? I
believe this is due to his most famous and foundational assumption, commonly called
the One Genus Postulate. He says:
We shall assume that everyone is simply much more
human than otherwise, and that anomalous interpersonal
situations, insofar as they do not arise from difference
in language or custom, are a function of differences in
relative maturity of the persons concerned. In other
words, the differences between any two instances of
human personality -- from the lowest grade imbecile
to the highest grade genius -- are much less striking
than the differences between the least-gifted human
being and a member of the nearest other biological
genus. 66
If psychiatrists keep their focus on what is common to all human beings, rather than

on what makes some different from others, mental health and mental unhealth will be
seen as nothing more than variations on one theme: humanity.
This being so, one might wonder, "In Sullivan's opinion, who are the persons
who should seek psychiatric help?" Clearly, occasional, isolated instances of one
acting against the norm would not warrant treatment by a psychiatrist.67 However,
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This point is, again, very similar to a claim that Hume's makes in the
Treatise, III, i, 403. When judging moral actions, Hume tells us not to be concerned
with the occasional, random action. He says: "The mind ballances the contrary
experiments, and deducing the inferior from the superior, proceeds with that degree of
assurance or evidence which remains."
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recurrent eccentricities in behavior might justify psychotherapeutic treatment. In the
end, though, this could conceivably happen to anyone, at any time. As Sullivan says:
The interviewer has to remember that there
is enough in the culture to justify his
client having some trouble in living ... Every
one of us has some trouble in living -- it
is ordained by our social order itself that
none of us can find and maintain a way of life
with perfect contentment, proper self-respect,
and so on. ... In the psychiatric interview, the
patient believes that he is going to learn
something useful about the way he lives. 68
What Sullivan is really attacking in this paragraph is the notion that culture which is
responsible in large measure for what determines successful interpersonal relations has
not developed (and probably never will) to the point where everyone could possess
perfect mental health. One must recall what was noted earlier, that culture is
inherently irrational. As such, culture itself mitigates the possibility that persons
could ever achieve perfect mental health when described as perfect contentment,
perfect self-esteem etc. This leads to a final remark.
Perhaps the definitions themselves patently suggest this, but one must always
bear in mind that for Sullivan, whether one is talking about mental health/illness or the
like, the diagnosis is made against the backdrop of culture. If cultures are changeable
(and they are for Sullivan), then so too are these categories of "mental health" or the
"patterns of interpersonal adjustive success."

Because of this, the burden that

societies bear for establishing "correct patterns of acculturation" is great.
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reason, Sullivan says:
Psychoneuroses and psychoses result when a
society is "twisted" from the purely average
in the statistical sense. 69
In the end, the continuum of mental health is variable against the backdrop of culture.

This strongly demonstrates that persons are, to a large extent, not responsible for the
failures in mental health. It also suggests that the role of the psychiatrist should be
more far-reaching than aiding "particular" patients. In short, the psychiatrist may be
seen to have the role of the social critic of and for society at large. The point though,
after a consideration of all of this, is that patterns of mental health/illness are subject
to change, in both time and place.

5)

The role of the psychiatrist: the therapeutic encounter

Having explained Sullivan's theory of the self and the nature of mental illness,
we are now in a position to see how these concepts are used in the therapeutic
encounter and by means of the psychiatrist. Again, although Sullivan's theory is
decidedly Humean in its normative agenda, I believe it is precisely when discussing
the peculiar role that the psychiatrist plays, that his account leaves much to be desired
-- not simply at a theoretical level, but most importantly as it affects the clients who
are treated in ITP.
We've seen in the previous section, that (any) person who exhibits a failure in
mental health and/or who is experiencing a difficulty in their interpersonal relations is
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a possible patient for therapy. Upon entering into therapy, from an interpersonal point
of view, Sullivan would claim that what is established is a "field." Much has been
written about the concept of "field theory," for it is not at all easily understandable.
The concept itself originated in disciplines other than ITP.70 Sullivan, apparently,
uprooted this concept and found it useful for ITP. He says:
The field of psychiatry is the study of interpersonal
relations and this is a perfectly valid area for the
application of the scientific method. The psychiatrist's
principal instrument of observations is his self -- his
personality, him as a person. The processes and the
changes in processes that make up the data which can be
subjected to scientific study occur, not in the subject
person nor in the observer, but in the situation which
is created between the observer and his subject (emphasis
added, mine). 71
In brief, field theory shows that the only relevant data in the therapeutic encounter is

the interpersonal situation that exists between the psychiatrist and the client; or in
other words, the "processes" that transpire between two persons.

For Sullivan, it is

virtually by definition of the nature of the psychiatric interview which demands this
approach and thereby denies psychoanalysis' ideal of a therapist as studying the client
in a neutral and impartial manner. 72 Sullivan says:
An interview is a situation of primarily vocal communication

° For an excellent discussion of the history and the confusion surrounding the
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in a two-group, more or less voluntarily integrated, on a
progressively unfolding expert-client basis for the purpose
of elucidating characteristic patterns of living of the subject
person... 73
Given this cursory overview of "field theory," I suggest that what should
concern us is the question: if Sullivan wishes to characterize the therapeutic encounter
as a "field of study"74 that consists of the "processes" that transpire between two
persons, how does the therapeutic encounter actually look in practice? Exploring this
question will lead us to an investigation of the respective roles of the client and the IT
therapist and the nature of what occurs between these "two persons."
One must remember that the field itself must be empirically observable. As
such, it is constituted by "syntaxic experience" (signs, symbols, language). In
Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, Sullivan claims that we might picture the field as

follows:
The situation is not any old thing, it is you and
someone else integrated in a particular fashion
which can be converted in the alembic of speech into
a statement that 'A is striving toward so and so from
B.' As soon as I say this, you realize that B is a
very highly significant element in the situation...
The situation is ... the valid object of study, or
rather, that which we can observe; namely the action
which indicates the situation and the character of
its integration. 75
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The above paragraph gives us better imagery of what the therapeutic situation might
look like: two persons striving towards an "integration" by their use of shared signs
and symbols. However, given this description that "action" between two participants
constitutes the data to be studied, one might very well wonder if the ITP psychiatrist
is somehow always studying himself in this process. And if so, how? Or conversely,
one might question if the client's communications affect the practice -- the person -- of
the psychiatrist?
The resounding answer to these questions would appear to be yes; although, as
we will see, in numerous passages Sullivan appears to say no. Let me begin by
saying that the use of the term "interpersonal" in this context is rather misleading.
Given some passages in his texts, it might have been wiser for Sullivan to admit that
some personal aspects of the psychiatrist enter into the therapeutic encounter.

Admittedly, that claim sounds quite strange. However, consider how Sullivan defines
the content of the interpersonal situation:
The setting up of the psychiatric field as
a study of interpersonal relations is certainly
necessary if psychiatry is to be scientific;
furthermore, by this simple expedient of so
defining psychiatry, we weed out from 'serious'
psychiatric problems a great number of 'pseudoproblems' -- which, since they are pseudo-problems,
are not susceptible of solution, attempts at their
solution being, in fact, only ways of passing a
lifetime pleasantly. Let me repeat that psychiatry
as a science cannot be concerned with what is
immutably private; it must be concerned only with
the human living which is in, or can be converted
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into, the public mode. 76
On the one hand, Sullivan is boldly making a normative claim about what aspects of
the person he is and is not interested in possessing knowledge of within the confines
of therapy. Moreover, Sullivan is also making claims with respect to what
legitimately counts as a psychiatric problem (what is definable and/or treatable) and
what is not. In general, one should note that what holds true for the client is also
implied for the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, as well, should not allow his private
mode of being to enter into therapy.
Consistent with the above view, in The Psychiatric Interview, Sullivan is most
emphatic in claiming that however "interpersonal" the therapeutic encounter may be,
the psychiatrist does not act as a "person," so to speak. He says:
From the beginning to the end, to the best of his
ability, the psychiatrist tries to avoid being
involved as a person -- even as a dear and wonderful
person -- and keeps to the business of being an
expert. (emphasis added, mine)77
There is little chance that the interviewee will
interpret correctly for the interviewer is not
engaged in being anything like a well-rounded
person whose durable characteristics would be
pertinent to the interview. He is engaged in
being an expert at determining what the durable
characteristics of the interview are. 78
Despite the reactionary move of ITP against the neutrality of Freud's psychoanalysis,
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Sullivan is not advocating that therapists be empathic. Quite often, in order to
describe the role of the therapist, Sullivan uses the seemingly oxymoronic phrase,
"participant observer." Clearly, though, the psychiatrist does not participate as a
person; but rather, only as an expert. This causes one to wonder, where in this
interpersonal field does the psychiatrist's expertise consist? Sullivan explains ...
The psychiatrist is supposed to be at least somewhat
familiar with practically everything that people do
one with another and to know more than his client
does about the interpersonal relations in any field
of interest that may be discussed. The psychiatrist
catches on to more; he is more informed about what
goes on in his relations with others than are even
really talented, but not expertly trained people.
... since the psychiatrist is an expert in interpersonal
relations, it is not at all strange that the patient
comes to the physician expecting him to handle things
so that the patient's purposes will be served; namely,
that his assets and liabilities in living will be
correctly appraised, and that his difficulties will be
tracked down to meaningful and remediable elements in
his past. 79
As has been argued in the previous section, within ITP (for the establishing of the
diagnosis), a psychiatrist's expertise is not to be equated with medical expertise. It

had there sufficiently been established that it was empirical observation with a view
toward "culture" that truly allowed for successful diagnosis. Let us take it as a given
that most rational persons, including psychiatrists, know a great deal about the
particular "culture(s)" in which they live. Let us use a thought experiment to see how
an ITP might treat a client whose "culture" varies considerably from his/her own.
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Consider the following simple example:
32 yr. old woman of Haitian descent. Moved to
Florida at the age of twelve. Recently moved to
Washington D.C. to work at a Catholic High-School
teaching history. Married to an American man.
Consulting an ITP for despair in marriage.
Imagining if this woman were to consult Sullivan himself for treatment, with the
exception of being part of the American culture and now only part of "east coast
society," I wish to suggest that Sullivan would have little understanding of the other
very important cultures of which she is a part, for example, the immigrant Haitian
culture of which she is a member. Now some might object and say that Sullivan
could have read about this other culture. Two easy responses are available on this
point: 1) This may be true; but even in this respect, Sullivan has no justification to
claim that the psychiatrist knows more than his client about the interpersonal relations
among Haitians and/or immigrant Haitians interacting with east coast society. 2)
Invariably, clients in all of their particularity will show up who are part of cultures of
which the psychiatrist will have no knowledge whatsoever. In short, psychiatrists can
not be expected to know something about all interpersonal patterns unless they become
cultural anthropologists (and even they would not purport to know something about all
cultures).

But this actually leads to the most important point.

Cultural anthropologists purport to study the patterns of society. As has been
said, psychiatrists treat individuals against the backdrop of society/culture. Because
they treat the individual, nuances, individual meanings, idiosyncrasies of the individual
are significant in a way in which they are not significant to a cultural anthrop0logist.
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For example, one might imagine if the Haitian woman practiced voodoo. This may be
significant in a way that it is not to a cultural anthropologist; and yet, it is precisely
this fact which is of importance in individual psychiatric treatment. I would venture
to say that an up-state New York psychiatrist would indeed know very little, perhaps
nothing, about this practice. What I am trying to establish here is that a psychiatrist's
knowledge of general patterns of behavior may be relatively unimportant in therapy
whereas knowledge of the details of an individual's life may be of essential
importance. 80
As a counterexample, someone might wish to argue that what is important for
the ITP psychiatrist to know is the important phases of the client's developmental
history. Indeed, Sullivan himself says this at the end of the above quote. Presumably,
if clients gained insight into the past as it affects their present, clients would learn

something useful for future actions.
In response to this objection, I would say that one must remember that the selfsystem of any individual is impervious to therapeutic change (see Section 1). It is
only the personality (more or less developed at the end of the juvenile era) which
might admit of therapeutic change. In the best circumstances, a client's personality
will change; however, the psychiatrist knows this to be the case by empirically
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observing a client's behavior. In other words, claims that one's personality has
"changed" are known only by inference. So too, a psychiatrist's understanding of
earlier phases of development rests upon "inference." The upshot that this has for our
present discussion is that the less one is acquainted with the cultures of which another
individual is a part, the less reliable will the psychiatrist's inferences be. One can only
imagine the reliability of the inferences Sullivan himself might make about the
developmental history of the Haitian woman. This point directly relates to the next.
Given the very different cultures to which the Haitian woman presently belongs
(and in the past belonged), the psychiatrist would indeed have very little fellowfeeling, or as Hume would say, feelings of sympathy toward her. For Hume, the
degree to which a person "sees their like" is the degree to which we have fellowfeeling. He says:
Now, 'tis obvious, that nature has preserv'd a great
resemblance among all human creatures, and that we
never remark any passion or principle in others, of which,
in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in
ourselves.... (emphasis added). Accordingly we find, that
where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there
is any peculiar similarity (emphasis added) in our manners,
or character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy.
The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object,
the more easily does the imagination make the transition,
and convey the related idea the vivacity of conception, with
which we always form the idea of our own person (emphasis
added). 81
Hume's remark invites two very important challenges to Sullivan's conception
of the role of the ITP psychiatrist. For, at the end of the quote, Hume claims that
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one's feelings of sympathy always occur with respect to the idea that one has of their
own person. As we have shown, Sullivan, oddly claims that the person of the ITP

psychiatrist -- even though dear and wonderful -- should not enter into the therapeutic
endeavor. Yet, as we will soon see, there are enough passages in which Sullivan
contradicts himself on this point. But secondly, one might counter and claim that
"fellow-feeling"/sympathy, as Hume calls it, although characteristic of human relations,
does not characterize the therapeutic encounter in ITP.

As I will argue, Sullivan

argues that the main assumption of any interpersonal field is characterized by "anxiety
in search of security." In other words, Sullivan is in complete agreement with Hume
and claims it is security that needs to be established in order to generate the cure/goal
of ITP. I will address both of these concepts below.

The first issue has to do with the fact that the psychiatrist's personal
characteristics impact the therapeutic encounter because ultimately, he makes use of
his "personal" knowledge of living as the criteria against which the patient is judged.
I make this point, because I do not think that it is arbitrary that numerous passages in
The Psychiatric Interview read as follows:

One of the reasons for the psychiatrist's initial
hesitancy in revealing by means of a summary how
at sea he feels in the interview situation is that
the sort of things that he summarizes is determined
by his own experience and his own grasp on living. 82
If it turns out that nothing about the patient fits
with any of the interviewer's past experience, he
will really have a grand and difficult task in being
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useful to this patient. 83
{With reference to a case study} And when I have all
this information -- and note that I am proceeding in what
has gradually been ingrained in me as a system of values
that seems natural to Americans -- I become curious,
sometimes to the patient's amazement, as to what sort of
person his father was ... 84
{When talking about the initial stages of the interview .. }.
At least, I try to give the client something of my
impression of why he is there. 85
What I am attempting to drive home by citing these remarks, is that there seems to be
a willingness on Sullivan's part to claim that the psychiatrist brings his own -- albeit
limited -- knowledge of experience to bear on the therapeutic encounter. More than
just knowing or being an expert in the rough taxonomy of the developmental stages of
the self, here, it seems as if Sullivan is claiming that the "personal aspects" are quite
necessary within the confmes of therapy.

But more importantly, the extent to which

persons sympathize with the other is the extent to which therapy will be useful or will
have accomplished its goal. So important is this to the success of ITP that I believe,

in a rather lucid and honest moment, Sullivan claims the following:
An identical distortion of living common to doctor
and patient makes this type of inquiry (psychiatric
inquiry), at best, difficult. Neither is able to see
the troublesome patterns ... , both become more firmly
deceived about life.86
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It is curious to note the choice of words in the above passage, for Sullivan clearly

states that a possible outcome of ITP is not merely "failure" of treatment; but more
radically, a deeper entrenchment of deception about life.
The second reason why personal characteristics are necessary in the ITP field
is because for Sullivan, the actual service of the therapeutic encounter is to be a
preliminary foray into the new patterns of behavior concerning future interpersonal
relations. He says:
.. .it may become possible to observe
better the factors that actually resist any tendency
to extend the integrations of our subject-persons,
so that they would include representative of other
groups relatively alien to them -- a Pilot Test of
which is the integration with oneself... 87
If the therapeutic encounter(s) serve as testing situations of better adjusted behaviors

on the part of the client, then in some sense, the psychiatrist has to use himself (his
own experience of interpersonal patterns) as some kind of criterion of mental health.
At the very least, the psychiatrist will be assuming some kind of personality that
comes replete with details (based on the personal experience of the psychiatrist).
Perhaps an example will better illustrate this point: One could imagine a patient who
enters therapy who has a problem with his boss. Imagine that this patient works in the
computer industry. Now, the psychiatrist's actual knowledge of corporate structure
may be limited or it may be vast. The point to note is that in his assumed role as his
patient's boss, invariably he has to bring his own knowledge (or lack thereof) to bear
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in his performance. The extent to which a client experiences success in the confines
of therapy, acts as a predictor as to whether or not the success will continue to occur
outside of therapy. In this regard, the degree to which the psychiatrist effectively (or
not) performs his role directly bears upon the success in living that the client will
experience (the restoration of mental health).
Finally, let me suggest that the personal characteristics of the psychiatrist enter
into the therapeutic encounter in the most important and necessary way by means of
his anxiety -- anxiety, of course, which is in search of security (or, sympathy as Hume
would say).

There is this sense that anxiety is somehow first and foremost our

natural state of being-with-others,88 and that individuals constantly strive to overcome
it by the "establishment" of security. I believe it is fair to say that in this respect the
therapeutic encounter imitates the manner in which the self develops. Sullivan often
states that the client presents to the psychiatrist precisely with a need to remedy his
trouble in living and at times, to ameliorate anxiety. Anxiety is said to have the
following very important role within the therapeutic encounter:
Anxiety as that which makes communication possible in
the therapeutic encounter: When there is no anxiety, a true
interview situation does not exist. 89
Although anxiety is always underlying any interview situation, anxiety is always in
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search of security. Some kind of connection based upon fellow-feeling becomes the
goal of ITP therapy.

6) Goals of therapy
Speckled throughout the subsequent sections have been hints as to what
constitutes the goals of ITP for the client. We might begin with overtly
acknowledging what is not a desired goal; namely pleasure. Indeed, insight desired
for only its own sake is also not encouraged. Insight may be a mediant, though not an
end-goal, of ITP. In other words, since Sullivan's notions of mental "unhealth/illness"
are based on a continuum conception, then ITP is honest in claiming that if clients
leave with having learned "something" that is conducive to living in their respective
cultures, then it has been worthwhile. 90
The emphasis in the above paragraph, I would, argue should be on "living,"
rather than on one's having "learned" something. Again, Sullivan, like Hume, is an
empiricist. One knows that one has succeeded in therapy to the extent to which one's
actions better conform to the expectations of his/her relevant cultures. A psychiatrist,
indeed, anyone, can only make inferences as to whether or not personality or character
has been modified.

However, the true test of success in this form of therapy is

judged by what is observable. As such, Sullivan is quite right to express only hope -and not certainty -- that the "pilot test" will be of some use to his client's future
behavior. To encourage psychiatrists to make ITP as successful as possible for their
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clients, Sullivan says:
I suggest that a psychiatrist find out something about
a person before he makes or implies expansive promises
about what he will do, or what ought to be done, and
particularly before he begins to do something which may
or may not have any earthly constructive influence on the
patient .... The psychiatrist should try to orient himself as
to certain basic probabilities according to the developmental
scheme of things. 91
What is important for the reader to recognize is Sullivan's honesty both about what
psychiatry can do and what the psychiatrist (and the client) may know about the
"cure" that results at the end of treatment. Like Hume who claimed that human
knowledge about matters of experience rests upon probability alone; so too, does
Sullivan claim that whether or not the client will manifest more useful patterns of
living (and hence, achieve a meaningful cure of therapy) is, ultimately, a matter of
faith. I call this a "matter of faith" because for Sullivan, what the client has learned in
therapy will only be meaningful when one acts accordingly. Thus, depending upon
how well the client "performs" in the pilot test acts as a kind of predictor about how
well they will perform their activities in the real world. The better the performance in
therapy, the more assured both the psychiatrist and client may feel about the client
performing these activities in the real world. In this respect, both will be more
assured that ITP therapy was useful -- successful -- for the client.
With respect to the content of these actions; Sullivan in no way explores what
these might be; for an individual's behavior must correspond to the culture(s) of which
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he/she is a part. This is an extremely important point to acknowledge because not
only does it indicate that Sullivan is an empiricist with respect to moral issues; but
also, that he is a relativist of some sort. This stands in marked contrast to what one
author has to say about Sullivan's "ethical theory:"
For Sullivan, the "good" is generally identified with
the state of human maturity, already described in the
"fully human estate," and characterized as dignity, selfrespect, competence and freedom. 92
Lawson is quite right in saying that dignity, self-respect, etc. are values that appear in
adolescence, or what is commonly considered to be the last phase of personality
development. Yet, drawing the further normative notion from this by saying that
Sullivan's description of maturity functions as some "abstract" rationalistic notion of
what all persons should aspire to -- the good, or the good life -- is a faulty
interpretation. In particular, with respect to competence and freedom, these are all but
absolute or well-theorized notions in ITP. In themselves, they may be pleasant to
have; but they are not intrinsically necessary for the establishment of mental health.
The same could be said for the concepts of dignity and self-respect. Some might wish
to say that a sense of dignity and self-respect are essential to acting in useful ways, or
are somehow necessary for acting well with others. There is some evidence that
Sullivan does seem to think this is the case; but remember, the beauty of ITP both
broadly and minimally is that people are ultimately judged by how they live. Dignity
and self-respect, then, are only evidenced through actions.
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In conclusion, it is hoped that the reader will see that there can no~ be, in

principle, any one set of ethical maxims that are suggested to all clients during and as
a goal of treatment in ITP. Values that are suggested to the client in the course of
treatment will and do vary according to the values that are esteemed within a client's
given culture(s). As I have attempted to demonstrate, Sullivan himself seemed to be
aware, though did not consistently express, that the success of treatment largely
depends upon the psychiatrist's familiarity with the client's past and present patterns of
behavior.
Nonetheless, there are consistent normative notions that the psychiatrist must
adhere to if he purports to practice ITP. These, as I have argued, are strikingly similar
to those professed by David Hume. In the end, it could safely be said that what is
important to inculcate for the client both within treatment and as the goal of therapy is
for him to experience feelings of security and approval from others. Psychiatrists are
experts in this field to the extent that they can do the work, in part, of the cultural
anthropologist. In this respect then, the ITP psychiatrist is indeed a relativist with
respect to values. However, it is also important acknowledge that an ITP psychiatrist
may be required to be a social critic when it is deemed that particular cultures do not
advocate security.
By way of illustration, biographer Helen Swick Perry says that in his later
years, Sullivan suffering from ill health and yet living in the aftermath of Hiroshima,
had to make the difficult decision to take care of his own health or advance
scholarship in the human sciences towards issues of social responsibility. She writes:
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His own comment on his decision was typical of
Sullivan: "It appears that I'm about to make even
more of a fool of myself than usual, but, by God,
I'm going to try it!" From that moment on, Harry
Stack Sullivan paid no more attention to his heart
or to his medical advisors. 93
So great were Sullivan's worries about social cohesion in the wake of Hiroshima that
until the day he died he was involved in issues of social activism. He urged other
psychiatrists to engage, as he did, in interdisciplinary mental health congresses in order
to explore "improper child training." 94 Knowledge thus gained could enlighten the
public about ill-founded cultural practices for the sake of encouraging better mental
health, and more importantly social progress. In this respect, then, Sullivan was an
absolutist; for, as society moved toward seeming chaos, Sullivan fought for greater
bonds of sympathy. As the founder of ITP, Sullivan founded a theory which
legitimated future psychiatrists to play the role of the social critic, social activist,
moral psychologist and cultural anthropologist. To the extent that ITP psychiatrists can
play these roles is the extent to which they serve their clients and society at large.

93

Helen Swick Perry, Psychiatrist of America, 404.

94

Ibid., 407.

CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS OF VIKTOR FRANKL'S LOGOTHERAPY

In The Will to Meaning, Viktor Frankl claims that "no psychotherapy is
immune to values; there are only psychotherapies which are blind to them." 1 More
than any other paradigm of psychotherapy analyzed in this dissertation thus far, Frankl
not only seeks to expose but even flaunts the philosophical and normative assumptions
that underlie logotherapy. Less than a century since Freud claimed "scientific" status
for psychoanalysis Frankl argues, by contrast, that it is the spiritual dimension of the
person which lies at the heart of mental wholeness or health.
The task of this chapter is to examine the normative force that a logotherapy's
philosophical assumptions acquire in the clinical context as they: a) function in
establishing the client's diagnosis, b) define the role of the therapist and the techniques
of treatment and most importantly, c) determine the goal(s) of therapy. Identifying
these assumptions would seem to be a relatively straightforward task considering how
much attention Frankl gives to these concepts in his writing. Chapters abound entitled:

1

Viktor E. Frankl. The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of
Logotherapy, expanded ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), xi.
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"Dynamics and Values of Therapy," "The Philosophical Foundations of Logotherapy,"
etc. 2 Paradoxically, despite Frankl' s discussions of these underlying assumptions, very
often a true grasp of their meaning remains elusive. 3 For this reason, part of this
analysis will consist of a reconsideration of Frankl's justifications for logotherapy, his
view of the human person and what he calls, the "objective realm of values."
It is my contention that when one examines the philosophical assumptions of
this paradigm on their own terms and for the consequences that they might entail, the
internal consistency of logotherapy as a discipline begins to erode. I will demonstrate
that the theoretical incoherence of logotherapy has two important implications for its
practice:
1) the nature of the expertise of logotherapists is unclear
2) any number of goals could potentially result for the client
at the end of treatment.

2

Viktor E. Frankl. Psychotherapy and Existentialism, Selected Papers on
Logotherapy (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967), 4.
3

I suspect this is the case for two reasons: 1) So as to differentiate
logotherapy from other psychological schools of thought, Frankl often appeals to
rich philosophical traditions to establish his theory. For example, he claims that
logotherapy borrows many of its concepts from existentialism and phenomenology.
The richness and breadth of these two traditions and the various persons who have
advanced them suggest that terms, such as "being" and "reality" admit of various
meanings. For this reason, the philosopher reading Frankl' s texts will look for
precision regarding the meaning he gives to these terms. 2) Because traditional
philosophical assumptions are uprooted from their context and being employed
for a different end -- the establishment of logotherapy -- these concepts acquire
subtle shifts of meaning. For these two reasons, then, I call them "elusive."
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In a variety of senses, I will argue that relativism lurks beneath logotherapy. Rather
than having established "the meaning of being human therapy" and attempting to
remedy clients' ailments by means of its methods, Frankl can only honestly be said to
have put forth an interpretation of a meaning of being human. As this last claim is
itself interpreted by individual practitioners of logotherapy, in its very real and human
context, any number of possible values may be achieved by the person who seeks this
kind of treatment.
Admittedly, the above paragraph reads as a very complex thesis statement. To
aid the reader to see the force that my interpretation has and to see it unfold from the
variety of perspectives under which logotherapy can be viewed, 4 the main themes of
this chapter are outlined below:
1) Historical background and purpose of logotherapy:
a) Why did this form of therapy arise and for what end(s)?
b) Is logotherapy merely a "supplement" to psychotherapy?
2) Logotherapy's view of the person
a) Frankl's dimensional ontology
b) Preliminary consideration of mental illness
c) The tragic triad of human existence: pain, death and guilt
3) "Logos" (meaning): The objective realm of experience
4) How do we know the objective realm of experience: the role of
intuitive conscience
5) Bridge: What has been accomplished?
6) The therapeutic encounter:
a) Treatment of the clinical neurotic
4

What I mean by this last phrase is simply that the clinical encounter involves
at least two different points of view - that of the client and the therapist. When one
adds temporal considerations to this, i.e. the client's view at the beginning, during and
at the end of therapy, one can see how logotherapy could be viewed from a variety of
perspectives. Of course, and as I have been suggesting, underlying these perspectives
is the theory itself (the philosophical assumptions) that the logotherapist purportedly
adopts.
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b) Treatment of the existential neurotic
7) Conclusion

1) Historical background and purpose of logotherapy:
1a) Why did this form of therapy arise and for what ends?

In his first chapter of The Will to Meaning, Frankl acknowledges the historical
indebtedness of logotherapy to other forms of psychotherapy. 5 Accordingly,
logotherapy draws from Freud's psychoanalysis and even the philosophical writings of
Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler and Martin Buber. Yet, because logotherapy merits its
own name and interprets the concept of mental health in a unique manner, Frankl is
eager to point out the differences between his version of therapy and those of his
predecessors.
In order to situate his version of therapy in the scheme of existing paradigms,
Frankl claims that logotherapy can be viewed as a branch of existential or ontoanalysis. 6

Like Ludwig Binswanger, Frankl agrees that psychotherapy should be

concerned with the human person's "being;" however, unlike Binswanger, Frankl
maintains that "being" requires the corollary of "meaning."

It is because existential

analysts overlooked this second and necessary correlate of human existence that Frankl
saw the need to further develop this school of thought by means of logotherapy.

5

Ibid., 3-12.

6

Ibid., 5.
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Both theoretically and practically, the addition of the concept of meaning is
essential because the self, for Frankl, simply can not be understood without some
reference to an "other." As opposed to the philosophy of Sartre and Binswanger's
(incomplete) existential analysis, Frankl maintains that the self can neither be what it is
nor become what it should be when considered against the background of nothingness.
An other/meaning(s) is required for human being-in-the-world. 7

The theoretical rationale for this view rests, in part, on a more complete
conception of the nature of the person.

In Frankl's view, previous schools of

psychotherapy overlooked the importance of logos precisely because they took for
granted the intrinsic spiritual core of the human person. Viewing the human person as
a combination of body and psyche forced the unpalatable conclusion that the human
person is solely a mechanism and driven by instincts. Although both psychoanalysis
and interpersonal forms of therapy have addressed these aspects of the human person,
their inadequacy lies in not recognizing that it is the spiritual (logos-seeking) aspect of
the human person which "constitutes oneness and wholeness in man. "8 Logotherapy

7

As we shall see in subsequent sections, the therapeutic setting itself must
imitate this self/other relationship. It is the logotherapist who facilitates the clients'
being to come in contact with meaning(s). As Frankl states in The Will to Meaning,
11-12: " .. .if self-understanding is to be reached, it has to be mediated by encounter. In
other words, Freud's statement, where id is, ego should be, could be enlarged; Where
id is ego should be; but the ego can only become an ego through a Thou."
Viktor E. Frankl. The Unconscious God: Psychotherapy and Theo/o~ (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 28.
8

123
addresses the spiritual dimension of the person and by implication, logotherapists
attempt to bring their clients into contact with "meaning."
In this section, I have attempted to summarize one motivation that led to the
formation of logotherapy. 9

When viewed in its historical context, it can be seen as an

intellectual development of existing psychotherapeutic paradigms. For this reason,
Frankl frequently speaks of logotherapy as "supplementary" to traditional
psychotherapy. 10

Yet, even a cursory glance at the underlying rationale for

logotherapy -- involving as it does a more complete conception of the nature of the
person and a discussion of meanings -- makes one wonder if it is more appropriate to
say that logotherapy constitutes a "revisionary" or "radically new" form of
psychotherapy. Determining whether or not logotherapy is intended to be only a
supplement to psychotherapy, or perhaps something more, is extremely important. It
will enable one to have a clear sense of what it is that logotherapy intends to do, both
theoretically and practically for the client who seeks this kind of treatment. Attempting
to answer this question directly leads us to the next question of this chapter.

9

It would be an oversight not to acknowledge the personal motivation that led
to Frankl's logotherapy. See Frankl, Doctor and Soul, x. There, he says that his
experience in the concentration camps served as a "testing ground for the main tenet
of logotherapy." Much of the theory had been developed prior to his entering the
concentration camps; however, the work was taken from him by the S.S. The thought
of reconstructing the book served as an orientation toward a meaning which had
survival value for him while in the camps.
10

Ibid., xii, 17, 270.
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1b) Is logotherapy merely a supplement to psychotherapy?
An architectural metaphor may be helpful to illustrate the nature and the
importance of the above distinction.

One might compare "traditional psychotherapy"

to a classically constructed building. If, as Frankl often claims, logotherapy is a
"supplement and not a substitute for psychotherapy," one might imagine that
logotherapy adds necessary structural supports to the already existent building. Even
with the supports, the overall appearance of the building remains the same. However,
if one construes logotherapy as revisionary, one might imagine in light of the metaphor
that it adds new and different supports to the building. If the support system were
"radically new," such as an inner steel frame might be for a classically constructed
building, it would necessarily follow that the overall appearance of the building would
be different. One might imagine that a classically constructed building with an interior
frame structure would no longer even bear a resemblance to what it once was; but
rather, it might look like a modem-day skyscraper. The same would be true if one
were to view logotherapy as providing foundations of a "radically new" kind for
psychotherapy. Traditional psychotherapy would no longer look as it does. It would,
by necessity "become" something different.
Repeatedly in his writings and as noted before, Frankl maintains that logotherapy is
supplementary to psychotherapy and because of this, is not applicable to all
traditionally conceived mental illnesses. Logotherapy, properly speaking, only
addresses the spiritual core of the human person and does not purport to treat the
body and psyche. Because of this, Frankl sometimes speaks as if logotherapy is only
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applicable to those who suffer from uniquely spiritual illnesses (i.e. the existential
vacuum, collective neurosis). If we are to interpret Frankl literally on this point, a
practical problem emerges for the potential client of logotherapy: If the human
person, metaphysically speaking, consists of a body, mind and spirit, is it possible that
one see a psychiatrist for medical management, a psychotherapist for interpreting one's
psyche and a logotherapist for concerns of the spirit/meaning? Are three different
"professionals" needed? Viewing logotherapy as a "supplement and not a substitute"
for psychotherapy would seem to delimit its appropriate sphere of intervention to only
and exclusively matters of the spirit. Practically, this would mean that clients might
need treatment from other professionals.
In other passages, Frankl rejects the above consequence. 11 By doing so, it appears
as if Frankl intends logotherapy to be more than a mere "supplement" for
psychotherapy. For example, some chapters of Frankl' s books are devoted to
demonstrating how classic (psychoanalytic) mental illness, i.e. obsessional neurosis,
anxiety neurosis, sexual frustration can be "cured" by means of logotherapy's
techniques. 12

In addition, his characterization of logotherapy as a medical ministry

11

Frankl, Will to Meaning, 151-2. "I am reminded of the American doctor
who once turned up in my clinic and asked me, 'Now, doctor, are you a
psychoanalyst?' Whereupon I replied, 'Not exactly a psychoanalyst; let's say a
psychotherapist.' He then asked me, 'What school do you stand for?' I answered, 'It
is my own theory. It is logotherapy.'"
12

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 176-209.
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highlights the therapeutic effects that logotherapy may have on the body. 13 More than
a supplement, logotherapy purports to do the following:
The applications of logotherapy discussed in this
book are also threefold: First of all, logotherapy is
applicable as a treatment of noogenic neurosis;
second, logotherapy is a treatment of psychogenic
neuroses, i.e. neuroses in the conventional sense of
the word; and third, logotherapy is a treatment of
somatogenic neuroses, or for that matter,
somatogenic diseases in general. As we see, all the
dimension of a human being are reflected in this
sequence of subject matters. 14
Indeed, as Frankl himself argues in this passage, "all the dimensions" of the human
being can be addressed by logotherapy's applications. Far from treating a mere onethird of our total human nature, the above citations show that logotherapy aims to do
much more. In my view, these two incompatible accounts of the purpose of
logotherapy rest upon Frankl' s ambiguous account of the nature of the human person.
As noted before, Frankl is eager to point out the philosophical foundations of
logotherapy; however, and as we will see in the next section, his discussion of the
nature of the person admits of two very different interpretations. In sum, depending
on what view of the person the logotherapist ultimately adopts determines if

13

Ibid., 281. "Medical ministry belongs in the work of every physician. The
surgeon should have recourse to it as much and as often as the neurologist or
psychiatrist. It is only that the goal of medical ministry is different and goes deeper
than that of the surgeon..... Where actual surgery comes to an end, the work of
medical ministry begins. For something must follow after the surgeon has laid aside
his scalpel, or where surgical work is ruled out -- as, for example, the inoperable
case."
14

Frankl, Will to Meaning, viii.
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logotherapy is only a "supplement to psychotherapy" or is, in fact, "revisionary in
nature. 15

2) Logotherapy's view of the human person
2a) Frankl's dimensional ontology
Frankl' s account of the self was modified over the years.

Yet, unlike Freud, it

could be argued that Frankl merely used different language to describe the self and did
not substantively change his theory. In other words, Frankl's view of the self remains
essentially the same. It is also, as I will argue, a consistently vague theory. For,
whether one considers Frankl's earlier or later work, both accounts admit of at least
two interpretations of the nature of the person. In what follows, I will describe these
two competing conceptions of the self and demonstrate how each implicitly supports
different aims of logotherapy as a discipline -- as either supplementary to
psychotherapy or as a revisionary form of therapy. Curiously, it will also be shown
that Frankl himself seems to favor one conception of the human person as opposed to
the other and, therefore, most likely does construe logotherapy as a "revisionary
version of psychotherapy." Consequences that this interpretation has for other aspects
of his therapy will be noted (i.e. descriptions of mental illness, motivational account,
causal account, etc.).

15

It goes without saying that if logotherapy theoretically admits of two
different interpretations regarding the nature of the person, then which view a
logotherapist adopts for practice is a matter of individual choice. In this way,
arbitrariness is imbued in the nature of the "expertise" that logotherapists claim to
possess. This individual choice might imply different goals for the clients treated by
this form of therapy.

128
Frankl' s 1947 text, The Unconscious God, is one of his first attempts at
characterizing the nature of the human person and the need for logotherapy. Even in
this early work, the primacy that Frankl accords to the spiritual dimension of the
person is apparent. However, in this book, Frankl' s account seems constrained by the
language of depth psychology. Like Freud, Frankl employs the notions of the
unconscious and conscious. Only unlike Freud, in this account he claims that "the
spiritual basis of human existence is ultimately unconscious." 16 Rather than merely
being the locus of instincts, the belief that the human person is fundamentally a
conscious and responsible agent is rooted at this primordial level of being.
Presumably, Frankl expands the notion of the unconscious in this way so as to align
logotherapy (in terms of technique) with psychoanalysis. Just as Freud believed that
unconscious material needed to be made conscious; so too, Frankl claims that in
logotherapy one is consciously made aware of their basic human nature: of being a
free, responsible and spiritual being.
In his later work, Frankl abandons talk of the spiritual unconscious which is at the
root of the self. I suspect he did this for two, somewhat related reasons: 1) It seems
plausible to suggest that Frankl realized the limitations of the language of depth
psychology to characterize the nature of the spiritual self.

Even in his early work,

Frankl seems to struggle with talk of a spiritual unconscious which is essentially free
and responsible. This leads him to make obscure claims such as "spiritual
phenomenon may be unconscious or conscious. " 17 2) Inspired by the work of Nicolai
16

Frankl, Unconscious God, 31.
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Hartmann and Max Scheler, Frankl realized that the language of "dimensional
ontology" better characterized his view of the person. 18 Even with this improvement,
however, two competing interpretations can be derived from this account.
In later work, Frankl adopts a concentric circle approach for analyzing human
nature. The core of the self is the spiritual center which is the locus of two,
irreducible ontological features: consciousness and responsibility. 19 Encircling our
spiritual core (and in this order) are the psyche and the body. To speak of the self as
having "aspects" -- consisting of strata or layers as Hartmann or Scheler claim, -- does
"justice," Frankl says "to the ontological differences of the human person."20 It is this
view of the person which implicitly supports the view that logotherapy is a supplement
and not a substitute for psychotherapy.
Nonetheless, despite these ontological differences, Frankl is adamant that the self
be viewed as a unity. Indeed, he criticizes Scheler's and Hartmann's account for
failing to emphasize the "unity that man is, a unity in spite of multiplicity."21 Concern
for presenting a holistic view of human nature is apparent even in his treatment of the
self in The Unconscious God In that text, Frankl critiques Freud's psychic atomism;
namely that the human being is conceived of in terms of distinct parts: the id, the ego
17

Ibid.

18

Frankl, Will to Meaning, 22.

19

Frankl does seem to want to justify these assumptions. For an example, see
Doctor and Soul, fn. 5-6.

° Frankl, Will to Meaning,

2

21

Ibid.

22.
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and the super-ego. Frankl's dissatisfaction with Freud's characterization of the self is
that it implied that the task of psychoanalysis was to reconstruct the whole person out
of mere fragments. 22
It is hoped that the reader can now see why logotherapy may have two very

different aims. Depending if one gives precedence to the three, ontologically different
aspects of the self, one may construe logotherapy as a supplement to psychotherapy.
While this interpretation is warranted based on his description of the self, Frankl
probably realized that too much emphasis on these ontological differences would
expose logotherapy to the same kind of criticism to which psychoanalysis falls prey.
If, on the other hand, one views the self as an integrated unity -- as Frankl seems to
advocate -- then logotherapy is indeed a revisionary form of psychotherapy and even
more, a medical ministry. If Frankl's view of the person is "revisionary" in this sense,
one can expect that his descriptions of what constitutes mental illness will be different
as well.
Giving precedence to the self as a unified whole has some interesting consequences
for logotherapy, now viewed as a revisionary form of psychotherapy. Two of these
implications are alluded to in the following passage:
Of necessity the unity of man -- a unity in spite of the
multiplicity of body and mind -- cannot be found in the
biological or psychological but must be sought in that
noological dimension out of which man is projected in
the first place. 23
22

Frankl, Unconscious God, 21.

23

Frankl, Will to Meaning, 25.
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If the unity of the person rests upon the noological (spiritual) core of the self, by

necessity the three dimensions of the person are hierarchically arranged. As a result, it
will be shown that for Frankl it is the spiritual core of the human person which
functions as the foundational and most important aspect of our existence. If this is the
case, then one might expect Frankl to provide the reader with a causal account of how
it is that the spirit "impacts" the other two dimensions of the self.

In sum, some kind

of causal story that explains the connections between these three strata is needed.
Finally, if it is consciousness and responsibility that capture the essential nature of the
human person, one might wonder what importance Frankl might grant to a client's
desires in the confines of therapy.
In the next section, we will turn to an examination of Frankl' s notions of mental
illness. If the above is a correct characterization of the person, then perhaps a
preliminary understanding of the nature of mental illness can be reached. Such an
investigation may carry with it the possibility that normative assumptions attached to
these definitions can be glimpsed.

2b) Preliminary consideration of mental illness
Understanding logotherapy as a revisionary psychotherapy due to its metaphysically
enriched description of the person suggests that traditional conceptions of mental
illness will be altered. 24 As mentioned in an earlier section of this paper, Frankl's

24

By the phrase, "traditional conceptions of mental illness and norm3:lcy," I
am simply referring to those schools of thought which characterize mental illness
solely in terms of a psychological data, i.e. Freud's psychoanalysis and H.S. Sullivan's
interpersonal theory of psychiatry.
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logotherapy does purport to treat schizophrenia, obsessional neurosis, anxiety neurosis,
etc. 25 However, one must bear in mind that the meaning assigned to these terms is
markedly different; that is to say, they are literally "re-viewed" through the lens of
logotherapy's understanding of what it means to be a person. In this section, we will
engage in a preliminary consideration of how Frankl conceives of mental illness. 26
Since the biological and psychological aspects of the self are said to constitute
human facticity, one might wonder how various psychological states (i.e. feelings of
frustration, erratic ideas, racing thoughts) and/or behavior (i.e. compulsive handwashing, avoidant activities) affect his definitions of mental illness. When seen from
the spiritual dimension of the person, as logotherapy asks us to view these data, neither
psychological nor behavioral data contribute to these conceptions in any meaningful
way. 27 Quite simply, they are said to constitute a human person's "destiny."

What

remains central to the concept of "normalcy" is that one's spiritual core -- the core of
conscience and responsibility -- is unscathed by destiny. Provided that one makes a

25

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 176-206.

26

I call this a "preliminary consideration" of mental illness and normalcy
because we are considering these notions on their own terms. One must remember
that for Frankl, the self can not be wholly understood in isolation; rather, an "other," is
required. We have yet to consider the nature of the corollary of being. As such, this
section is only to be considered as a preliminary investigation of mental illness.
27

See Section 6a of this chapter for a further explanation as to why only the
spiritual dimension of the person contributes to a meaningful understanding of mental
illness.
28

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 75.
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choice or takes a stand toward these data, a person's essence will not be impacted by
such facticity. This theme is expressed in numerous ways in The Doctor and the Soul:
The mind is contingent upon instincts and existence is
contingent upon substance. This destiny can be transcended. 28
Destiny must always be a stimulus to conscious, responsible
action. 29
Biological destiny is the material which must be shaped by
the free, human spirit. 30
Man's psychological fate, meaning by this, those psychic factors
which stand in the way of spiritual freedom. The ego can decide,
freely; the ego can have control over the instincts. 31
On this reading, I think one can assume that "mental illness" may still be said to
exist, although one may be said to be spiritually normal. Invoking the view of the
person as ontologically stratified would allow for this interpretation, though it would
seem to entail some extremely undesirable implications. 32 Because of this, I would
maintain that Frankl reconstrues traditional conceptions of mental illness by means of
29

Ibid.' 79.

30

Ibid., 83.

31

Ibid., 85.

32

One could certainly imagine a case where someone believes he should
commit suicide. It would appear as if logotherapists would have to concede that this
person is spiritually healthy provided they have taken a conscious and responsible
'stand' toward their destiny. Yet, Frankl himself denies this implication. In The Will
to Meaning, 61, he says: "I am personally glad to take the blame for having been
directive along the lines of a life-affirming Weltanschauung whenever I have had to
treat the suicidal patient."
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his integrated understanding of the nature of the person. In large part this is
accomplished by a broader understanding of the nature of the symptom. When one
understands what constitutes a "symptom" in logotherapy, one will have to concede
that logotherapy radically reconstrues the nature of "mental illness."
When discussing the nature of the symptom in The Doctor and the Soul, Frankl
draws parallels between the expression of the symptom and the human person's three
ontological dimensions. He says the following:
The symptom is never merely a consequence of some somatic
factor and the expressions of some psychic factor, but it is also
a mode of existence -- and this last element is the crucial one
(i.e. somatic factors in the concentration camp included lack of
sleep, hunger; psychological expressions included inferiority
feelings, depression, etc.) But ultimately, symptoms express a
spiritual attitude. For in every case, man retains the freedom
and the possibility of deciding for or against the influence of his
surroundings. 33
I believe that the language Frankl uses in the above passage to characterize the
symptom supports my view that Frankl does indeed re-construe traditionally conceived
notions of mental illness and normalcy. Characterizing the most "crucial" aspect of
the symptom as being a "mode of existence" and that "ultimately, it is a spiritual
attitude," can not help but forge new understandings.

What emerges, though, from

this consideration is a paradox: If it is the case that symptoms can be expressed at the
spiritual level and manifest themselves at this conscious, free dimension, one wonders
how "in every case, man retains the freedom and the possibility for or deciding
against" anything whatsoever. In other words, the spiritual dimension of the person is
33

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 97.
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the very aspect of the person which is capable of free, conscious and responsible
choices; yet, it is this very dimension of the self which also can fall prey to
"symptoms." This paradox could be resolved if Frankl would speak of the spiritual
dimension as somehow stratified; yet, this possibility is not addressed. Rather, Frankl
seems to want to stress the unity and wholeness of each of the three aspects of being.
While this paradox has been shown to exist in other paradigms of psychotherapy, it is
my contention that it will pose particularly acute problems in existential versions of
psychotherapy. 34
I believe that a logotherapist has three possible stands to take with respect to this
paradox: 1) either the spiritual dimension of the person is completely immutable in the
face of mental, even spiritual illness; 2) the spiritual dimension suffers at some level
and is immutable at some level; 35 3) the spiritual dimension of the self suffers
completely -- conscience and responsibility are incapacitated. There is evidence that
Frankl adopts all three of these positions.

36

Since the above example can be

interpreted as illustrating either the first or second position, I will focus on the
theoretical evidence for the third possible interpretation of the paradox.
34

See Section 6a of this chapter for a further explanation.

35

Ibid., 195, "Obsessional neurosis is not a psychosis; the sick person's attitude
is still relatively free."
From my point of view, Frankl's implicit adoption of all three stands without
clearly justifying them to the reader and more importantly to the logotherapist
necessarily ushers a certain arbitrariness into this discipline. I remind the reader that
analysis of the paradox lends support to my thesis: namely, that logotherapy involves
"incoherent" metaphysical assumptions and as a result ushers relativism into its
practice.
36
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At times, Frankl speaks of uniquely "spiritual illnesses" or "spiritual suffering."
There is evidence which suggests that this suffering can be experienced in either one
of two ways: either persons are incapable of actualizing their freedom and
responsibility; or, persons have a distorted view of their basic human nature. 37 In the
former case, Frankl claims that these cases of spiritual suffering represent the "greatest
human accomplishment." For, it is at these points that one most fully realizes their
essential nature; namely, to be a free and responsible being. In the latter case, Frankl
does not call this distortion an '"'accomplishment," but neither does he call it "a mental
disease; let alone a disease of the spirit. "38 Rather, cognitive distortion of one's basic
nature constitutes a "particular philosophical position" or a "particular world-view. "39
Our preliminary excursion into the nature of mental illness has resulted in
revisionary conceptions of its nature. One might even suggest that in logotherapy, the
term, mental illness, is somehow obsolete. To summarize what has been
accomplished, logotherapy "allows" for the following forms of "abnormalcy:"
1) Traditionally construed "mental illnesses" (understood as
psychical states or physical expressions) constitute part of
human "destiny,"
2) When viewed from the spiritual dimension, traditional "mental
illnesses," may be accompanied by "spiritual symptoms,"
37

See Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 191. Frankl claims that the obsessional neurotic
"seeks absolute certainty in cognition and decision. He strives for hundredpercentness." As we will see in a later section, Frankl believes that human
cognition is fallible and limited. Therefore, the obsessional neurotic misconstrues
human nature.
38

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 195.
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3) Uniquely spiritual illnesses may be interpreted as accomplishments

or distorted philosophical worldviews.
Underlying these multiple descriptions lies an ambiguous conception of the spiritual
dimension of the self. 40

2c) The tragic triad of human existence: pain. death and guilt
Thus far, attention has been granted to only one philosophical assumption
underlying logotherapy, namely the nature of the self. By discussing the theoretical
inconsistencies operative in this one, foundational concept it is hoped that the reader
may already begin to glimpse how this could impact the practice of logotherapy. At
this point, however, the normative force that this concept assumes in the course of
therapy has yet to be addressed. This section functions as a bridge by which the
reader can begin to see the normative project flourish. At the end, the reader will see
how Frankl's description of the person's existential state, consisting of death, pain and
guilt takes on a prescriptive force and suggests of its own accord a "particular
philosophical worldview. "41
40

In the previous sections, it was shown that logotherapists are warranted in
adopting two views of the self. In this section, we have shown that whether or not

logotherapists buy into one or the other, they still have an insufficient metaphysical
foundation of the spiritual dimension of the self which supports the various diagnoses
of mental illness, spiritual illness, etc. More will be said on this when the technique
of the logotherapist is discussed.
41

The unique position that this section occupies can be explained in a slightly
different way. In the preceding section, I had suggested that Frankl employs Sartre's
existential concept of "facticity," and would agree that it is a person's biological and
psychological dimension which constitute destiny. Given the uniqueness of persons,
one might assume that each individual experiences their destiny in a highly subjective
way. When discussing individual clients, Frankl himself often speaks this way.
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In addition, analysis of the tragic triad of our existence bridges together an isolated
analysis of the self (subject) to that of the objective realm of values (the other). On
the one hand, it characterizes essential features of the person's existence, and therefore,
relates to the experience of the self. On the other hand, these features form the
backdrop against which human beings act, adopt values, relate to others, etc. At the
end of this section, the path will be paved for a discussion of other philosophical
assumptions in logotherapy, in particular a discussion of "the objective realm of
values." A proper understanding of the descriptions of death, pain and guilt, greatly
colors the worldview that logotherapy advocates; for it is against the universal and
subjective background whereby all persons exercise free, conscious and responsible
action.
Frankl claims that the tragic triad of existence characterizes our "human
predicament," but more importantly it motivates us to act and to reach out to the
objective realm of values. 42 The three aspects which form the "tragic triaq of our
existence" correlate to each of the ontological dimensions of the self. In some sense,
these features can be interpreted as limiting factors of existence. For example, at the
somatic level one simply must acknowledge the natural limitation of death. While
physical immortality might be a pleasant notion to entertain, all persons have to

However, for all of the uniqueness of our thoughts and situations, Frankl does find
certain features to be characteristic of all human destiny. Using Sartrian language, one
might call this a general, universalizeable "facticity."
42

Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, 15 "man's human condition
consists of pain, death and guilt."
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contend with the inevitability of their own death. Given this, it is quite conceivable
how death may act as a motivator to action in the present. Recognition that our lives
are limited provides one with a sense of urgency to act in the present moment. While
it is rather clear how one's finitude functions as both a limiting factor and a motivator
to action, one might very well wonder how this might be explained with respect to
pain and guilt. The majority of this section will be concerned with how Frankl
understands the concepts of pain and guilt.
Corresponding to the psychological strata of the self is the facticity of pain;
corresponding to the spiritual layer is guilt. Unfortunately, Frankl posits these notions
and yet says very little about their exact nature -- when they are experienced, how, in
what contexts and with reference to what objects. 43 In addition, the proper method by
which to examine these so called "realities of our human predicament" is not
discussed. Perhaps the method by which these concepts may be investigated is the
phenomenological method that Frankl adopts from Scheler. Frankl says:
We need only tum to the way the man in the street actually
experiences meanings and values and translate this into
scientific language. 44
With this method, let us begin with the concept of pain. I believe it is patently
obvious that Frankl is not referring to momentary, fleeting, somatic sensations of pain.
In this context, since pain is said to be part of our human condition, it must somehow
43

Frankl, Will to Meaning, 73. "The tragic triad consists of pain, death and
guilt. There is no human being who may say that he has not failed, that he does not
suffer and that he will not die."
44

Frankl, Will to Meaning, 69.
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constitutes a rather permanent aspect of psychological nature. In the abstract and as
functioning at the psychological level, one may seek to describe pain as hardship or
suffering. But even with this description, pain seems to require an "object." In other
words, what is the hardship or suffering about?
There are various ways that Frankl could answer this question. Hardship could be
experienced in the face of life in general, in response to other human beings, etc.
Frankl himself might be seen to advocate this view given his experiences in the
concentration camps and his lengthy analyses of human suffering. 45 Yet, these "outer
objects" do not seem to be the proper foundation for a general sense of pain. Life,
after all, is not commonly a concentration camp and suffering tends not to define the
entirety of our existence. What I am suggesting is that if and only if outer experience
could function as the permanent object of our psychological sense of pain, then
perhaps it is outer objects which force us to have this tragic existence.
However, I think it is a more plausible way to view pain as constitutive of our
psychological nature. In many of his books, Frankl criticizes Freud's notion of the
pleasure principle. Two arguments are used: 1) If we wish to claim, as Freud does,
that human beings. are so constituted as to only pursue pleasure, then we reduce human
beings to the level of animals and claim that they are only driven by their instincts,
and 2) pleasure can never be aimed at directly for it always eludes the individual. 46

45

See Viktor E. Frankl. Man's Search/or Meaning: An Introduction to
Logotherapy, new and revised ed., trans. by Ilse Lasch with preface by Gordon W.
Allport, (New York: Pocket Books, 1963), 3-149.
46
Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, 63-64.
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Pleasure for Frankl, can only be the by-product of completing a task or actualizing a
meaning. 47
I believe that Frankl' s real motivation for claiming that pain is part of our
psychological tragic existence serves as his ultimate refutation of Freud's psychological
hedonism. Unlike Freud, Frankl does not need to claim that human beings are
motivated or have a drive toward pleasure; but, by positing pain as part of our facticity
he mitigates the idea that there is some one, reductionistic goal that all people seek. It
also gives precedence to the will as decider of values, rather than to our instinctual
nature. Unfortunately, it leaves Frankl with a decided problem with respect to the
goals of logotherapy. For how can one truly feel a sense of happiness or pleasure if a
sense of pain is always constitutive of a person's psychological make-up? What sense
of joy can possibly result?

If trying to understand the concept of pain were a thorny enough issue, then
understanding the concept of guilt becomes even more complex. First, common sense
observation does not seem to indicate that all people are cognizant of a state of guilt.
Once again one wonders what is the proper object of guilt.
For any religious believer, guilt tends to imply a sense of inadequacy, shame or
failure with reference to God. In virtue of the fact that Frankl sometimes refers to
logotherapy as a "medical ministry" and perhaps because he is Jewish, one might
suggest that Frankl superimposed his own sense of guilt onto his psychological
47

Sometimes Frankl equates pleasure with happiness. The reader should be
aware that Frankl's exact understanding of the nature of pleasure is not central to my
argument. For that reason, the reader can construe the meaning of this term as he/she
wishes, at least in this section.
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understanding of the human person. Textual evidence seems to support this view.
Just as Frankl adopts a hierarchical notion of the person, so too does he see this as
operating in the disciplines. In The Unconscious God, he says:
Higher dimensions are subsumed by lower ones; Thus
biology is overarched by psychology, psychology by noology
and noology by theology. 48
Could it not be the case then, that at the spiritual dimension of being, the human
person feels guilt because of his/her fundamental imperfection, failures to God or to
prescribed religious action?
There are two reasons as to why this can not be the correct interpretation: 1)
Despite his religious alignment, Frankl would never claim that the objective realm of
meanings and values are to be equated with religious prescriptions. Religious persons
may interpret the values in light of their beliefs; yet, they exist for all persons. 49 2)
Frankl contends that while logotherapy may serve as a medical ministry and may
orient the person to ultimate meaning, namely God, this is by no means its primary
task. It is only a supplementary one if so desired.

Returning to the question at hand: What then is the proper object of guilt?
Clearly, guilt can not follow upon our choices. For according to Frankl, when humans
are confronted with the objective realm of values, to every situation/question that life
poses there is only "one true/right meaning to each situation. "50 Now, if individuals
48

Frankl, Unconscious God, 13.

49

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, xv.

°Frankl, Will to Meaning, 60-1.
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are choosing the "right" meaning, as Frankl says they must, then clearly guilt does not
follow from such a choice.
The only possible answer to this question is that it is the fallibility of conscience
itself which is the source of our guilt. The following summarizes the main features of
conscience:
Conscience - is fallible, a human phenomenon, intuitive, creative,
its job is to discover values - and the development of conscience
is the main goal of education. 51
If what I suspect is right, then human beings are in a perpetual state of guilt because

they realize their imperfection. Sometimes they make the right choices, and
conscience is to be the guide of these; sometimes they make the wrong choices and
conscience is the guide for these. Guilt remains in either case, for the human
condition is such that we lack complete certainty regarding the correctness of our
choices. 52 When we embark on a discussion of the goals of therapy -- how one
knows when the goals are reached and how one feels when they are reached -- we will
see how this precise issue will present Frankl' s logotherapy with a major problem.
It might be useful, at this point, to summarize what has been accomplished in this

section. One must recall the dual role that the tragic triad of existence is intended to
serve in logotherapy: 1) They are limiting factors of the three ontological strata of the

51

52

Ibid., 63.

Admittedly, there is a paradox involved in these two paragraphs. How is it
the case that one must always choose the "true" or the "right" meaning in a situation
and yet not fully be cognizant (or have a feeling of assurance) that they chose the
"true" or "right" meaning? This will be explored in subsequent sections.
-
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human person and 2) They operate as specific motivators to action. In order to clarify
their role as limiting factors, it was necessary to explore the very meaning of pain and
guilt. 53 It was concluded that since Frankl maintains that pain is a permanent,
universal element of the human condition, it would have to be understood "negatively;"
that is to say, "pleasure" is not the main goal that persons seek. As for guilt, it was
demonstrated that this state pertains to the fallibility of one's own conscience. Let me
suggest that it is a small, logical leap to claim that these philosophical features acquire
a normative force. Indeed, all persons must contend with death, pain and the fallibility
of their own conscience and all human action occurs against the backdrop of these
"realities." The worldview which logotherapy advocates begins to "feel" like an
enlightened Stoic reality. 54
With respect to the triad's role as a motivator to action, I find Frankl's account
rather bizarre. As noted earlier, perhaps death provides the human person with a sense
of "urgency" to act in the present moment. But, it is unclear how a constant privation
of pleasure and the unavoidable fallibility of conscience would provide the necessary
motivations for one to act. In fact, one could effectively argue that the opposite is true
-- the tragic triad may motivate one not to act all. For why would one engage in
activity if there is a constant, psychological sense of "pain?" And what would be the
53

54

It was noted that it was obvious to see how death would be a limiting factor.

Although not specifically addressed in this section, the "realities" of pain,
death and guilt truly acquire their normative force in the actual practice of
logotherapy. Presumably, a client who is not aware of the tragic triad of his/her
existence will have to "acknowledge" it when treated by a logotherapist. This, of
course, presupposes that a logotherapist is practicing his craft consistent with the
theory.
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purpose of action if in the end error is all that is achievable? Frankl's description of
the tragic triad is theoretically untenable as a motivational account. In the realm of
practice, one must be concerned with how the client who seeks logotherapy is really
motivated in their search for meaning.

3) "Logos" (meaning): The objective realm of experience
Throughout this paper, I have baldly been referring to "an objective realm of
values" to which the self is related and by which it is constituted. Having analyzed the
nature of the self, it is now time to tum to the second half of the equation of the real. 55
Three questions will be considered in this section. They are: a) What is the nature of
"logos?" b) How real is "logos?" 3) What are Frankl's proofs for positing "logos?"
By the end of this analysis, I will have shown that there is good reason to understand
logos as being something far less objective than Frankl intends it to be. At best,
Frankl' s logos can only honestly be called an inter-subjectively constituted realm of
facts and values; at worst, evidence warrants an interpretation of logos as a subjective
concept. The theoretical untenability of logos will necessarily lead to practical
difficulties for logotherapy.
Throughout this analysis, one must recall one of the reasons which led Frankl to
establish logotherapy; namely, it was intended to be a corrective for already existent,
55

It would be preferable to confine this analysis to a purely descriptive account
of the nature of this realm of reality; however, such an exposition will invariably
involve the related question of how it is that one knows the nature of these values.
Because of this, analysis of the "objective realm of values" may often bring us back to
the knowing and acting subject, the self. The reader should be forewarned of the
possibility that there is bound to be some overlap in the treatment of these
metaphysical descriptions and related epistemological issues.
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but inadequate versions of existential analysis/ontoanalysis. While existential analysis
was seen to be partially correct in its focus upon the human person as an acting and
existent subject, it failed to concern itself with "essence," "logos" or "meaning" -- or
that to which the acting subject was related. It is the very presence of "logos" that
allowed for existential analysis to be more than mere "analysis" of a subject and to
function as a viable form of "therapy" for persons. 57 Both the novelty and central
importance that Frankl gives to logos in his theory requires us to consider the nature
of the logos and the concomitant issue of its objective/"real" status.
Quite frequently, Frankl simply translates "logos" as "meaning." Construing logos
in terms of meaning, at some level, seems to be oxymoronic; for meaning ordinarily is
interpreted as something wholly subjective rather than objective. In The Will to
Meaning, Frankl asserts that "meaning is what is meant, be it by a person who asks me

a question or by a situation which too implies a question and calls for an answer. 58 In
some sense, the definition itself foreshadows the claim that I want to establish in this
section, namely, that the "objective realm of experience" is really permeated with
subjectivity at some level. At first glance, one is tempted to interpret "meanings" as
belonging to the subjective rather than an "objective" realm. The phrase, "what is
meant," seems to hinge upon an individual's interpretation. If there is anything
"objective" in that phrase it may be such things as "persons, questions or situations"
which actually exist and confront individuals. Indeed, in numerous other passages
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Ibid.
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Frankl, Will to Meaning, 61.
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where Frankl speaks of an "objective realm of experience," what seems to be objective
are facts/entities, but certainly not meanings.

One is led to believe that perhaps it is

the facts, properly speaking, that solely constitute an objective realm of experience. 59
The following passage seems to suggest this interpretation:
Perhaps the law by which man's responsibilities are
revealed only in concrete tasks is more general than we
imagine. Objective values become concrete duties, are cast
in the form of the demands of each day and in personal tasks.
The values lying back of these tasks can only be reached for
only through the tasks. 60

59

Personal vignettes also seem to suggest this view. For example, in Mans
Search/or Meaning, 58-9, Frankl tells of a personal dilemma that confronted him
during World War II. Faced with the choices of remaining with his parents in Vienna
or emigrating to the United States, Frankl describes how he made that decision. He
says: "While I was pondering what my true responsibility was, I felt that this was that
type of situation in which you wish for what is usually called a hint from Heaven.
Then I went home and when I did so, I noticed a piece of marble stone lying on a
table. I inquired of my father how it came to be there, and he said: "Oh, Victor, I
picked it up this morning at the site where the synagogue stood." (It had been burned
down by National Socialists.) "And why did you take it with you?" I asked him.
"Because it is a part of the two tables containing the Ten Commandments." And he
showed me, on the marble stone, a Hebrew letter engraved and gilded. "And I can tell
you even more," he continued, "if you are interested; this Hebrew letter serves as the
abbreviation of only one of the Ten Commandments." Eagerly I asked him, "Which
one?" And his answer was: "Honor father and mother and you will dwell in the land."
On the spot I decided to stay in the country, together with my parents, and let the visa
lapse."
I believe that this story offers way to see how logos may be construed as
"objective." In Frankl's view, it was the fragment of the Torah which was the very
carrier of "values." By way of concluding the account, Frankl denies that this story
could be interpreted as a projective test and says: "... the only thing which is
subjective is the perspective through which we approach reality, and this
subjectiveness does not in the least detract from the objectiveness of reality itself'
(emphasis added, mine).
60

Frankl, Doctor and the Soul, 41-2.
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While it is tempting to create a sharp divide between facts and meanings with the
hope of getting clear as to what exactly is objective and subjective, facts/objects are
inextricably intertwined with meaning. So, the logos that was earlier referred to does
not by itself constitute some outer objective realm of experience; but rather,
meaning(s) exist in conjunction with a multitude of facts/events. Together, these
constitute the objective realm and confront the individual.

At this point, our

conception of the objective realm of experience can even be broadened to include
facts, meanings and values; for values are only "... meaning universals which
crystallize the typical situations a society or even humanity has to face. "61
Inadvertently, we have achieved a full description of what constitutes the objective
realm of experience: facts/events/situation, meanings and values. Now we will turn to
a consideration of the phenomenological proofs that Frankl offers for this view. 62

61

62

Ibid., 56.

I imagine that one could claim that Frankl's negation of Sartre's relativism
and subjectivism serves as a kind of proof for the objective realm of values. For
Sartre, persons confront their existential situation (facticity). Through action, persons
create both their individual essence, and a model for how all human persons should
be. Frankl finds this view untenable, so much so, that he claims it reminds him of the
Fakir trick (see Will to Meaning, 60). However, Frankl rejects Sartre's view by
insisting that "what man so badly needs in order to preserve mental health and
wholeness is that the objectiveness of the objective pole be preserve" (Will, 61). As
one can see, Frankl's argument is really no argument at all. Rather, he just uses
different starting points or assumptions than does Sartre. In short, Frankl does not
directly provide the reader with proof that Sartre's view is wrong, but only that it fails
to lead an individual to mental health/wholeness. While disproving Sartre's
existentialism may be peripheral to the grounding of logotherapy, demonstrating that
the objective realm of values exists is not. It is the existence of this realm that allows
persons to have mental health and also, which allows logotherapists to cure the
spiritual sufferer.
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There are at least four lines of reasoning Frankl uses in order to legitimate this
objective realm of experience. They are:
Unless self-understanding is crippled by pre-conceived patterns
of interpretation, not to say indoctrination, he refers to meaning
as something to find rather than something to give. And a
phenomenological analysis which attempts to describe such an
experience in an unbiased and empirical way will show us that,
indeed, meanings are found rather than given. 63
The particularity of all perspective, the fragmentary nature of
all images of the world, after all presupposes the objectivity of
the world. 64
The ultimate -- or, if you will, the first -- question of radical
skepticism is about the meaning of existence. But to ask the
meaning of existence is meaningless in that existence precedes
meaning. For the existence of meaning is assumed when we
question the meaning of existence. 65
Value is transcendent to the act which intends it. It transcends
the value-cognitive act which is directed toward it, analogous to
the object of an act of cognition, which likewise is situated
outside of this (in the narrower sense of the word cognitive) act.
Phenomenology has shown that the transcendent quality of the
object in the intentional act is always already present in its
content. If I see a lit lamp, the fact that it is there is already
given along with my perception of it, even if I close my eyes or
turn my back to it. In the perception of an object as something
real is already contained the implication that I recognize its
reality independently of its perception by myself or anyone else.
The same is true of the objects of value perception. As soon as
I have comprehended a value, I have comprehended implicitly
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Frankl, Will to Meaning, 61.
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Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 16.
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Ibid., 196.
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that this value exists in itself, independent therefore of whether
or not I accept it. 66
I have quoted the above passages at length, not with the intent of assessing the
validity of these proofs, but rather, to assess how real (or what kind of reality) the
objective realm of values has according to Frankl. Frankl forthrightly states that the
proof for this realm is derived from the phenomenological tradition. For this reason, a
brief excursion into the phenomenological tradition may well be justified.
It is a basic strategy of all who call themselves "phenomenologists" to begin with

the brute fact of experience and the knowing subject. In addition, phenomenology
aims to discover meanings/essences of experience. But essences are equally
constituted by "acts of consciousness" and by what experience presents us with. To
some, such as myself, a phenomenological theory of meanings seems to order upon a
version of idealism. By implication, this understanding of phenomenology would
render it impotent with respect to claims about mind-independent reality. However,
one should bear in mind that the proof for the logos of Frankl' s logotherapy draws
much more from the work of Max Scheler than that of Husserl. Scheler, in greater
degree than Husserl, would say that the place where meanings are discovered lies with
the object and not with the knowing/perceiving subject. Or, "meaning is given to
consciousness with the sense data and essences are carried by objects. "67 By way of
summary: 1) all phenomenologists begin with experience, 2) to know what experience
66
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Ibid.' 40-1.

Eugene Kelly, Max Scheler, Twayne's World Leaders Series, vol. 55,
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977), 32.
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is assumes both a "something (meaning or an object)" and a knower (subject), 68 but 3)
unlike Husserl, Scheler and Frankl are far more insistent about the permanence/reality
of essences that "impinge" upon the mind of the knower. In the end, the question will
be can the nature of this realm be substantiated according to their own criteria1'9
In some sense, the very fact that Frankl establishes his claims for an objective
realm of values within the phenomenological tradition mitigates interpreting his theory
as a version of objective realism. 70

More honestly but less frequently, Frankl seems

to admit that the objective realm of values is only "phenomenologically real" and
consists of only "trans-subjective meanings/values." If this is the case, as it seems to
be, one could simply end this account by claiming that Frankl was inconsistent with
his language. Rather than referring to an "objective" realm of values, he should have
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It should be noted before moving on that the potential error of interpreting
"existence" as subjective and essence as "objective" has been tempered. Even though
Frankl all-too often makes use of the term "objective" which might imply that persons
can have knowledge of reality-in-itself, phenomenological proofs mitigate this
interpretation. All experience is always experience relative to the observer. For this
reason, Frankl occasionally refers to logos more correctly as "trans-subjective" reality.
This phrasing better explains the meaning behind passages such as: "We must remain
aware of the fact that as long as absolute truth is not accessible to us (and it will never
be), relative truths have to function as mutual correctives. Approaching the one truth
from various sides, sometimes even in opposite directions, we can not attain it, but we
may at least encircle it" (Doctor and Soul, xiii). Given this view of reality, one might
say that Frankl is really a relativist in a foundational sense. It appears as if Frankl is
solely describing "phenomenological reality" as opposed to "objective reality." For an
explanation of "phenomenological reality," see Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, 2nd ed.,
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996), 20.
70

By using the term, "objective realist," I have in mind traditional
metaphysicians such as Plato or Descartes who believed that there is a reality
which exists independently of the conceiver.
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consistently referred to it as a trans-subjective realm of experience. This section could,
then, conceivably end here.
However, let me suggest that even if we charitably overlook Frankl's inconsistent
use of language, the above quotations still leave us with questions of the following:
With respect to the first citation, one may very well wonder how empirical and
unbiased Frankl' s assessment is of the realm of experience. 7 1 Granted that there is a
trans-subjective realm of experience consisting of meanings/values and facts taken
together, is it possible to claim that there is more (and we can know more of it) than
that? Considering this question will serve as a further explanation of the "reality" of
the "trans-subjective" realm of values as well as function as a natural bridge to the
next section on epistemological considerations. In other words, barring the question of
existence, is it the case that a hierarchy of values can truly be discerned from a transsubjective realm of values?
Frankl, following in the footsteps of Scheler, maintains that within the realm of
experience there exists a hierarchy of values. Values, for both Scheler and Frankl are
of one of two kinds: eternal or situational. The criteria for this distinction could be
described in various ways. Eternal values are somehow "more binding," more
universal" more enduring and often called "higher" on the scale of values when

71

Again, the reader must bear in mind that this question is not only
theoretically significant, but also, it is of great practical importance. As noted at the
outset of this section, logotherapy was introduced as a corrective to inadequate
versions of existential analysis. It was due to the introduction of "logos" that allowed
existential analysis to truly become a viable form of "therapy" rather than mere
"analysis."
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compared with situational values. While Scheler proceeds to identify four kinds of
values from this fundamental distinction, 72 Frankl's hierarchy consists of three,
different values. The following quote identifies his schema and reminds us, curiously,
of the "empirical" method that yielded this "unbiased" data. 73 He says:
The logotherapist is neither a moralist nor an intellectual. His
work is based on empirical, i.e. phenomenological analyses, and
a phenomenological analysis of the simple man in the street's
experience of the valuing process shows that one can find
meaning in life by creating a work or doing a deed or by
experiencing goodness, truth and beauty, by experiencing nature
and culture; or, last but not least, by encountering another unique
being in the very uniqueness of this human being -- in other
words, by loving him. 74

If one prefers in this context to speak of values, he may discern
three chief groups of values. I have classified them in terms of
creative, experiential and attitudinal values. This sequence
reflects the three principal ways in which man can find meaning
in life. The first is what he gives to the world in terms of his
creations; the second is what he takes from the world in terms of
encounters and experiences; and the third is the stand he takes to
his predicament in case he must face a fate which he cannot
change. 75
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W. Stark, ed., introduction to The Nature of Sympathy, by Max Scheler,
trans. by Peter Heath, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1973), xvi. The values
are: a) holiness, b) spiritual/cultural values, c) vital values and d) pleasure values.
73

I do not believe it is an arbitrary point that the three categories of values
naturally correspond to Frankl's dimensional view of the self. The fact that attitudinal
values are the deepest and most important kind of values that can be achieved seems
to underscore the correctness of my interpretation that the spiritual core of the self is
the foundational and most important aspect of the self.
74
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Frankl, Will to Meaning, 69.

Ibid., 69-70. For a further description of creative, experiential,
and attitudinal values, see Frankl's Doctor and Soul, 43-4.
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There are two important conclusions that result from considering a phenomenological
analysis and categorization of values. First, both Scheler and Frankl must admit that
to claim that values are "trans-subjective" opens their theories up to the charge of
relativism at some level. Secondly, and moreso than Scheler's categorization, Frankl's
definitions refer obviously and implicitly to human subjectivity. In virtue of the fact
that creative and attitudinal values find their origin within the individual and are
specifically values of individuals (as opposed to groups of individuals), the logos of
logotherapy seems to be far more radically subjective than trans-subjective.
So as to side-step the charge of relativism, both Frankl and Scheler appeal to the
defense of perspectivism.
He compares the eternal and immutable values to a mountain
range which towers high above the valleys in which we humans
live. To every age and to every people they reveal, according to
their respective points of view, a different aspect of themselves:
each one is true, and yet each one is unacceptable to all the
others. We must not speak of a relativism of values then, but
rather of a perspectivism (314) - an altogether different
proposition. 76
... the only thing which is subjective is the perspective through
which we approach reality, and this subjectiveness does not in
the least detract from the objectiveness of reality itself. I
improvised an explanation of this phenomenon for the students in
my seminar at Harvard. "Just look through the windows of this
lecture hall at Harvard Chapel. Each of you sees the chapel in a
different way, from a different perspective, depending on the
location of your seat. If anyone claimed that he sees the chapel
exactly as his neighbor does, I would have to say that one of
them must be hallucinating. But does the difference of views in
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the least detract from the objectivity and reality of the chapel?
Certainly it does not. 77

It seems highly dubious to me to suggest, as Kelly does, that perspectivism is

somehow an altogether different proposition from relativism. But even if somehow it
is, it appears as if Scheler' s hierarchy of values is more amenable to this interpretation.
On Frankl' s categorization, only the experiential values of truth, beauty and goodness
are of the kind that may be "seen" through a particular perspective. Creative and
attitudinal values, by contrast and by definition, are of the sort that are rooted in
human subjectivity. An additional concern of "perspectivism" is that the criterion by
which trans-subjective values are found is, as has been noted, by consulting how the
ordinary man in the street behaves. Perhaps even the limited category of experiential
values, then, have subjectivity as at their root, being nothing more than consensually
agreed upon values.
Summarizing what has been accomplished in this section, it has been shown that in
logotherapy, the objective realm of experience consists of an inextricable combination
of facts and values. Nonetheless, the "objectivity" of this realm really is only "transsubjectively" or phenomenologically real. Definitions of the supposed hierarchy of
values reduces itself to two categories of values which really have their basis in human
subjectivity. The only category of values which somehow retains its "transsubjectivity" are experiential values. Even so, this category of values does not escape
the charge of being relative by appealing to perspectivism as a defense. This is
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especially true when one considers the criteria by which values are "discovered,"
namely by consulting how the man in the street behaves. If the objective logos is
permeated with subjectivity and therefore is relative at some level, why, one wonders,
is Frankl insistent that the logos is objective?
The philosophical answer might be that it simply serves as a corrective to a
misguided philosophical theory, namely Sartre's. Perhaps the real reason why Frankl
does this is to argue that life is not absurd; or, one might say, even if one thinks life is
absurd meanings still exist in spite of such a perception. But more importantly, Frankl
does want to make room for morality.

Our contemporary society which is

characterized by a loss of meaning and in which many people find themselves in an
existential vacuum signals the possibility of further corruption -- corruption that we
bore witness to in Nazi Germany. An objective realm of values allows for a standard
by which the likes of Hitler could be judged and be deemed a failed human being.

4) How we know the objective realm of experience: the role of intuitive conscience

In this section, I will focus on the nature of intuitive conscience or the means by
which an individual can be said to know the objective realm of values. By necessity,
my analysis of intuitive conscience will be confined to three issues: a) How is it
possible that one discovers the one/true meaning in a situation if conscience by
definition is fallible? b) What motivates "intuitive conscience" to discover transsubjective values? c) A problem with the causal story and motivational story.
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A basic description of the role of intuitive conscience is required if one is to
understand how it is that an individual discovers the trans-subjective realm of values.
Again, this issue has both theoretical and practical importance; for if the logotherapist
is neither to be construed as a moralist nor as an intellectual, then by default, it will be
the client's own conscience that allows her to know the trans-subjective realm of
values and to achieve "meaning." Frankl is unusually specific when it comes to
describing the central features of intuitive conscience. Nonetheless, I will show that
there is an obvious discrepancy in the description and the role of conscience itself.
Since this is a theoretically difficult issue, it is likely to raise concerns about the
logotherapist' s theoretical understanding of this concept and practical applications of it.
In The Will to Meaning, Frankl offers the following definition of conscience. He
says: "conscience could be defined as the intuitive capacity of man to find out the
unique meaning of a situation." In addition, conscience is creative insofar as it has the
"power to discover unique meanings that contradict accepted values;" it is "human
phenomenon and because of this it is fallible; "78 Two consequences follow from the
78

Consider the following descriptions of conscience put forth by Frankl, in The
Will to Meaning: "Apart from being intuitive, conscience is creative. Time and again,
an individual's conscience commands him to do something which contradicts what is
preached by the society to which the individual belongs," 63. "Conscience also has the
power to discover unique meanings that contradict accepted values," 63. "Because we·
live in an existential vacuum, or a place where values are on the wane, education can
not afford to proceed along the lines of tradition, but must elicit the ability to make
independent and authentic decisions... a lively and vivid conscience is what resists the
effects of conformism and totalitarianism," 64-5. "True conscience has nothing to do
with what I would term 'Superegotistic pseudomorality.' Nor can it be dismissed as a
conditioning process. Conscience is a definitely human phenomenon. But we must add
that it is also "just" a human phenomenon. It is subject to ~the human conditiOn in that
it is stamped by the finiteness of man. For he is not only guided by conscience in his
search for meaning, he is sometimes misled by it as well. Unless he is a perfectionist,
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definitions. 79 First, I would suggest that the very fact that conscience is "creative"
subtly adds credence to my previous interpretation of the trans-subjective realm of
values as radically subjective and/or simultaneously further erodes the reliability of
"looking at the common man in the street's behavior" as a criteria for making
decisions. Although Frankl wants to claim that the "creative" capacity of conscience is
to discover unique meanings, if our criteria for discovery is empirical (and sometimes
this empirical evidence may be misguided or in need of correction), then an
individual's conscience is given precedence as the criterion for decision-making. Thus,
at least in logotherapy, while empirical evidence is sometimes referred to as the guide
for discovering phenomenologically real values, it is human conscience which acts as
the ultimate arbiter in decision-making.
A second, but even more significant problem is readily apparent in Frankl' s
description of conscience. Conscience is a human phenomenon and as such, it is a
fallible guide. But, in spite of this permanent possibility of fallibility, 8° Frankl insists
that in each situation, there is always one right and one true meaning to be found.
Frankl himself seems to be well aware of the oddity of these two claims; but
nonetheless, he defends them as follows:

he will also accept this fallibility of conscience," 65. "But if man is not to contradict
his own humanness, he has to obey his conscience unconditionally, even though he is
aware of the possibility of error," 66.
79
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One must recall what was said in the analysis of the tragic triad of human
existence. The fallibility of conscience is said to be part of human facticity.
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On one of my lecture tours through the United States my
audience was requested to print questions in block letters for me
to answer and hand them over to a neurologist who passed them
over to a theologian who passed them on to me. The theologian
suggested that I skip one, for as he said, it was "sheer nonsense.
Someone wishes to know," he said, "how you define six hundred
in your theory of existence." When I read the question I saw a
different meaning. "How do you define GOD in your theory of
existence?" Printed in block letters, "GOD" and "600" were hard
to differentiate. Well, was not this an unintentional projective
test? After all, the theologian read "600," and the neurologist
read "GOD." But only one way to read the question was the
right one. Only one way to read the question was the way in
which it was meant by him who had asked it. (emphasis added
mine) 81

To be sure, man is free to answer the questions he is asked by
life. But this freedom must not be confounded with
arbitrariness. It must be interpreted in terms of responsibleness.
Man is responsible for giving the right answer to a question, for
finding the true meaning of a situation. And meaning is
something to be found rather than to be given, discovered rather
than invented. Crumbaugh and Maholick point out rather that
finding meaning in a situation has something to do with a Gestalt
perception. This assumption is supported by the Gestaltist
Wertheimer' s statement: "The situation, seven plus seven
equals ... is a system with a lacuna, a gap. It is possible to fill
the gap in various ways. The one completion -- fourteen -corresponds to the situation, fits the gap, is what is structurally
demanded in this system, with its place, in the function of the
whole. It does justice to the situation. Other completions such
as fifteen, do not fit. They are not the right ones. We have here
the concepts of the demands of the situation; the 'requiredness.'
"Requirements of such order are objective qualities. "82

I quote these passages at length in order to demonstrate how Frankl defends this idea
that there is only one true or right answer to be given in a situation, in spite of the
81
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fallible nature of conscience. In the first quote, while Frankl admits that at least two
interpretations are possible, the "right" meaning is precisely "that which is intended by

him who asked the question." This proviso is interesting for at least in that situation,
one has a way of determining the correctness of the interpretation. Assuming that the
individual had a specific intent in asking the question and not wanting to be deceptive,
one need only ask the person in order to discover the "truth" or "rightness" of his

meaning of the question. However, when one considers the plethora of situations,
facts, events, persons, meanings, objects, etc. that constitute the "objective realm of
experience," it is certainly not as obvious what the criteria might be for checking the
truth or correctness of our interpretation. It is even difficult to imagine what the
criteria might look like in order to carry out this investigation.
Fortunately, Frankl's second, mathematical example offers us a hint. The number,
"fourteen," we are told, is the right response precisely because it fits the situation and
does justice to the equation. However, I would contend that the number fits the
situation because the rules of addition determine what number must necessarily fill the
gap. By analogy, and in the realm of experience, one must say that there are
"experiential rules" which determine how persons ought to behave in certain situations.
But, whereas it seems plausible to suggest that these experiential rules are only "social
rules" (and therefore, human creations and inter-subjectively constituted), Frankl
misleadingly identifies them as "requirements" which are "objective qualities."
A bit later, these requirements are compared to "social rules" and are explained as
follows:
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Today, we live in an age of crumbling and vanishing traditions.
Thus, instead of new values being created by finding unique
meanings, the reverse happens. Universal values are on the
wane... However, even if all universal values disappeared, life
would remain meaningful since the unique meanings remain
untouched by the loss of traditions. 83
Care has been taken with terminology in this section because there are at least two
different places and two kinds of criteria that one may use in order to discover the true
or right answer to a situation. On the one hand, one may use common-sense
observation and consult traditions. In this way, one will necessarily find the true and
right meaning of a situation. On the other hand, if the rules can not be discerned
(either because there is no clear social rule, or by the discovery that the rule is
somehow wrong), then conscience must act in its creative capacity and discover the
true/right answer. The following issues are neither explained nor acknowledged by
Frankl: when one should consult what proper object and/or with what concomitant
epistemological criteria; the intelligence that a person must have in order to enact these
mechanisms; the inherent inter-subjective origins of the basis of "traditions." With
such variability, one wonders how an individual (let alone a logotherapist who purports
to have expertise in this area and help people find these answers) is really capable of
discovering the true/right meaning of a situation. 84
83
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These issues will be shown to be especially disconcerting when it comes to
the practical application of logotherapy. For, acknowledging that "spiritual illnesses"
can and do occur, how is it the case that a client can mobilize his "conscience" in
order to effectively assess existent traditions, let alone to discover unique meanings?
In addition, is it the case that the logotherapist (again, by the theory itself advocating
these two, disparate ways of knowing) can neither be a "moralist" nor an "intellectual"
in his practice? This footnote can only scratch the surface of this topic. A further
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Perhaps, the answer to the above dilemma lies with the "intuitive" nature of
conscience. A rough and ready definition of "intuitionism" is that persons have a
direct and immediate grasp of some reality. 85 Frankl often equates one's intuitive
ability with having the capacity to "sniff out values." Our concern in this section will
be to assess whether intuitive conscience finds its basis in the emotive or cognitive
realms for Frankl. In short, leaving aside the very real question of whether or not
intuition constitutes a valid criteria for knowledge, I want to consider the motivational
account lying behind Frankl' s understanding of conscience. Is it feeling that motivates
an individual toward meaning; or rather, is it consciousness itself?
Understanding what motivates an individual toward meaning is crucial for both the
theory and practice of logotherapy.

For, if the intuitive aspect of conscience is

grounded at the emotive level, this would seem to imply that it is the psychological
aspect of the self which motivates action. If the three layers of the self are
analysis will follow in subsequent sections.
85

As an anticipatory point, it seems likely that many persons consult
psychotherapists because they lack, or think they lack, a direct grasp of reality. Frankl
says as much in The Doctor and the Soul: "the neurotic lacks an instinctive sureness,"
14. Given this, is it not the case that the logotherapist acts in the capacity as either an
intellectual or moralist when reinstilling an instinctive sense of sureness for the
neurotic?
In other passages in Doctor and Soul, Frankl says that the logotherapist's role is
to evaluate the appropriateness of the neurotic's worldview. He says: "Suppose the
patient's world-view should turn out to be a valid one. In that case we would be
committing a serious error in opposing it, for we must never leap to the conclusion
that a neurotic's world-view is necessarily wrong simply because it is neurotic.
However, it may happen that the patient is wrong in his world-view. In that case,
correcting it calls for non-psychotherapeutic methods. .. .. We must still refute it [the
worldview] .. . Our evaluation of ideas does not depend on the psychic origin of those
ideas (emphasis added, mine), 14-15.
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ontologically distinct, how is it the case that emotions "cause" free decision? I think
this is important because Frankl is insistent that persons are always capable of talcing a
stand toward their psychological distress. Yet, if it is the case that emotions are what
motivates and causes free action, and if persons suffer at the psychological level, how
is free (conscious and responsible) action possible in logotherapy? What would
motivate or cause a psychological sufferer to take a stand at all?
There is some evidence that Frankl understands the "intuitive" part of conscience
as rooted in emotion. In The Unconscious God, Frankl characterizes the "intuitive"
nature of conscience as follows: An intuitive conscience is one that is "prelogical,"
"irrational," and "it is based in the emotional and intuitive. "86 He also claims that the
intuitive conscience is rooted in "love." Love is a complex emotion and might be said
to have both a psychological and cognitive component. Could persons have a
conscious awareness of love that acts as a motivator and cause of action? Gould
thinks that this is where Frankl draws from Scheler and bases intuition on the feeling
of love.
However, there is some ambiguity as to whether or not love is the proper motivator
to action. This ambiguity occurs in several places in Man's Search/or Meaning. To
begin with, Frankl recounts the story of how he endured his suffering in the
concentration camps by contemplating his wife. He says:
A thought transfixed me: For the first time in my life, I saw the
truth as it is set into song by so many poets, proclaimed as the
final wisdom by so many thinkers. The truth that love is the
86
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ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire. Then I
grasped the meaning of the greatest secret that human poetry and
human thought and belief have to impart: The salvation of man
is through love and in love. 81
In this respect, conscience is like love-- the reason for this
comparison is that both have to do with something that is
absolutely unique. 88
Even if a man has never loved or never been loved, he may
still realize values. 89
So, perhaps love is not the basis of the intuitive conscience which moves us toward the
objective realm of values. It can not be a psychological force such as an instinct or a
desire - this would imply that the person is driven. 90 Sometimes, Frankl speaks as if
the pull from the objective realm of values pushes the individual toward them (fmd
quotes) -- but this still leaves us with the problem of individual engagement. What
after all, would make an individual want to realize an eternal value in a certain
situation? This type of justification really poses a problem for us when one recalls
from the previous section that it is only experiential values, and not creative or
attitudinal values, that can provide this "pull."
Whether or not Frankl definitively asserts that love, feelings, etc. is the basis for
the intuitive part of conscience and is far from clear. However, let me suggest, that if
this were to be the case, then the theoretical and practical problem exists concerning
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what motivates individuals toward meaning. Conversely, if love, feelings, emotions,
etc. are not the basis for intuitive conscience, the only possible explanations for why
individuals are motivated to act is either an abstract sense of duty rooted in conscience
and/or the objective realm of values itself. If either of the latter are intended to
explain human motivation, then, from a practical point of view, it would be very
difficult to see why individuals seek logotherapeutic help. Why, after all would a
logotherapist even be consulted if conscience can discover the objective realm of
values and this realm of values alone provides sufficient motivation for an individual
drive toward meaning?
Let us now turn to a consideration of how these competing motivational accounts
may impact logotherapeutic practice. To begin with, almost all of Frankl' s case
studies suggest that people enter therapy for relief of pain. Both of the novel
techniques of logotherapy, namely, dereflection and paradoxical intention have as their
main aim the relief of psychological suffering. 91 However, one must remember that
the stated goal of logotherapy is for persons to actualize meaning(s) or value(s).
Ironically, Frankl's case studies repeatedly indicate that, if not brute pleasure, at least
some kind of relief of suffering is what actually motivates human beings both to seek
logotherapeutic treatment and may in fact function as the end goal of therapy itself. If
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It is not necessary that I be very careful about my language at this point
because I am solely establishing that the techniques of dereflection and paradoxical
intention in no way address an individual's search for meaning. By definition, these
techniques only aim to relieve psychological suffering or pain.
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this is actually the case, then theoretically some sort of psychological motivation would
have to be presupposed on the part of those who seek logotherapeutic help.
If on the other hand, Frankl's motivational account is really rooted in an abstract
duty of conscience or if the objective realm of values itself provides the necessary
motivation to seek meaning, then logotherapy, I would argue, really becomes
something of an abstract, intellectual affair. Detailed, selection criteria of candidates
would seem to be required; for, if clients fail to have a certain amount of intelligence
to cognize "abstract/eternal" values, or if they do not understand their duties, then
logotherapy, in principle could not be effective. In other words, certain kinds of
clients, by definition, could not be treated by logotherapy.
Either motivational accounts raise some curious issues for the practitioner of
logotherapy. I have repeatedly cited Frankl' s assertion that the logotherapist is
"neither a moralist nor an intellectual."

If the first motivational account is correct and

clients do seek relief from psychological suffering then, at the very least, I would
argue that the logotherapist is both a moralist or an intellectual. For, expertise in the
application of the techniques of paradoxical intention and dereflection is assumed,
(hence, the intellectual role); and because a value is the aim of the technique, then that
would be a sufficient requirement to demonstrate that the logotherapist is a moralist.
However, even if the second motivational account is correct, then there is still
reason to believe that the logotherapist is both an intellectual and a moralist. First,
and as acknowledged earlier, it would be difficult to see why a client who has
sufficierit intelligence and a sense of duty would be motivated to seek help from a
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logotherapist. What, after all, would a logotherapist do for them? But, indeed, if such
a client does seek such treatment in logotherapy, then the logotherapist would be
acting as an "intellectual" or as Frankl sometimes says as an "opthamologist" by trying
to get the client "to see the world as it really is. "92 In this way, the logotherapist is
somehow clarifying the nature of the objective realm of experience.

5) Bridge: What has been accomplished thus far?
By way of a reminder to the reader, the purpose of this chapter has been to
identify the philosophical assumptions in logotherapy and to demonstrate the normative
force that they acquire in the context of therapy and for the goals of treatment.
Indeed, much of the above analysis has shown how a clear understanding of the very
philosophical notions has been difficult to achieve. This being the case, a coherent
account of the normative force of these assumptions -- resembling perhaps a consistent
ethic of logotherapy -- seems to be a pipe-dream.
At the beginning of this chapter, I claimed that I would show how relativism, in a
variety of senses, lurks beneath logotherapy. I have argued that consistently there is
ambiguity in the meaning of logotherapy's foundational assumptions, specifically with
respect to the purpose of this form of therapy, the definition of the nature of the
person, the nature of the objective realm of values, etc.

Recalling the architectural

metaphor used at the beginning of this chapter, this kind of semantic relativism has
two important implications for practice. First, the meaning of the assumptions is
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relative to the individual interpretations of the practitioners of logotherapy. 93
Secondly, the goals that clients are said to achieve at the end of therapy are relative to
the practitioners understanding of the purpose and techniques of logotherapy.
As they occur in the actual clinical encounter, these various senses of relativism
will be explored in the remaining section of this chapter. The clients of logotherapy
will be the next subject to be considered, specifically: a) analysis of clinical neurotics
and b) analysis of existential neurotics.

6) The therapeutic encounter
6a) Treatment of the clinical neurotic
It is important to stipulate at the outset that when I refer to the clients of

logotherapy, I refer only to those individuals who are being seen for some extended
period of time (more than 2 occasions) and on an individual basis by a practitioner of
logotherapy. This stipulation is essential because Frankl admits that logotherapy may
legitimately be said to have many different applications, in many different contexts and

93

Some might wish to challenge my claim and say that Frankl acknowledges
the fact that the particular individuality of the psychotherapist will enter into the
confines of therapy. In The Doctor and the Soul, 280, he says: "All psychotherapy is
ultimately something of an art. There is always an irrational element in
psychotherapy. The doctor's artistic intuition and sensitivity is of considerable
importance. The patient, too, brings an irrational element into the relationship; his
individuality. ... it is questionable whether there can ever be the 'correct
psychotherapy.' Is there not rather a correct psychotherapy practiced by a particular
doctor upon a particular patient? At any rate, psychotherapy resembles an equation
with two unknowns -- corresponding to the twin irrational factors." However, Frankl's
admission in no way challenges my claim that individual -- and perhaps "irrational" -interpretations enter the confmes of therapy because of the theory itself. Fratikl would
never admit to this.
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for various numbers of people. 94 This stipulation, will allow for greater precision
when selecting the case analyses to be discussed and greater clarity in seeing what are
the goals of a an application of logotherapy.
When delimited in this way, clients deemed suitable for logotherapy are those who
suffer from "neurosis," either of the existential or clinical sort. 95 Irrespective of the
distinction, and in light of Frankl's dimensional view of the person, it is the spiritual
aspect of the person which receives focused attention in the confines of logotherapy.
This is the hallmark of logotherapeutic treatment and differentiates it, in Frankl' s view,
from other forms of psychotherapy. 96
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Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 279: "In these cases logotherapy is a specific
therapy; in other cases, it is a non-specific therapy. That is to say, there are cases in
which ordinary psychotherapy must be applied and yet a complete cure can be effected
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the neurologist or the psychiatrist, but by every doctor. The surgeon, for example,
needs to minister to his patient when he is faced with an inoperable case, or when he
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Search, 127-33, on the opportunities for collective psychotherapy within the
concentration camp.
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We may begin by focusing on clinical neurosis. A cursory list of the names of
these kinds of mental illness may ring familiar, for they appear to be standard
psychological descriptions of illness. They are: anxiety neurosis, obsessional neurosis,
melancholia and schizophrenia. It is worthwhile to quote one description of this type
of illness at length in order for the reader to get the flavor of how clients suffering
from clinical neurosis may be viewed as potential clients for logotherapy:
Like all other neurosis, obsessional neurosis also has a
constitutional basis. Wexberg and others, whose interest lie
mainly in the fields of psychogenesis or psychotherapy, have
assumed that a somatic substructure ultimately underlies
obsessional neurosis. A number of clinical pictures had been
observed in which postencephalitic behavior showed striking
similarities to obsessional neurotic syndromes. The mistake was
made of confusing similarity in form with identity in nature.
An "anankastic syndrome" was considered to be the hereditary
element in obsessional neurosis; it was believed to have special
genetic radical which was supposedly dominant. Finally, it was
proposed that the term "obsessional disease" be used instead of
"obsessional neurosis," in order to stress the constitutional quality
of the illness.
As far as therapy is concerned, these various views strike us as
largely irrelevant. Moreover, to make much of the constitutional
factors underlying obsessional neurosis does not relieve psychotherapy
of its obligation, nor deprive it of its opportunities. For anankasm
consists of nothing more than a mere disposition toward certain
characterological peculiarities such as meticulosity, exaggerated
love of order, fanatical cleanliness, or overscrupulousness -- traits
which, in fact, must be recognized as culturally valuable. They
do not seriously incommode the person who has them or those
around him. They are only the soil in which the actual
obsessional neurosis can grow, though it does not necessarily do
so. Where such a constitution does give rise to a neurosis,
human freedom is involved. Revealing the psychogenic nature of
the particular neurotic content need not be therapeutically
effective, nor is it indeed even indicated. On the contrary,
detailed treatment of symptoms in obsessional neurotics would
only give encouragement to their compulsion to brood over their
symptoms.
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We must, however, distinguish carefully between such
symptomatic treatment and palliative treatment by logotherapy.
The logotherapist is not concerned with treating the individual
symptom or the disease as such; rather, he sets out to transform
the neurotic's attitude toward his neurosis. For it is this attitude
which has built up the basic constitutional disturbance into clinical
symptoms of illness. And this attitude, at least in milder cases or
in the early stages, is quite subject to correction. Where the attitude
itself has not yet taken on the typical obsessional-neurotic rigidity,
where it is not yet infiltrated, so to speak, by the basic disturbance,
a change in its direction should still be possible. 97
There are several issues that are important to highlight from this one example of a
clinical neurosis. However, the most important feature to recognize is that all aspects
of the human person are said to contribute to the neurosis -- physiological,
psychological and spiritual components. Nonetheless, what is deemed important from
a logotherapist 's point of view is the spiritual aspect of the illness -- both as a way for
making the diagnosis and in circumscribing the proper focus of treatment.
The exclusivity of logotherapy's focus is odd, indeed, when one considers that both
the cause and the cure for the illness are rooted in a person's spiritual dimension of
being. As stated above, "human freedom is involved" in the illness; yet, human
freedom is precisely the aspect by which one's illness can be cured. As Frankl states:
"Obsessional neurosis is not a psychosis; the sick person's attitude toward it is still
relatively free. "98 The idea that there are somehow degrees of individual freedom is
left unexplained and unexplored in Frankl's theory.
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While the above point has been noted in previous sections, what has yet to be
explored is just how the logotherapist actually engages a client's freedom while
simultaneously avoiding being a moralist and an intellectual but rather, being like an
opthamologist, correcting one's vision. At least in the case of clinical neurosis, these
theoretical maxims are not even discussed. Rather, the logotherapist is positively
encouraged, in terms of method and attitude to engage in suggestion and persuasion
when treating the clinical neurotic.

What Frankl fails to acknowledge is that these

methods and attitudes ultimately impact the goals of treatment and threaten the
disciplinary viability of logotherapy. Logotherapy, in its practical applications of
treating the clinical neurotics, at the very least, says nothing about "achieving meaning;
encountering a realm of objective facts and values." In my view, by encouraging its
practitioners to encourage radically subjective goals for their clients could actually
violate what "remnants" of freedom a client has at his disposal.
Let us begin with the general description of the "unique" logotherapeutic methods
that could be applied when treating the clinical neurotic. Of the choices available,
namely paradoxical intention and dereflection, it is paradoxical intention that is
recommended for treating the obsessional neurotic. By definition, "paradoxical
intention means that the patient is encouraged to do, or wish to happen the very thing ·
he fears. "99 The goal of this method is to allow a client to overcome anticipatory
anxiety or what Frankl sometimes calls, "hyperintension." 100 What paradoxical
99

lOO

Frankl, Will to Meaning, 101.
Ibid., 100.
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intention attempts to overcome (and by implication what the focus of logotherapist

really is in the confines of therapy) is described as follows:
In order to understand the therapeutic efficiency of this
technique we must consider the phenomenon called
"anticipatory anxiety." By this I mean that the patient
reacts to an event with a fearful expectation of its
recurrence. However, fear tends to make happen precisely
that which one fears, and so does anticipatory anxiety.
Thus a vicious circle is established. A symptom evokes
a phobia and the phobia provokes the symptom. The
recurrence of the symptom then reinforces the phobia.
The patient is caught in a cocoon. A feedback mechanism
is established.
How can we break up the vicious circle? .... to unhinge
the circle, one must attack it on the psychic pole (emphasis
mine) as well as on the organic pole. And the first is precisely
the job done by paradoxical intention. 101
There are two important conclusions that I want to draw from this quote. First,
when using the technique of paradoxical intention, the focus of the logotherapist is no
longer on the spiritual aspect of the person; but rather, on the psychic dimension of the
individual. 102 Presumably, when effective, the client overcomes their psychic
symptoms. 103 Having achieved a "proximate goal" of relief of psychological pain, the
101

Ibid.' 102-3.
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Although not central to the discussion, an implication for clients who are
said to need paradoxical intention is that the clients who come to a logotherapist may
first and foremost (if not only and exclusively) be motivated to enter treatment for
psychic suffering. Problems of meaning, or lack thereof, may not at the outset or ever
be deemed a "legitimate" concern from the client's perspective.
103

Frankl does describe an instance of when paradoxical intention was not
successful. In The Will to Meaning, 109, he writes: "I had a man in my department, a
guard in a museum who could not stay on his job because he suffered from deadly
fears that someone would steal a painting. During a round I made with my staff, I
tried paradoxical intention with him: 'Tell yourself they stole a Rembrandt yesterday
and today they will steal a Rembrandt and a Van Gogh.' He just stared at me and
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ultimate work of logotherapy may then be said to begin, namely, the search for
meaning. However, case after case of practical applications of logotherapy terminate
with the goal of psychological symptom removal. What I am suggesting is that in
cases of clinical neurosis, the proximate goal of a therapeutic technique seems to
function as the end goal of therapy. It is unimportant to me how this final goal be
described, be it in terms of happiness, relief of psychological pain, etc. What is
important to note is that logotherapists appear to overstep their disciplinary boundaries
or at the very least, are inconsistent with what they purport treat in the confines of
therapy.
A second conclusion that was alluded to in earlier sections is Frankl' s incoherent
account of how the three different dimensions of the person causally interact. The
mechanism of anticipatory anxiety presupposes a causal relationship between the
physiological and psychological dimensions of the person. It is precisely at the
psychic pole of the aforedescribed feedback mechanisms where logotherapists are
recommended to intervene. Successful applications of paradoxical intention result in
symptom removal/behavioral change. Yet, in the description of obsessional neurosis,
Frankl states that it is the spiritual dimension where logotherapists were "obliged" to
intervene; for it is this "attitude which has built up the basic constitutional
disturbance." Mysteriously, the three aspects of the person "effect" each other and

said, 'But Herr Professor, that's against the law!' This man simply was too feebleminded (emphasis added) to understand the meaning of paradoxical intention.~'
Apparently, there are some selection criteria for clients who seek this kind of
treatment. Intelligence is clearly one of them.
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result in changes for the client. In the absence of a coherent causal account, it
certainly appears as if logotherapists are magically capable of effecting these changes.
In his recommendations to logotherapists, Frankl adds to this already confused account
as follows:
To say a thing is "psychogenic" is not equivalent to
saying psychotherapy is indicated." Contrariwise, psychotherapy can be indicated even when it is not causal therapy.
In other words, it can be the therapy that solves the
problem, even when it is not specific therapy. The case of
logotherapy is similar. Logotherapy can be an entirely
suitable therapy even though it is neither causal nor
specific. 104
If this is the case, one must wonder, what is the exp'!rtise of the logotherapist?

A third conclusion follows from both the paradoxical intention quote and the
description of obsessional neurosis. This implication concerns the language used to
describe what it is that the logotherapist does when making a diagnosis and using
logotherapy' s techniques. In the description of obsessional neurosis, the reader is told
that the logotherapist "... sets out to transform the neurotic' s attitude" and that this
attitude is "... subject to correction." In later passages on obsessional neurosis, it is said
that the method for treating such a client may be by "re-education." 105 In addition,
when addressing those aspects of obsessional neurosis that are impervious to change,
Frankl instructs logotherapists as follows:
That is, insofar as his illness does have some constitutional
core, the patient should learn to accept the character structure
104

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 281.
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Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 191.
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as fate, in order to avoid building up around the constitutional
core additional psychogenic suffering. There is minimal
constitutional basis which in fact cannot be influenced by
psychotherapy. The patient must learn to affirm this minimum.
The more we train him to a glad acceptance offate, the more
insignificant will be the residues of symptoms which are beyond
help (emphasis added, mine). 106
Again, I remind the reader to focus on the language in light of the preceding claims
that the logotherapist is neither a moralist nor an intellectual, but rather like an
opthamologist. .. For, certainly both the technique of paradoxical intention and other
methods for treating the obsessional neurotic make it appear as if the logotherapist is
engaged in a prescriptive task of some sort. 107 Nonetheless, with respect to the
technique of paradoxical intention, Frankl devotes several passages in his books to
denying this consequence. He says:
Hans 0. Gerz has pointed out: "One often hears the argument
that it is 'suggestion' that gets the patients better. Some of my
colleagues have attributed the results to my 'authoritarian' approach.
Frankl has been accused of having made paradoxical intention
successful because he is the great authority, the professor, and
helps his patients with 'massive authoritative suggestion.' The
fact is, however, that many other psychiatrists have been using
Frankl's technique successfully. Cases have been reported as
remaining symptom-free for even decades." Our patients often set
out to use paradoxical intention with a strong conviction that it
simply cannot work -- and yet, finally succeed. In brief they
succeed not because of, but in spite of suggestion.
106
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Ibid., 186-87.

By way of clarification, I do not at this point, think it is possible to identify
the exact normative project that logotherapists are be engaged in. Given the confusion
surrounding the philosophical assumptions underlying this paradigm, a coherent
account would seem to be rather impossible. In addition, to establish my claim, I
need indicate that the therapist is minimally involved in some normative enterprise in
order to demonstrate the inconsistency of Frankl's claims.
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This leads to another question -- namely, whether or not
paradoxical intention belongs to the persuasive methods. As
a matter of fact, paradoxical intention is the exact opposite of
persuasion, since it is not suggested that the patient simply
suppress his fears (by the rational conviction that they are
groundless) but, rather that he overcome them by exaggerating
them!1os
Despite these attempts at defense, I do not think Frankl's arguments have any
legitimacy to them. To begin with, simply because psychiatrist's have reported
success with the technique of paradoxical intention does not in any way refute the
claim that the technique itself is suggestive. In short, these claims are wholly disparate
and in no way even logically related.
Second, it is vacuous to claim that "paradoxical intention works in spite of
suggestion" because, at some point, the patients must have heeded the suggestion to
employ paradoxical intention even though, at first, they thought it could not work.
Thus, paradoxical intention at some level has to be construed as suggestive. Frankl,
himself may have later realized this. When defending this technique in The Will to

Meaning, he says: "On the other hand, the remarkable results obtained by paradoxical
intention cannot be explained merely in terms of suggestion" [emphasis added, mine] 109
Finally and with respect to Frankl' s retort that paradoxical intention is not a
persuasive technique, I believe that Frankl misunderstands the concept of persuasion
itself. It seems to me that the very notion of "persuasion" says nothing about the

content of what a person is encouraged to do, nor to think or believe. In other words,
108

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 238.
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Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 110.
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a person may randomly hold belief "x" and be persuaded by someone else to more
forcefully adhere to that very same belief. Perhaps this is a semantic argument more
than a substantive argument, but it seems to me that Frankl misunderstands the nature
of persuasion. He suggests that paradoxical intention is not a persuasive technique
because the person (is told!) to exaggerate the very symptoms he dislikes. This is
simply no argument.
By way of conclusion, Frankl offers no convincing arguments to show that
logotherapy as applied to clients who have a clinical neurosis is not suggestive nor
persuasive. As such, and for the purposes of my thesis, if the door is opened to
suggestion (in the sense of subtle/implicit prescriptions), then contrary to what Frankl
claims, logotherapists are engaged quite unwittingly and misguidedly in a normative
endeavor.
If this is the case, as I have tried to argue, then the goals of therapy with clients

who suffer from clinical neurosis may be of one of two kinds: 1) if treatment
terminates with the successful application of logotherapeutic techniques, then
logotherapy may properly be said to afford an individual psychological relief as a goal
in itself Frankl would not want to admit this; 110 for happiness, defined as pleasure, is

only a by-product of achieving meaning. 111 It is not clarified in Frank.l's texts whether
or not in this context, psychological relief is equivalent to happiness; yet, if this seems

° For an argument of this point, see part one of this chapter.

11

m Frankl, Will to Meaning, 99-100, "When discussing the motivational

theory of logotherapy I pointed out that the direct intention of pleasure defeats itself.
The more an individual aims at pleasure, the more he misses the aim."
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plausible, then one must acknowledge that logotherapists are not practicing consistent
with their theory.
But, a second kind of goal could equally result for clients suffering from clinical
neurosis, namely the therapist subtly coerces (through suggestion, persuasion, the very
making of the diagnosis itself) the client to adopt his particular philosophical vision.
Although, the theory of logotherapy claims that the authentic self must choose/act by
himself with reference to objective being, in its very real applications, the appropriate

balance between the client's self and being and self is suggested, etc. by the
logotherapist. Such a goal is beautifully exemplified in the following passages. We
shall first begin with a passage on the obsessional neurotic and then move to the
general remedies for various clinical neuroses:
Obsessional neurosis is not a mental disease, let alone a disease
of "the spirit"; the position the person takes on the disease is
independent of the disease. He remains free to change his
attitude. It is imperative for the therapist to make use of this
freedom. For obsessional neurosis "seduces" the obsessional
neurotic to a particular philosophical position, namely that worldview of hundred-per-centness of which we have spoken above.
... Because of the overdeveloped awareness that accompanies the
obsessional neurotic' s acts of cognition or decision, he lacks that
"fluent style" in which the healthy person lives, thinks, and
acts." 112
To sum up, we may say that the normal person desires a halfway-secure world, whereas the neurotic seeks absolute security.
The normal person desires to surrender himself to the one he
loves -- while the sexual neurotic strives for orgasm, aims at that
in itself, and thereby impairs his sexual potency. The normal
person wishes to know a part of the world approximately -while the obsessional neurotic wants a feeling of obviousness,
112

Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 191.
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aims at that and thereby finds himself being carried away on an
endless moving belt. The normal person is ready to take
existential responsibility for actual existence, while the neurotic
with his obsessional scruples would like to have only the feeling
(though an absolute one of a conscience at peace with itself.
From the point of view of what men should desire, the
obsessional neurotic wants too much; in terms of what men can
accomplish, he wants too little. 113

6b) The existential neurotics
A second class of clients is uniquely suited for treatment by logotherapists, namely
those suffering from existential neurosis. Existential neurosis is characterized by
"frustration of one's will to meaning," 114 and as such, is a uniquely spiritual illness.
One would expect the treatment of existential neurotics to be well-within the proper
sphere of activity of logotherapy. The kinds of identifiable existential neurosis are:
those suffering from the existential vacuum, unemployment disease, the Sunday-blues
disease, the executive disease, etc. 115
In almost all of Frankl' s case studies, it is not at all clear that the clients are
motivated to see a logotherapist because they are cognizant of the lack of meaning in
their lives. 116 Typically, some other factors are the reasons for which clients seek
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Ibid., 194.
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Ibid., xvii.
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Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, 122-4.
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For an example, see Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 121, 124. When describing
several cases of existential neurotics, Frankl attributes their reason for visiting a
logotherapist to a feeling of despair, sometimes accompanied by the desire to- commit
suicide.
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treatment. At least in these cases, it is incumbent upon the logotherapist to inform
clients -- or, to lead them to interpret their own suffering -- in existential terms and
hence, as a lack of meaning.
While paradoxical intention and dereflection are specific logotherapeutic techniques
employed with those suffering from clinical neurosis; no specific techniques are
advocated for the treatment of existential neurotics. However, Frankl is insistent that
the personal values of logotherapists not impact a client's search for meaning -- the
purported goal of treatment for the existential neurotic. He says:
In this sense existential analysis also remains noncommittal on the question of "to what" a person should
feel responsible -- whether to his God or his conscience
or his society or whatever higher power. And existential
analysis equally forbears to say what a person should
feel responsible for -- for the realization of which
values, for the fulfillment of which personal tasks,
for which particular meaning to life. On the contrary,
the task of existential analysis consists precisely in
bringing the individual to the point where he can of
his own accord discern his own proper tasks, out of the
consciousness of his own responsibility, and can find the
clear, no longer indeterminate, unique and singular
meaning of his own life. 117
Continuation of the treatment... so that it intrudes into
the personal sphere of particular decisions, must be
termed impermissible. The physician should never be
allowed to take over the patient's responsibility to
be shifted to himself; he must never anticipate decisions
or impose them on his patient. His job is to make it
possible for the patient to reach decisions; he must
endow the patient with the capacity for deciding. 118
117
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118

Ibid., 276-7.

182
Within clinical practice, it is difficult to understand how a logotherapist actually
engages a client's sense of conscience and responsibility without "imposing," on some
level, his own values on the client. Examining actual descriptions of clinical
encounters consistently leads one to the conclusion that in the endeavor for clients to
find their own meaning, the logotherapist's personal values are indeed, either covertly
or overtly suggested to the client. If this is the case, then logotherapists must admit
that a search for meaning is never purely a client's own, individual endeavor; but
rather, their personal search is strongly guided by the logotherapist himself. When one
adds to this consideration that theoretically logotherapists unwittingly are told to
believe that their own values are not operative in the context of logotherapy, this
exponentially increases the possibility that uncritically analyzed personal values may
impact the a client's search for meaning .. The following illustrates how this might be
said to occur in practice. Moreover, I challenge to the reader to consider whether the
client could really be said to have benefitted from treatment: .
A patient was sent to a psychiatrist because she was
troubled by an intense fear of syphilis. It developed that
she was suffering from a general neurotic hypochondria.
She misinterpreted neuralgic pains as signs of luetic infection.
... In this particular case the patient did not have these
sexual guilts. It was true that she had been the victim of
rape, but she was sensible enough to have no guilt feelings
about that isolated sexual experience. Her guilt feeling
had reference to another aspect of the matter entirely:
that she had not told her husband about the incident. Here
she was again being sensible; she deeply loved her husband
and had wanted to spare his feelings, since she knew him to
be a distinctly suspicious person. Her confession compulsion
was not a symptom at all. It therefore was not susceptible
to the ordinary interpretations of psychotherapy; what was
required was the logotherapeutic methods of matter-of-fact
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discussions, of taking the moral issues at face value. In
fact, the confession compulsion promptly vanished the moment
the patient realized that in the concrete case her continued
silence was an obligation she owed to her love. She perceived
that there was no need to make any confession since only guilt
can be confessed, and she felt herself to be free of any real
guilt. Moreover -- here we have an analogy to a case mentioned
in another connection -- she would only have conveyed quite the
wrong impression to her suspicious husband and would have been
deceiving him with the truth. This patient, then, could only
be reassured when her conscience was reassured. And her
conscience was not troubled over the sexual incident, but only
in regard to the dubious moral obligation to confess. 119
This example is a clear illustration of how and where a logotherapist's personal values
actually do impact the goal of treatment. Much more than merely allowing a patient
to clarify her particular meaning, the logotherapist deems her understanding of her rape
and her decision not to tell her husband about it as "sensible!" More strongly, it is
said that the client had an obligation to withhold this information from her husband so
that he may not suffer. Frankl is quite right in suggesting that this is a case involving
moral issues; however, it certainly seems as if the "decision" that was made by the
client at the end of treatment was strongly guided by the logotherapist. Contrary to
facilitating her contact with an objective realm of values and/or encouraging her to
engage in value clarification, it was the logotherapist who succinctly judged her
decisions to be "sensible."
Some might suggest that such cases are not detailed enough to make sweeping
claims. Let me be clear in saying that it is not incumbent upon this analysis to show
how in all cases suggestion is operative; but only, that at least in some cases,
119
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suggestion is present. If this is the case, then indeed, logotherapists are acting in the
capacity of a moral advisor and/or intellectual. Additionally, they are quite simply not
practicing in accord with the theory of logotherapy. But most importantly, I leave it
to the reader to judge whether or not clients are really led to discover their own
meaning in this form of therapy.

7)

Conclusion

Had Viktor Frankl written Man's Search for Meaning, solely to discuss the
importance that "meaning" has in human life, I doubt that I would have devoted the
preceding pages to an analysis of that inspirational message. Indeed, Frankl's tales of
the concentration camps and his concomitant message that those who survived were
those who had found meaning are extraordinary. As such, they deserve to be read by
those who want to consider how Frankl's thoughts may enrich their own walk through
life.
However, Frankl purported to do more than offer life lessons. As was noted in the
introduction, he developed this discipline of logotherapy to serve as a corrective to
existential analysis. It was as a paradigm of psychotherapy, that I investigated
logotherapy. Unlike any other paradigm of psychotherapy assessed in this dissertation
and from the very beginning, I have demonstrated that logotherapy must be viewed as
both inconsistent and incoherent. In other words, the fact that logotherapy's purpose
was unclear -- sometimes viewed as a "supplement" and at other times a "substitute
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for psychotherapy" -- led us down a long path of demonstrating the inconsistent
meanings of its assumptions and as a result, of its applications.
This analysis then, has important implications for those who write about the theory

and purport to engage in the practice of logotherapy. Today, there is an independent
journal called: The International Forum for Logotherapy. Contributors clarify the
theory and report on its applications. In a recent article, entitled: "The Dynamic of
Meaning," Jana Preble, a "diplomate of logotherapy" and associate professor of applied
psychology cites three case examples of those successfully treated by logotherapy."
After claiming that it was discovering a third grade boy's "world of meaning" that
ultimately was the the key to success for teaching him how to read, Preble
unabashedly claims:
Logotherapy is consistent as a philosophy and a viable
therapy. There is no need for manipulation, no forcing
a client to fit a treatment, or a treatment to fit a client.
All that is occasionally required is a shift in perception, a
new way of seeing that expands persons rather than limits
them.120
As I have argued, considerations as to how, why and who is truly responsible for this
"expansion" are extraordinarily ambiguous in logotherapy. For that reason, I find
Preble's assurance of the consistency of logotherapy quite discomfiting. As I have
attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, clients who are treated in this form of
therapy may in the end say that they have found "meaning" -- but its nature, reality,

120 Jana Preble. "The Dynamic of Meaning," International Forum for
Logotherapy, vol. 14, no. 2 (Fall, 1991): 98.
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and whether or not they, as free and responsible individuals have authentically chosen
it is all but clear.

CHAPTER FOUR
CONSIDERATION OF THE STATE OF CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOTHERAPY:
AN ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM DYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY

The three paradigms of psychotherapy analyzed in this dissertation no longer
exclusively characterize contemporary theory and practice. As stated in the
Introduction, the paradigms were selected for the following reasons: 1) historical
significance and 2) an extensive literature that attempts to articulate the nature of the
school of thought. These two factors made it possible to demonstrate competing
metaphysical and normative commitments. Although many therapists today still
adhere to aspects of these schools of thought, very few would define their practice by
any one theoretical orientation. 1 Rather, there is growing evidence that
psychotherapists are rejecting the limitations of particular schools of thought in favor
of an eclectic orientation.

23
'

If this is indeed the case, one might claim that my thesis

1

Council for the National Register of Health Service Providers, National
Register, I-13: "Each Registrant may identify a primary and secondary orientation,
neither, or only a primary or theoretical orientation. These choices were based upon
the descriptions psychologists use and are by necessity limited. As a result, the
orientations listed may not be entirely reflective of a Registrant's practice. The
choices are as follows: Behavioral, Cognitive/Cognitive Behavioral, Existential/
Humanistic, Interpersonal, Psychodynamic, Social Learning Systems."
2

Sol L. Garfield. Psychotherapy: An Eclectic-Integrative Approach (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 3: "While such popular orientation as
psychoanalysis and its derivatives and behavior therapy have had a marked irifluence
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is only of historical interest insofar as it describes the practice of psychotherapy of a
day gone by. Given the trend of eclecticism, theoretical analyses of paradigm-specific
practice could only be a caricature of actual practice. By implication, any attempt to
distill the normative assumptions present in the practice of psychotherapy would be
unrealistic.
This final chapter is offered as a response to such objections. In part, I will
explain why the current eclectic orientation in psychotherapy in no way renders my
thesis obsolete. Values are still present in the theory and practice of contemporary
psychotherapy. Eclecticism can only be said to make the project itself more
complicated -- both in terms of identifying "possible" paradigms and investigating
normative assumptions as they may appear in practice. 4 As a result of this
on the developments within the field, a majority of practitioners do not appear to
follow any particular school exclusively, or to limit themselves to the theories and
procedures of just one theoretical orientation. For example, in a 1970's survey of 855
clinical psychologists, over half of them indicated that they were eclectics (Garfield &
Kurtz, 1976) Since that time, a number of additional surveys have been conducted, and
although the percentage of individuals identifying themselves as eclectics has varied
from study to study, the eclectic orientation has generally been the most popular. In a
recent study of clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers and marriage and
family therapists, 68 % of the sample of 423 individuals indicated an eclectic
preference (Jensen, Bergin & Greaves, 1990).
3

As stated by Dr. Lowy in Basic Principles and Techniques in Short-Term
Dynamic Psychotherapy by Habib Davanloo. 1st ed. (New Jersey: J. Aronson, 1994),
93: "What is remarkable about this meeting is the absence of a school of thought. It
has been noted a number of times that schools are for minnows and fish and not for
scientists, and it is really quite refreshing to have an absence of 'this school versus
that school."'
4

It is important to acknowledge at this point two possible reactions to my

thesis: 1) Some therapists might claim that they adopt their ideas from so many
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"complication" and unlike previous chapters, a brief foreward addressing the presence
of paradigms in contemporary psychotherapy will be necessary. Exploring this issue
will make it apparent as to why my thesis must be tempered. Given the nature of the
paradigm I intend to investigate, namely Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy,5 and the
manner in which it developed, I am only able to demonstrate where certain theoretical
commitments might allow for a therapist's personal values to enter into the practice of
therapy.

Eclecticism and the problem of paradigm identification
Since the 1960's, there has been a rapid growth in the number of new forms
and techniques of psychotherapy. Recent estimates suggest that there are 450+
approaches to psychotherapy. This recent statistic viewed in light of the following

paradigms that the very identification of a coherent normative project would be
impossible. In this case, I would urge therapists to engage in critical reflection so as to
decipher exactly which assumptions they adopt from which schools of thought. It may
be the case that two assumptions are contradictory or imply contradictory normative
claims. Both could negatively impact the client. 2) Some therapists might reject
practicing from within any paradigm whatsoever (non-paradigmatic practice). Two
responses are applicable: a) Values are still likely to enter into the practice of
psychotherapy, but they are non-paradigmatic values (i.e. the therapist's personal
values, religious values, etc.) orb) One could question the "legitimacy" of practicing
psychotherapy in this way. As stated by Sol L. Garfield, in The Practice of Brief
Psychotherapy. (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon, 1989), 19: "Needless to say, if this rate of
increase continues [the growth of schools of thought], at some point we will have a
different form of psychotherapy for every person in the United States. This
manifestation of the free enterprise system, perhaps, may epitomize true democracy,
but whether it is an ideal situation for psychotherapy is another matter."
5

In this chapter, "Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy" is abbreviated as
STDT. I will use STD in front of the term "therapists."
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quote seems to indicate that the sheer number of forms of therapy virtually doubles
every ten years. As Garfield says:
"By the mid-1960's, I had accumulated over 60 different
approaches to psychotherapy ... In the 1970's, a report
from the National Institute of Mental Health made
reference to the existence of over 130 different forms of
psychotherapy (Report of the Research Task Force of the
National Institute of Mental Health, 1975). And, this
burst of unusual creative efforts in psychotherapy has
continued. Just five years later, Herink (1980) published
The Psychotherapy Handbook: The A to Z Guide to more
than 250 Therapies in Use Today. A few years later,
Kazdin ( 1986) made reference to the existence of over
400 therapeutic techniques. 6
Ironically, psychotherapists have greeted this increasing diversity with a curious
mixture of enthusiasm and concern. While many therapists welcome the creative
developments and new techniques for treating clients,7 others appear to be concerned
that the diversity has caused a kind of disciplinary confusion for the field of
psychotherapy. 8• 9
6

Garfield, Psychotherapy: An Eclectic-Integrative Approach," 1.

7

Jeremy Holmes and Richard Lindley. The Values of Psychotherapy. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 9: "The convergence of the psychotherapies while
retaining their separate identities is, in our view, one of the positive features of
contemporary psychotherapy. The recent development of cognitive behavioral
therapies, for example, means that behavior therapists now recognize the inner world
of their patients, and are beginning to build bridges with analytic therapies."
8

Garfield, Psychotherapy: An Eclectic-Integrative Approach, 2: "Such diversity
is confusing to people entering the field. It is equally confusing for individuals
outside the field. There can be too much of a good thing. This diversity raises some
basic and intriguing questions concerning what is really important in psychotherapy.
In other words, what are the variables or processes that lead to positive change in
psychotherapy? Does one school of thought have a more correct view of these
fundamental processes, or are all approaches either viewing different parts of the
elephant or characterizing similar phenomena in different ways?"
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The overall effect that the proliferation of forms of therapy might be said to
have on clients and for the discipline in general is not the central concern of this
chapter. Rather, the question that concerns me is to what extent it is possible (or not)
to identify paradigms amidst the many new "forms" of psychotherapy. One wonders,
for example, if these 450 forms of therapy really share all or even most of the features
of the three, historical paradigms analyzed at the beginning of this dissertation.

That

is to say, one wonders if they are defined by the fact that they were founded by a
specific individual; advocate specific notions of reality and mental illness; and/or have
an identifiable community of practitioners. Unfortunately, scholars writing on this
topic have been notoriously vague regarding what constitutes a new "form" of
therapy. 10• 11 Concerns of this kind, together with the sheer number of developments in
9

See Light, Donald. Becoming Psychiatrists: The Professional Transformation
of Self, 1st ed., (New York: Norton, 1980), 290. Light makes a distinction between
"strong and weak paradigm development" within medicine. By paradigm development,
he means: "the degree to which there is consensus among practitioners about the
theory or paradigm underlying their work." He says: "The studies of residents in
orthopedic surgery and psychiatry are particularly useful for looking at awareness of
uncertainties because the strength, and to a lesser degree, the development of their
paradigms contrast so sharply. Psychiatry is widely regarded as having weak and
competing paradigms to guide its diagnosis, treatment and research; while orthopedic
surgery has a strong paradigm with competing derivations," 290.
10

Psychotherapists themselves writing on this topic have neither been very
careful nor consistent about the language used to describe these forms of therapy -whether they be schools of thought, paradigms, new techniques, etc. One of the most
curious uses of language occurs in Holmes and Lindley, Values, 3. They say:
"Psychotherapy is enormously diverse. The Psychotherapy Handbook lists over 300
types of therapy ranging from Active Analytic to Zaraleya Psychoenergetic Technique.
Most therapists follow a particular school or tendency, (emphasis added) and the
authors are no exceptions."
11

Garfield, Psychotherapy: An Eclectic-Integrative Approach, 1-2.
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psychotherapy, make the task of paradigm identification difficult at best.
Two additional phenomenon that add to this difficulty deserve to be mentioned:
namely, the resurgence of the medical model in treating mental illness (the rise of
psychotropic drugs) and a growing number of therapists that establish what is loosely
defmed as the "helping professions." With respect to the first issue, I believe that the
medical model does, in some sense, pose a problem for the present analysis. An
increasing number of scientific studies suggest that a combined use of psychotherapy
and psychotropic medication in the treatment of mental illness constitutes the best
form of treatment. 12

The increasing popularity of combining neuroscientific and

psychotherapeutic remedies further erodes attempts to identify "pure" normative
projects in contemporary psychotherapy.
Finally, the sheer growth in the variety and numbers of people in the "helping
professions" also contributes to the problem of identification. It is interesting to note
that Freud, Sullivan and Frankl shared several features in common: all were medical
doctors, all practiced psychotherapy at a time when the discipline was still young and
relatively small 13 and all adhered to psychoanalysis at some point in their lives.

12

For an example see Lester Luborsky, Paul Crits-Christoph and A. Thomas
McLellan. "Do Therapists Vary Much in Their Success? Findings from Four
Outcome Studies." American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 56 (October 1986):
501-12.
13

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 115th Ed., (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Commerce: Economics & Statistics Administration, Bureau of"Census,
1995), 411: Statistics comparing the years of 1983 and 1984 verify the staggering
growth in terms of numbers and kinds of individuals involved in this profession. (Data
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Today, the field of psychotherapy has extended beyond the realm of medical practice
and includes social workers, marriage and family therapists, school psychologists,
pastoral counselors, occupational therapists, etc. In terms of differences in licensing,
educational background and variable contexts under which these practitioners claim to
treat the mentally ill, the contemporary scene of psychotherapy has grown and altered
considerably.
In light of these three factors, some stipulations need to be provided at the

outset of this chapter. First, when I refer to a paradigm of psychotherapy, I will only
be referring to it in its "pure" form. That is to say, the paradigm discussed in this
chapter will be reviewed on its own terms and without reference to how drugs might
interfere with or change its ideology. Fusing two distinct schools of treating mental
illness in practice carries with it the possibility of substantively affecting the
underlying assumptions implicit in a school of thought. For these reasons, neither a
pure medical approach nor a combined neuroscientific and psychotherapy approach
shall be discussed in what follows ..
Second, I have chosen to confine my analysis to a relatively new "form" of
therapy which today functions as a paradigm of sorts. Short-Term Dynamic

per 1000 individuals employed):
Therapists:
Counselors:
Psychologists:
Social Workers:

1983
247
184

135
407

1994

430
237
280
667
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Psychotherapy is arguably a suitable focus for this chapter because it shares many
important features with the historical paradigms assessed earlier. Short Term Dynamic
Therapy (STDT) seems to meet many of the criterion of Kuhn's conception of
"paradigms."

For example, STDT at least has a history of some twenty or more years

in which it was developed and gained acceptance in the psychotherapeutic community.
One sign of evidence for such acceptance is that STDT has at least one academic
journal developed to researching and further articulating the paradigm. 14
There are some features, however, of STDT which impede its analysis as a
paradigm. As the analysis will show, the manner in which Short-Term Dynamic
Therapy developed as a paradigm of sorts is relatively complex. The number of
thinkers to whom proponents owe their allegiance are various. In addition, and in a
different spirit from the historically based paradigms assessed in the first three
chapters of this dissertation, contemporary modes of psychotherapy tend to strike one
as consisting of a potpourri of techniques. This should hardly be surprising.
Typically, as a discipline develops, new paradigms develop in reaction to and yet as
an outgrowth, often times, of previous modes of thought. When and where
metaphysical assumptions are operative, very rarely is there a theoretical explanation -that is, notably of the nature of the self, worldview, and even of mental illness.
Nonetheless, where at least Freud, Frankl and Sullivan attempted to explain the
assumptions in their theories, it seems as if contemporary paradigms tend to ignore

14

See, The International Journal of Short-Term Psychotherapy (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.), vol. 1 (1986--).
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addressing these issues altogether. 15
Finally, my analysis of this paradigm will be limited to the approach taken and
the explanations provided by either clinical psychologists or psychiatrists. While
social workers and counselors may purport to adopt a psychodynamic orientation,
other factors indicate that their operative normative assumptions and goals may be
decidedly different from psychologists and psychiatrists. These factors are: the
contexts within which they do their work, their respective clients and the education
they have received. Additionally, it should be noted that social workers and
counselors have not been the creators of these paradigms themselves, but rather,
clinical psychologists and psychiatrists have largely been responsible for their
articulation in the past and at present.
There are a variety of possible methods for exploring my thesis in this chapter
in light of these difficulties. 16 In the following analyses of STDT, I will attempt to

15

I suspect that one reason for this is because these approaches are seen as
historical developments of previous theories. Perhaps, then, there is a sense that these
issues have been adequately addressed by previous theorists. A second reason may be
due the fact that contemporary theories seem to place much more emphasis on
techniques, goals of therapy, etc. at the expense of "factual notions" (and hence
normative notions attached to these). Whatever the case may be, the choice of the
appropriate methodology for exploring the thesis of this dissertation is undoul;>tedly
made more complex in virtue of these two issues: 1) the "eclectic" feel of the theories
themselves along with 2) an apparent disregard for the metaphysical assumptions
underlying the historical theories to which they appeal.
16

Given the above considerations, one possible mode of exploring STDT
would be to distill this paradigm to its ultimate origins. For example, STDT has its
theoretical roots in the dynamic theories of Freud, Klein, Rank, and more recently
French & Alexander, etc. If a reductionistic account could be achieved, then; one
could argue that STDT is simply a briefer version of traditional psychoanalytic
theories and as a result, shares most, or even all, of its normative assumptions.
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distill the general features of the paradigm itself and attempt to crystallize its unique
and/or foundational tenets. By such a distillation of these ideas in their own right,
perhaps one will be able to judge if in fact from these features alone (the features that
are most discussed), discemable metaphysical features can be noted or not. If this
exists as a possibility, then obviously one will be able to move on to the normative
assumptions contained therein. Once these two moves have been accomplished,
connections which exist between the contemporary paradigm and those that have
historical ties will be noted. The advantage of this methodology is that one can still
preserve the uniqueness of the contemporary paradigms (and thereby avoid
reductionism) as well as highlight what is novel about STDT. In addition, though, if
indeed points of "real" contact exist between the metaphysical assumptions and
historical paradigms, this can duly be noted.

The origins of short-term dvnamic therapy
In the book, Basic Principles and Techniques of Short-Term Dynamic Therapy,

Despite its appeal, this methodology suffers from a major flaw. Even though the
proponents of this theory acknowledge their indebtedness to past thinkers, and
paradigms, they are often eager to emphasize the novelty of their school of thought
and hence, would seem to be unwilling to acknowledge a strict reduction to
foundational paradigms. By way of an example, STDT's recommend that therapists
take an active, even confrontational, approach towards their clients in order to have
successful therapeutic outcomes. This stands in marked contrast to Freud's
recommendation to analysts. More than representing a mere variance in their
approach, STD therapists claim to be doing something new by theoretically articulating
the role of the therapist. This novelty, by their own admission, could not possibly
admit of a reduction to the metaphysical, and as a consequence, to the normative
assumptions involved. In the end, this approach is not choiceworthy.
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H. Davanloo and J. Mannor provide forewords to the proceedings of the First and
Second International Symposiums on Short-Tenn Psychotherapy held in 1975-76.
Both claim that the ultimate origin of the paradigm hearkens back to Freud's
psychoanalysis (insofar as this is an instance of dynamic therapy), and also to the
work of Alexander and French in the 1940's.17
The writings of Alexander and French serve as an interesting bridge between
Freud's psychoanalysis and the development of STDT. As Mannor tells us, Alexander
and French began to experiment and modify standard Freudian psychoanalytic
principles, particularly as they concern the length, frequency and regularity of intervals
that the client was seen. In addition, they began to experiment with the concept of
transference with the hope that a more active role of the therapist could produce faster
results. Their seminal work, Psychoanalytic Therapy (1946) was greeted negatively by
the analytic community. Although Marmor does not tell us why this was the case,
presumably it had to do with the very idea of modifying an already accepted scientific
paradigm of therapy namely, Freud's psychoanalysis. 18
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, at least three psychiatrists (H. Davanloo, D.
Malan and P .E. Sifneos) continued the experiments with the techniques of traditional
psychoanalytic therapy. The impetus behind their research was largely a practical
concern, as Sifneos claims:

17

Franz Alexander and T.M. French. Psychoanalytic Therapy: Principles and
Application. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 1946.
18

Davanloo, Basic Principles, 2.
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(STDT) was developed nearly forty years ago in order to
meet the demand for psychotherapeutic help which far
exceeded the availability of trained therapists, and to
counteract the prevailing -- and I feel absurd -- idea that
long-term psychotherapy was the only way to change
human attitudes and behaviors. 19
An economic explanation for the paradigms development can be noted here: supply of

therapists and the prevailing demand for therapy created the need for shorter forms of
psychotherapy that nonetheless could yield significant and long-lasting improvements
for the client. Some might be tempted to claim that the paradigm itself, then, only
differs from psychoanalysis in virtue of its limited duration. Again while the brevity
of treatment was a foundational concern to the originators of STDT, substantive
differences in terms of technique, role of the therapist, selection criteria of clients were
explored in each of their forms of treatment. In the early 1970's, the American
psychiatrists, Davanloo and Sifneos, met and discussed their fmdings. A little later,
they became acquainted with the English psychiatrist, D. Malan, who had for some
years been exploring briefer forms of psychotherapy. Motivated by a similar concern,
yet pursuing their work independently of each other, they agreed to meet in the mid1970's in order to discuss their work.
This, in brief, is the history of STDT. In what follows, we will explore the
theoretical commitments of STDT with the hope of identifying where, at the very

19

Peter E Sifneos. Short-Term Anxiety Provoking Psychotherapy: A Treatment
Manual, (New York: Basic Books, 1992), x. See also: "The Current Status of
Individual Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy and its Future: An Overview,"
American Journal of Psychotherapy, vol. 38, no. 4, (October, 1984): 472.
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least, normative assumptions may appear. This will be done keeping in mind the
historical ties that STDT has to Freud's psychoanalysis. For if it is the case that
STDT is simply a briefer version of psychoanalysis, then it could be the case that
many of its normative assumptions are the same as those identified in Chapter 1.

The logic of short-term dynamic therapy
In practice, it is true, there is nothing to be said against a

psychotherapist combining a certain amount of analysis
with some suggestive influence in order to achieve a
perceptible result in a shorter time -- as is necessary for
instance in institutions. But one has a right to insist that
he himself should be in no doubt about what he is doing
and should know that his method is not that of true
psychoanalysis. 20
567. But, after all, the game is supposed to be defined by
the rules! So, if a rule of the game prescribes that the
kings are to be used for drawing lots before a game of
chess, then that is an essential part of the game. What
objection might one make to this? That one does not see
the point of the prescription. Perhaps as one wouldn't see
the point either of a rule by which each piece had to be
turned round three times before one moved it. If we
found this rule in a board-game we should be surprised
and should speculate about the purpose of the rule. ("Was
this prescription meant to prevent one from moving
without due consideration?") 21
As noted in the previous section, STDT appeared roughly at the same time
albeit by three key persons working independently of each other. Because of this, by

°Freud, SE 12: 118.

2

21

Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe,
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1963), 150-1.
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the time First International Conference on STDT was held, what I would like to call
"private language games" 23 were already rather well-developed. Sifneos, working at
the Beth Israel Medical Center, coined his version of psychotherapy as "Short-Term
Anxiety-Provoking Psychotherapy (STAPP)." By contrast, Davanloo developed what
he called, "Broad-Focused Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy (BFSTDP)." The
individual theoretical differences along with different research methods and outcomes
prompted the desire to search for common ground in the mid-1970's. 24
In spite of the individualized manner in which STDT emerged, I will attempt to
explore the general logic behind versions of STDT in this section. This is possible
because several structures are broadly recognized in STDT. As I will argue, these
structures appear to function like the "rules' of a game. Each one of the categories
discussed below is logically, even necessarily linked to another. This structure, in
some sense, indicates how this form of psychotherapy is to be practiced. Yet, despite
the apparent formal nature of the rules, as we work through each category it will

23

I make this point about there being "private language games" existing in the
realm of STDT to highlight yet again, a difficulty noted at the outset of this chapter.
As I suggested earlier, focusing a discussion of major paradigms in contemporary
psychotherapy is a problematic task. One wonders if the differences, let us say,
between Sifneos' version of STAPP and Davanloo's BFSTD are of such qualitative
import so that they do in fact constitute different paradigms altogether. So, another
stipulation is in order. I will treat STDT as a paradigm unto itself and yet, when
focusing in on, a feature that is unique or more highly noted in one theory as
opposed to another, I will alert the reader to this fact.
24

Walter V. Flegenheimer. Techniques of Brief Psychotherapy. (New York:
Jason Aronson, 1982): Other versions of STDT identified are: Intensive Brief Therapy
of David Huntingford Malan; Time-Limited Psychotherapy of Mann; EclecticIntegrated Therapy of Walberg, etc.
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become increasingly apparent that the rules (and the overall game) operate according
to the individual interpretations of the therapist. Thus, in my view, Short-Term
Dynamic Therapy is a form of therapy that appears to have built-in warrants for its
practitioners to rely on personal values.

Selection criteria of clients
Unlike any other contemporary paradigm, STDT theorists are quite specific in
defining the kind of patient that qualifies for treatment. As we will soon see, this
highly specific and limited number of individuals largely sets the pace for how this
kind of treatment works.
In his book, Short-Term Anxiety Provoking Psychotherapy~ Sifneos offers the

most comprehensive list of selection criteria for clients. In brief, clients must be:
intelligent and/or psychologically-minded; have exhibited meaningful relationships in
the past; present with a focused problem; and relate flexibly to the examiner, with
positive and negative feelings exhibited appropriately. 25 Each criterion is significant
because it determines not only the substance of the following categories/rules but also,
the success or failure of the practical application of the paradigm.
To begin exploration of some of these features, at times, there is a tendency to
subsume them under a general heading that clients must exhibit a "strength of

25

Criteria distilled from Peter E. Sifneos. Short-Term Anxiety Provoking
Therapy: A Treatment Manual (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 19. See also:
Davanloo, Basic Principles, 9-34.
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character. "26 Whether or not these features alone are constitutive of character or not,
the operative word in this phrase does indeed seem to be "strength." Clients who are
admitted into STDT must possess both cognitive and emotional resilience. If strength
of this nature is a prerequisite for "treatment" of a "mental illness," of course, one
naturally wonders what mental illness constitutes on these terms. This of course, will
be explored in the next section. For now, let the following remarks suffice as to the
criteria of selection of patients.
In STDT, persons who are intelligent are those "with a highly developed
capacity to deal with complicated concepts." 27 According to Malan, the most
important way of exploring a client's intelligence is to see how the client responds to
"tentative confrontations and classifications. "28 Interestingly, the degree to which
clients use sophisticated language does not indicate their level of intelligence for
clients, it is said, may not fully understand the meaning of their words. Appeals to
other forms of testing intelligence, (i.e. IQ tests, work status, level of education, etc.)
are not mentioned by these theorists. The underlying and obvious conclusion to be
drawn is that intelligence of a client upon entry into STDT is solely a function of the
extent to which she can absorb the clarifications/interpretations offered by her
therapist. If this is how intelligence is construed in practice, this may indeed be an
area where normative judgements enter into STDT. In the absence of objective
26

Sifneos, Short-Term, 20.

27

Ibid., 36.

28

David Malan. The Frontier of Brief Psychotherapy, (New York: Plenum
Press, 1976), 36.
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measures for determining intelligence, the ultimate standard by which competence is
judged is by the individual therapist.
In addition, a client's emotional fortitude also constitutes part of the generic

term, "strength of character." "Psychological mindedness" falls under this category.
By and large this consists of a) one's capacity at introspection and b) ability to
withstand the various techniques of STDT. 29

This latter category consists of:

confrontation, clarification, exploration, manipulation, abreaction, interpretation and
anxiety-provoking techniques. 3° Clients who are not capable of withstanding these
techniques are not deemed suitable candidates for STDT. As Malan notes in his
recent book, Individual Psychotherapy & the Science of Psychodynamics:
There are two classes of patients with whom purely
dynamic psychotherapy tends to be ineffective: 1) those
who are very fragile or badly damaged emotionally; and
2) those who either start with massive resistance or else
develop subtle forms of impenetrable resistance during
their therapy. 31
As point 1) of the above quote indicates, strength to withstand emotionally charged
techniques delimits STDT candidates; but also, I would urge one to pay specific
attention to issue 2) of the above quote. It is not an arbitrary fact that those clients
who present with what is deemed as "massive resistance" are also rejected -- resistance
perhaps to acknowledging/giving credence to a therapist's interpretation.

29

Davanloo, Basic Principles, 17.

30

Ibid.

31

D. Huntingford Malan, Individual Psychotherapy and the Science of
Psychodynamics, 2nd ed., (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1995), 273.
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A third feature, namely, that persons have had a meaningful human relationship
during childhood is the most curious selection criterion. Sifneos offers the most
comprehensive explanation. He says:
Making a sacrifice for another person at the expense of
one's own pleasure is evidence of altruism. A child's
demonstration of altruism at an early age denotes a
capacity to interact flexibly with another person in a
give-and-take way. Such a relationship is "meaningful."
Why should one go about investigating so thoroughly the
existence of one meaningful relationship in early
childhood? Altruism and the capability of expressing
feelings for another person in a give-and-take way are
evidence that the patient reached a level of psychological
maturity at an early age. Such an individual is not likely
to become psychotic or develop a borderline or
narcissistic personality later in life. In this sense the
second criterion attempts to rule out these more serious
conditions and gives the evaluator an opportunity to
pursue an investigation of the patient's character strengths
and suitability for STAPP. 32
This passage has important implications not only for the logic of STDT but also, as I
will argue, for the normative assumptions that this kind of therapy might involve in
practice. With respect to the logic, it will be shown that the criterion that one has had
a meaningful relationship directly bears upon the second rule of the game of STDT,
namely diagnosis. In principle, neither psychotic, narcissistic, or borderline personality
disorders are treatable illnesses within the confines of STDT. More than a way of
delimiting treatable categories of mental illness, though, altruism greatly colors the
kind of therapeutic relationship that is considered valuable in STDT.

For, depending

upon how the therapist interprets the meaning of "altruism" and "give-and-take

32

Sifneos, Short-Term, 23-24.
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interaction" with others, the extent to which there exists an asymmetrical balance of
power between the client and the therapist as well as the degree to which the personal
values of the therapist may impact the practice of STDT will be indicated.
Let us take a closer look at what Sifneos might mean by the terms, "altruism"
and "give-and-take interaction with others." Sifneos seems to understand the term
"altruism" as the ability of one to make sacrifices for another. I would venture to say
that this is a rather extreme way of defining the term --- the term "sacrifice" implying
that one might do something for others at the expense of their own interests and/or
their own well-being. Nonetheless, even if we were to understand "altruism" in a less
extreme sense, (i.e. altruism as opposed to egoism as typically distinguished in ethics),
at the very least, altruism implies that one has "other-centered" interests in contrast to
merely attempting to satisfy one's own self-interest. Now, if this latter definition were
to be what Sifneos means by the term, "altruism," one might still argue that this usage
of altruism implies something radically different than a "give-and-take interaction"
with others.
A simple example

m~y

easily illustrate my point: Mother Teresa's work with

the poor in Calcutta is typically called altruistic -- her self-less and untiring labor for
the sake of others has been well established. Now, while it may be the case that
Mother Teresa might claim that she receives more personal gratification, etc. as a byproduct of her work, it is highly unlikely that one would claim she is really engaged in
a type of "give-and-take relationship" with those whom she helps. The latter clearly
implies an egalitarian relationship, one based on the expectation that reciprocal
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interests and needs will be satisfied. In sum, the term, altruism could be said to have
at least three different meanings: sacrifice, taking into account the interests of others,
and "give and take interactions."
Now, to some, it may seem as if I am belaboring a trite issue. However, I
explained the various meanings of this term because I believe that the criteria of
having had at least one "meaningful" childhood relationship has far more importance
than simply delimiting those diagnoses that are non-treatable in STDT, namely:
narcissism, borderline and psychotic disorders. In my view, if one follows the logic of
the rules of the game of STDT, altruism (narrowly defmed as sacrifice) is a prerequisite of candidates of STDT because, from the therapist's point of view, it makes a
therapeutic relationship possible. In other words, it is not an arbitrary fact that clients
must have evidenced "altruism" in the past because, and in a very real sense, STDT
requires that clients will have to establish a similar "meaningful and altruistic"
relationship with the therapist. In addition, the manner in which the individual
therapist interprets "altruism," that is, as sacrifice, etc. covertly obliges the client to
manifest differing levels of motivation. In this way, the therapist exerts different
levels of power/control over the client. In conclusion, what seemingly reads as a
descriptive feature of STDT has actually been shown to take on a normative force in
the context of treatment. The following case example of a college student suffering
from psychoneurosis beautifully illustrates what a sacrifice might look like in STDT
but also what might happen when a client "changes her mind" regarding this sacrifice:
[Initial Evaluation:] She seemed to be motivated to
understand the reasons for her symptoms and to realize
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that she had to work hard. When asked what sacrifices
she was prepared to make, she answered that she was
willing to cut some of her classes in order to keep her
appointments in the clinic, despite the difficulties this
might create for her.
[Second Visit:} Patient: ... Now what about the change
of the hour (of the appointment)? Doctor: I understand
that you have a conflict of interest, but my schedule is
somewhat rigid, and this is the only hour I have.
One may view the therapist's attitude on this point as
inflexible; but, in his judgment, he has to assess the patient's
manipulative tendencies and her somewhat contemptuous
attempt (emphasis mine) to make psychotherapy rank
second to her studies. He, therefore, decides at this early
point to draw the line.
Doctor: What I said stands. If you want to see me it
would have to be at this hour. Patient: You are going to
become the reason for my flunking my exam. Doctor:
Oh, come now, Miss N., I am surprised at you! After
telling me that you are such a rational person and that
you come from such a rational country, after emphasizing
that you and your mother always think logically, after
viewing me in a derogatory way, how could it be possible
that I would be held responsible for your failing your exam? 33

I believe that even D. Malan, who is not so adamant as the others that motivation is
of paramount importance as a selection criteria (and especially as evidenced in the
initial interview) may subtly be lending evidence to my thesis in the following
passage:
... (the client) must show adequate motivation to attempt
to solve his problems by achieving insight. This is an
additional -- and equally important reason for giving
interpretations during the assessment period; since in this
way the patient has been provided with a foretaste of the
kind of therapy he will be offered. It is not necessary for
his motivation to start high as long as it increases during
his exposure to the clinical situation; correspondingly,

33
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decreasing motivation is a poor prognostic_sign
(emphasis added, mine). 34
The interpretative connection that I am trying to establish here is that "signs" of
altruism as evidenced in the therapeutic relationship/transference will eventually (as
Malan notes above) emerge over the course of therapy and the expectation for what
constitutes valid signs of altruism depends, in large part, on the level of patient
motivation that is expected in therapy.
As a final point of historical interest concerning a meaningful relationship as a
selection criteria of patients, it is important to note that it is here where, STDT sharply
diverges from Freud's psychoanalysis. Like Freud, many dynamic theorists believe
that childhood relationships are significant because the patterns in which they occur
will invariably be repeated in the transference neurosis. Nonetheless, nothing is said
about "altruism", let alone, of "give and take interactions" being a significant feature,
according to Freud, in these early childhood relationships. As a result, they do not
function as selection criteria for clients. 35
The full ramifications of the above analysis of "altruism" will not fully be
recognized until the third category, therapeutic techniques, has been explored. But at
the least, a door has been opened to suggest that normative values, of a highly
personal and covert nature, are operative in STDT.

34
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Davanloo, Basic Principles, 9-10.
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Client diagnosis
Assuming that the client satisfies the aforementioned criteria of selection, let us
move on to the second rule of STDT, diagnosis. From the therapist's perspective, this
category largely acts as the final determiner for recommending STDT to a client. As
stated previously, clients exhibiting certain kinds of illness are not deemed to be good
candidates for this kind of therapy, and as such, their treatment is not amenable to the
therapeutic techniques of STDT. For this reason, I believe that this second category is
logically tied to both the selection criteria of clients and hints at the kinds of
therapeutic techniques that are used in STDT. 36
The way in which STD therapists arrive at a diagnosis could complicate this
analysis. Borrowing concepts freely from psychoanalysis, and interpersonal,
neuroscientific and even to some extent, behavioristic schools of thought, STD
theorists attempt to establish a unified diagnosis.

Whether or not a unified or

coherent diagnosis is possible in spite of the variety of the schools of thought upon
which they base their thought is only peripheral to my thesis.
In this section, I will focus on a standard accusation leveled at proponents of
STDT, namely: that the kinds of mental illness treated by STDT, as well as its cure,

36

For some acknowledgement of this fact in contemporary research on STDT
see Leonard Horowitz, Saul E. Rosenberg and Kim Bartholomew, "Interpersonal
Problems, Attachment Styles and Outcome in Brief Dynamic Psychotherapy," The
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, vol. 61, no. 4, (1993): 549-560.
"Some types of interpersonal problems seem to be more difficult to treat than others,
and people who complain primarily of the more difficult types of problems would
seem to be poor candidates for brief dynamic psychotherapy" 549.
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are limited in nature and in scope. 37 What I would like to do now is to turn to a
consideration of this matter: does STDT only offer superficial treatment for illnesses
of a rather recent temporal onset, such as adjustment disorders?
A scientifically sound way of attacking this charge would be to demonstrate
empirically that STDT can impact "characterological disorders." 38

There is at once an

urgency on the part of STD therapists to claim that characterological change can and

does occur in their form of brief therapy and at the same time a noted
acknowledgement that STDT lacks outcome studies demonstrating such deep-level and
long-term transformations. 39
It is consistently noted that outcome studies must take into consideration the
selection criteria of clients. That is to say, positive or negative outcome in all forms

of therapy depend upon the kind of client that one treats, the nature of the presenting
problem, etc. For this reason, just as Freud claimed that psychoanalysis requires that
clients have a "reliable character," so too, and as noted earlier, STDT requires that

37

Davanloo, Basic Principles, 93.
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I have in mind here those illnesses that are identified in the DSM-IV as Axis
II personality disorders.
39
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clients have a general "strength of character." Invariably, the diagnosis acts in much
the same way. For this reason, it may be useful to consider a list of those kinds of
clients that are, in principle, not deemed as good candidates for positive outcome in
STDT. They are: 40
-

Suicidal Patients
Substance Abusers
Long-Term Hospitalized Patients
Chronic Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD)
Chronic Phobias
Patients treated by ECT
Self-Destructive Persons

* Narcissistic
* Psychotics

& Borderline Personality Disorders

It strikes me as curious that while STD therapists are seeking to make a

broader claim that their form of therapy can impact "characterological disorders," in
principle, they are excluding from treatment two kinds of "characterological disorders,"
notably narcissistic and borderline personality disorders.

The curiosity increases,

when one considers that from an historical point of view, Freud claimed that
psychoanalysis was capable of treating the narcissist. 41
One possible explanation for the exclusion of some of these illnesses is the

40

See David Malan, "Exploring the Limits of Brief Psychotherapy," Chapter 4,
in Davanloo, Basic Principles.
41

My inquiry in this section is limited to only those diagnoses that Freud
thought psychoanalysis was capable of affecting. For this reason, I shall not address
"self-destructive" clients; as stated, it is too vague of a description to be certain if
Freud treated such clients. In addition and obviously due to advances in technology,
the comparison can not be made for patients who underwent ECT treatmentsr The
clearest example of a diagnosis which Freud claims to treat and STD therapist exclude
is the narcissist. For that reason, my investigation will be limited to this diagnosis.
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length, strength and number of symptoms that a client possesses.

If these are

considered too severe to be overcome in brief therapy, then, the patient is not deemed
a suitable candidate. Indeed, one could make the case that it is exactly this kind of
reasoning that is employed in STDT's decision to treat persons with OCD or phobia
but not those with chronic OCD or chronic phobia.
However, I think the above is a shallow explanation precisely because it does
not account for the exclusion of narcissists and borderline clients from treatment.
Rather, I wish to suggest an alternative explanation that might function as the real
rationale for why such persons having these characterological disorders are deemed
unacceptable candidates for this kind of therapy. In brief, by definition of the
disorders themselves, both narcissists and borderlines have severe problems forming
relationships with others. 42

The therapeutic relationship that is necessary in STDT is

of such a kind as to require the client -- immediately and unequivocally -- to willingly
accept the therapist's interpretation of what the proper focus of treatment should be.

Only when this is accomplished can the therapist employ the techniques of STDT and
move on, if you will , to the next "rule of the game," namely the techniques of
therapy.

I believe that both the importance and clarity of this thesis emerges when

one compares Freud's reasons for claiming that psychoanalysis can be a successful
form of therapy for narcissists. It is Freud's underlying notion of the therapeutic
relationship that accounts for his claim to do so. In the end, what will be
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demonstrated is how radically different STD therapists understand the nature of this
relationship and how, to a much greater degree than psychoanalysis, a therapist's
personal values may be said to guide the course of therapy.
A place to begin this analysis lies with the kind of client that both Freud and
STD therapists would agree could not be treated, namely the psychotic. On several
occasions, Freud stated that it is impossible to treat the psychotic - the clearest
instance of the person with "loose" connections with reality. In An Outline of

Psychoanalysis, Freud says:
If the patient's ego is to be a useful ally in our common

work, it must however hard it may be pressed by the
hostile powers, have retained a certain amount of
coherence and some fragment of understanding for the
demands of reality. But this is not to be expected of the
ego of a psychotic; it can not observe a pact of this kind,
indeed it can scarcely enter into one. It will very soon
have tossed us away and the help we offer it and sent us
to join the portions of the external world which no longer
mean anything to it. Thus, we discover that we must
renounce the idea of trying our plan of cure upon
psychotics - renounce it perhaps for ever or perhaps only
for the time being, till we have found some other plan
better adapted for them. 43
What is important about the above quote is that, in some sense, it is not the diagnosis
per se of being a psychotic which does not allow for such individuals to be treated
with psychoanalysis; but rather, from the therapists point of view, the diagnosis has a

meaningfu.l implication for the possibility of establishing a "viable" therapeutic
relationship.

43

Establishing the appropriate kind of relationship is a necessary

Freud, SE 23, 173.
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requirement for the very possibility of "doing" psychoanalysis. As Freud says, if a
client can not be a "useful ally" and form a "pact" with the therapist, it is the therapist
that must "renounce" psychoanalysis as a form of cure for the client.
By contrast, Freud did think that narcissists could fulfill the above
requirements.

Provided that the individual has not broken off all connections with the

external world, as is the case with schizophrenics, Freud believed that psychoanalysis
could be a viable form of treatment for many individuals suffering from narcissism.
He explains this distinction as follows:
A pressing motive for occupying ourselves with the
conception of a primary and normal narcissism arose
when the attempt was made to subsume what we know of
dementia praecox (Kraeplin) or schizophrenia (Bleuler)
under the hypothesis of the libido theory. Patients of this
kind whom I have proposed to term paraphrenics, display
two fundamental characteristics: megalomania and a
diversion of their interest from the external world -from people and things. In consequence of the latter
change, they become inaccessible to the influence of
psychoanalysis and cannot be cured by our efforts. But
the paraphrenic's turning away from the external world
needs to be more precisely characterized. A patient
suffering from hysteria or obsessional neurosis has also,
as far as his illness extends, given up his relation to reality.
But analysis shows that he has by no means broken off his
erotic relations to people and things. He still retains them
in phantasy. .. ... But the megalomania itself is no new
creation; on the contrary, it is, as we know, a magnification
and plainer manifestation of a condition which had already
existed previously. This leads us to look upon the narcissism
which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a
secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism
which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a
secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that
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is obscured by a number of different influences. 44
Even with this severe symptomatology, the narcissist, for Freud, is an acceptable
candidate for treatment in his psychoanalysis. Even though, his capacity to form
interpersonal relationships is questionable, the narcissist is capable of forming a viable
therapeutic relationship with the analyst. The narcissist is capable of the following:
The analytic physician and the patient's weakened ego,
basing themselves on the real external world, have to
band themselves together into a party against the enemies,
the instinctual demands of the id and the conscientious
demands of the super-ego. We form a pact with each other.
The sick ego promises us the most complete candor - promises,
that is, to put at our disposal all the material which its selfperception yields it; we assure the patient of the strictest
discretion and place at his service our experience at
interpreting material that has been influenced by the
unconscious. 45
And how, one might wonder is candor evidenced within the therapeutic relationship,
according to Freud? One sign would be the client's pledge to "to obey the
fundamental rule of analysis." 46 This, of course is free association, a main technique

of psychoanalysis.
I spent some time quoting Freud at length because it seems to me that his
sense (at least in these passages) in explaining the nature of the therapeutic
relationship emphasizes an important value that lies at the root of the therapeutic
relationship. Candor allows for the possibility of the pact formation and enables the
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technique of free association to occur in the therapeutic encounter. But more
importantly, the therapist informs the client that candor is required; indeed, the patient
"pledges" to commit to such sincerity. Freud reasons that the narcissist, even despite
the extreme nature of the pathology, is quite capable of willingly agreeing to be
candid, and thereby free associating in therapeutic sessions.
Unlike Freud, STD therapists offer vague descriptions of the therapeutic
relationship that is necessary to successful outcome in their form of treatment.

At

times it is said that a "joint agreement" must exist between the client and the therapist.
At other times, it is suggested that only "part" of the client can, in principle, jointly
agree to therapeutic work while simultaneously another "part" of the client will
actively resist any therapeutic endeavor. 47

What concerns me is their repeated failure

to acknowledge that STD therapy requires that the client possess other values, in
addition to candor if this form of therapy is to succeed. More boldly and as will soon
be made clear, STD therapists encourage clients to adopt certain "values" as opposed
to others in the confines of therapy. For now it is sufficient to note that if candor
were the only value that is necessary for the therapeutic relationship and if STD
therapy can accomplish characterological change, as these therapists claim it can, then
the narcissist should in principle be an acceptable candidate for treatment.

And as

noted, he is not.
One reason why a discussion of client values/norms may be overlooked by
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STD therapists is that the therapeutic relationship is typically discussed from the point
of view of the therapist. The following quote illustrates this:
According to Davanloo (1980, 1990), the therapist must
abandon the passive stance and work actively to bring the
patient's conflict into focus, intensifying the affective
involvement and creating an intrapsychic conflict that makes
rapid change possible .... In this way, the BFSTDP therapist is
not neutral but adopts a therapeutic stance that advocates
openness and honesty, (emphasis added) even when painful.
The therapist communicates a serious but dedicated approach
to getting at the truth (Malan has referred to this as "the iron
hand in the velvet glove"). It is clear to the patient from the
outset that the therapist is working diligently and is presenting a
challenge to the patient to join in and work at his or her highest
level of ability. 48
In the above passage, the therapist admits that her stance is "non-neutral" insofar as

she "advocates" openness and honesty on the part of the client. One could easily
interpret "openness and honesty" as equivalent to Freud's notion of candor. Again, if
this were the only value that were assumed in this form of therapy, then the narcissist
by definition (and given STD therapists' purported goals of affecting characterological
change) should, in principle, be capable of treatment. However, I would urge the
reader at this point to focus on the last part of the above quote. In addition to
encouraging "openness and honesty," the therapist is also said "to challenge the patient
to work. .. at his or her highest level of ability."

In the abstract, the therapist, in her

non-neutral stance is encouraging the client's motivation. As described in the
foregoing section, it was noted that motivation is broadly evidenced in terms of
"altruistic" behavior. The asymmetrical nature of the therapeutic relationship seems to

48
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218
presuppose at least one (some) values in addition to candor.
By way of concluding this discussion, we have seen that formulating a
diagnosis in STDT is both a final determination of the selection criteria of STDT and
hints at the kinds of techniques that will be used in this form of therapy. At the outset

of therapy, the client is assumed to possess some other values, in addition to candor,
or openness and honesty. If the client does not possess these, the therapist, in her
"non-neutral" stance, may encourage clients to adopt values in the course of therapy.
Even though both Freud's psychoanalysis and STDT are "dynamically" based theories,
Freud allowed for treatment of the narcissist because his conception of the nature of
the therapeutic relationship emphasized only the value of candor.

STDT presupposes

other values in addition to candor on the part of the client. This final point makes it
obvious as to why STDT is fundamentally different from Freud's psychoanalysis (longterm therapy). Free associative techniques imply a lengthier treatment of the
individual and, at the very least, a more egalitarian notion of the nature of the
therapeutic relationship.
In the next section, I will explore the sense of therapeutic techniques that are

made use of in STDT and see how this next rule may affect the actual and normative
goals of this form of therapy.

Techniques of therapy
Following in the footsteps of Freud, STD therapists use interpretive techniques
in the course of therapy.

Even today, clients are said to have unresolved Oedipal
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Conflicts and symptomatology is said to result from unconscious sexual wishes. 49 In
this section, I choose not to focus so much on the content of the interpretations; but
rather, on the following issues: 1) the appropriate time to offer interpretations in the
course of therapy, 2) the various classes/categories of interpretation that therapists
may use and 3) the way in which therapists are trained to use these techniques.
Discussing the timing of interpretations may seem, to some, to be a relatively
unimportant topic. However, it is one of the ways in which STD establishes itself as a
novel version of dynamic therapy. Freud has much to say about the timing of
interpretations and the impact that this may have for the outcome of therapy. For this
reason, consideration of Freud's comments on this point may be a useful tool with
which to further assess the impact that this could have upon the goals of therapy.
In numerous texts, Freud cautions therapists against making use of

interpretation too soon in the therapeutic process. Based on his own clinical
experience, Freud warns of the negative consequences of this form of therapeutic
technique. For example, in On Beginning the Treatment, he says:
It is true that in the earliest days of analytic technique we

took an intellectualist view of the situation. We set a high
value on the patient's knowledge of what he had
forgotten, and in this we made hardly any distinction
between our knowledge of it and his. We thought it a
special piece of good luck if we were able to obtain
information about the forgotten childhood trauma from
other sources - for instance, from parents or nurses or the
seducer himself - as in some cases it was possible to do;
and we hastened to convey the information and the proofs
of its correctness to the patient, in the certain expectation
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of thus bringing the neurosis and the treatment to a rapid
end. It was a severe disappointment when the expected
success was not forth-coming. How could it be that the
patient, who now knew about his traumatic experience,
nevertheless still behaved as if he knew no more about it
than before? Indeed, telling and describing his repressed
trauma to him did not even result in any recollection of it
coming into his mind (emphasis added, mine). 50
It is clear from the above comment that Freud's early observations of imparting

interpretations too quickly led to some unpalatable consequences: 1) the inability to
distinguish between the content of the knowledge achieved (at the conscious level) as
being that which is proper to the therapist or the patient and 2) rushing a suggestion
further repressed unconscious. Taken together, one could argue that at least in this
passage Freud was concerned with a client's autonomy; presumably, it is important for
clients to possess their own knowledge and this, of course, would presuppose that
unconscious material has been dealt with at the conscious level.

But let us consider

some other negative effects. Freud notes that:
It is not difficult for a skilled analyst to read the patient's

secret wishes plainly between the lines of his complaints
and the story of his illness; but what a measure of selfcomplacency and thoughtlessness must be possessed by
anyone who can, on the shortest acquaintance, inform a
stranger who is entirely ignorant of all the tenets of
analysis that he is attached to his mother by incestuous
ties, that he harbors wishes for the death of his wife
whom he appears to love, that he conceals an intention of
betraying his superior, and so on. I have heard that there
are analysts who plume themselves upon these kinds of
lightning diagnoses and 'express' treatments, but I must
warn everyone against following such examples. Behavior
of this sort will completely discredit oneself and the

° Freud, SE 12:

5

141.
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treatment in the patient's eyes and will arouse the most
violent opposition in him, whether one's guess has been
true or not; indeed, the truer the guess the more violent
will be the resistance. As a rule the therapeutic effect
will be nil; but the deterring of the patient from analysis
will be final. 51
The above probably represents the most curious passage, especially in light of
the techniques of STD therapists, for there are several different nuances within Freud's
cautioning against rapid interpretations. There is a level in which Freud seems to be
implying that such treatment between "strangers" simply violates the established rules
of etiquette; but most importantly, it does in fact, increase the resistances present on
the part of the patient. Again, irrespective of the content of the interpretation, Freud
claims that there are at least four possible negative consequences that the timing of an
interpretation may be said to have for the client. One wonders, how might STD
therapists respond when faced with such consequences?
Interestingly, many of Freud's concerns are lessened by the selection criteria of
clients. For example, Freud's noted worry about possibly alienating the patient from
psychoanalysis -- and therapy in general -- is mitigated by the fact that STDT ensures
that clients are highly motivated individuals who possess a "strength of character."
Potential alienation of the client because of a stranger imposing a strange myth upon
the patient, again, because of the selection criteria seems to be highly unlikely, and
may in the end say more about Victorian etiquette rather than our own.52 Similar in
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vein is the fact that Freud argues that early interpretation may misconstrue diagnosis.
This is clearly not a concern of STD therapists who believe that diagnosis can and
ought to occur within the initial interview.
What is curious, though, is Freud's concern that early interpretation can (and
negatively for the goals of therapy) deepen a client's resistances. Many STD therapists
(notably Peter Sifneos) seem to relish the fact that resistances are strong and that they
can only be combated by anxiety-provoking measures. Perhaps, at this time, it is
appropriate to make the transition to this seemingly novel and odd (on psychoanalytic
terms) technique and ask the question: What is the justification for anxiety-provoking
or even "highly confrontational, almost adversarial techniques?"53
In some sense, the justification for all or any of the techniques used in STDT

rests, once again, with the selection criteria for clients. Consider the following claim
by Sifneos:
... staying within the designated and agreed-upon
focus increases anxiety and brings about resistance.
When that happens, the therapist is faced with a
dilemma. Should one persist in making the patient
more and more anxious and thus resistant, or should
one become more supportive and try to diminish the
effect - in short, become anxiety-suppressive?
The STAPP therapist persists in making anxietyprovoking confrontations and clarifications. Here
again the therapist counts on the patient's motivation
for change. Despite unpleasant emotions, the patient
will understand the need to come to grips with the
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anxiety once and for all, for the sake of recovery. 54
An case example of a therapist employing this technique is useful to consider. Sifneos

cites the following and the reader will soon see why it is worth quoting at length:
If a patient brings up information about some form of
acting out which seems to be antitherapeutic, the therapist
might say: "It appears to me that your action is
completely contrary to what we have been talking about.
Under these circumstances, therefore, I think that there is
no need for us to go on, because it is clear that you are
not interested in solving your problems if you act out
against your own therapy."
Such a statement usually will produce a great deal of
anxiety because the patient's motivation for change has been
challenged Patients usually vehemently deny that they want to
discontinue their therapy, and they also agree that acting out
will be counterproductive.
If, on the other hand, the patient has used acting out as
an excuse to terminate treatment because it is too anxiety
provoking, it would be concluded that the original evaluation
of the patient's motivation for change was faulty and that the
patient was not an appropriate candidate for STAPP.55

By now, the analogy made between a game and its rules and the logic of STDT
should be apparent.

According to Wittgenstein, the rules of a game define the

parameters of success/failure within the game. But what I would truly like the reader
to notice in the above passage is that if one compares STDT to a game, the players in
this game do not occupy "equal" positions. Quite simply, the client does not have the
same opportunity nor power, as does the therapist, to make use of the "rules."
Because of this, within the boundaries of STDT, the client is really a powerless player
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in his own treatment. The above passage offers an excellent example of this theme.
If a client persists in certain behavior (in this case, what is considered by the therapist

to be a form of "acting out,") then, within the game of STDT, the client has only one
choice: namely, to change the behavior. Persons who have only one choice in a
certain situation, in a very real sense, have no choices at all. I suspect that STD
therapists could say: Ah, but the client could leave and find another therapist.
Admittedly, this is true. But note, if a client were to make this "decision," he is

forced to step outside of the game of STDT in order to experience any "real choice"
whatsoever.

The utter significance that this point has is when one realizes how a

STD therapist, such as Sifneos, might explain a client's decision to leave therapy. For
if this were to occur, the therapist bears no responsibility for this decision. Rather, the
therapist need only chide himself for having made an initial error in selecting the
client for treatment because the client is said to have lacked (all along!) the necessary
"level of motivation" for treatment. The therapist need only take responsibility for an
initial error in his judgment -- but nothing else. 56
Before leaving the above cited passage, one other issue deserves to be
mentioned. An implication of the passage is that client's who "acquiesce" to the
anxiety-provoking comment and/or do not see it as a viable option to terminate
therapy, are said (and from the therapist's point of view) to have bolstered their sense
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Undoubtedly, when the success rate of this form of therapy is considered in
the next section, the reader would do well to remember this point. As we will see, to
a large degree the success/failure rate of this form of therapy rests with the therapist's
clinical observations of the client.
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of "motivation" to continue to explore the central issue of therapy. The obvious
question that this leaves us with is: When using anxiety-provoking techniques, is it
really the case that therapists have augmented the motivation of their clients? Or
rather, have STD therapists really fostered a sense of passivity (a decrease of
autonomy) within their clients to accept the interpretation offered? A plausible
argument could be made which claims that, as part of their selection critetja, STD
therapists ultimately choose to treat clients who lack confidence in themselves or their

ability to make autonomous choices. 57 Unfortunately, a complete examination of this
claim would take me too far afield at this point; yet, one must remember that within
the game of STDT, it is the therapists who have the sole power to interpret and use
the rules of the game.
By way of concluding this section, I wish to briefly consider how technique is
said to depend upon a therapist's "individual style." Perhaps unlike any other
paradigm explored in this dissertation, STDT touts the fact that techniques of therapy
should be chosen based upon the individual personality of the therapist. As cited
earlier, Sifneos has stated that a therapist's "individual style" can neither be "taught or
described." Even beyond this, STD therapists seem to be comfortable in claiming that
a choice of techniques may have to do with a therapist's unconscious motivations. In
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Again, the reader should remember this claim in light of the forthcoming
paragraphs. STD therapists suggest that the ultimate choice of a therapist's techniques
are often based on unconscious "reasons" or "motivations." If this is so, one can not
help but wonder if therapists are unconsciously selecting clients who are passive or
weak-willed.
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the end, though, individual style is not something to avoid in STDT; if anything, it is
strongly encouraged. However, after reading about the preferred techniques of the
leading thinkers in this field, one wonders to what extent the individual styles which
have "worked so well" can ever be replicated by anyone else who hopes to learn this
form of therapy. I believe that two very important issues depend upon whether or not
techniques can in principle be "imitated" or "taught:" 1) If techniques can be taught,
one can speak consistently and honestly about STDT as constituting a discipline.
There is certainly a dearth of evidence which suggests that STD therapists see
themselves as theoretically articulating and practicing from within an established
discipline/school of thought. 2) However, if the techniques of this form of therapy can
not, in principle, be taught to those new to the field, then the disciplinary status of
STDT is rendered questionable. In light of this last claim, consider the following
passages:
My own perception of Davanloo as a therapist has always
been that of a leopard, or other wild animal in his natural
environment, guided by infallible instinct who, at any
given moment, knows exactly what direction to take and
which strategical moves are best suited to accomplish his
aim... (emphasis added, mine) 58
... there is not much point in imitating Davanloo's visible
moves, hoping to be as effective without understanding
and assimilating the underlying theory, so as to adapt it
to one's own personality. Clearly, not all of us are
leopards, and trying to imitate one, even by using a
therapeutic manual, would be not only ridiculous but a
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gross oversimplification. Conversely, each of us has got
his own unconscious and, even while we are trying to
follow a certain model, we should never overlook its
signals.
This having been said, it remains evident that
Davanloo's technical interventions are often totally
original, and differentiate his approach from all the
others. 59
In 1995, I wrote that perhaps Davanloo's most important
contribution has simply been the demonstration that
widely applicable brief psychotherapy is possible, so that
other therapists are encouraged to use some of his ideas
to find equally effective methods that suit their own
personalities. Dr. Coughlin Della Selva has
unquestionably done this, and the next step will be much
easier; namely, for yet other therapists to adapt her
technique to suit their personalities -- in which process,
the publication of this book will play an essential part. I
hope the result will be a chain reaction by which the
whole status of psychotherapy may ultimately be
transformed (emphasis added, mine). 60

I imagine that Malan envisions a positive transformation for psychotherapy. I am
wary of such optimism. With techniques taught in this manner to individuals who
want to learn STDT, I can only envision a "chain reaction" that leads to a further
enslavement for potential clients of this increasingly subjective "discipline."
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Goals of STDT
If it is indeed the case that individual style is a laudable means for therapists to

choose their techniques, then one has to wonder how the goals of treatment are to be
assessed in this form of therapy. Specifically, one wonders if there can be
generalizable results of this form of treatment. Davanloo claims that the "individual
personality characteristics and the empathy of the therapist" are "crucial for the
outcome of therapy. "61 The literature suggests that STDT aims at the following
plethora of possible "outcomes" for the client:
- insight; characterological change; psychodynamic
change; insight into emotional conflicts and understanding
symptoms in dynamic terms; main (circumscribed focal)
conflict has been accomplished; patient feels better; new
attitudes have been developed; increase in self-esteem. 62

Let us begin by focusing on what is not listed as a possible goal:, namely a
.change in clients behavior and/or symptomatology. This will lead to a further
consideration of the criteria that is used to assess client goals of STDT.
Since its inception in the late 1960's and early 1970's, there has been a surge of
interest in generating (presumably, replicable) outcome studies of what is actually
achieved within STDT. 63 Curiously, Sifneos notes that while his version of STDT has
had great success in provoking increased patient insight, actual "change in
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symptomatology has not been impressive." 64

Whether or not therapists can

empirically demonstrate a necessary causal link between "interpretation" and change in
behavior/symptomatology is beyond the scope of this present analysis. However, what
is of concern is whether or not STD therapists assume responsibility for informing
their clients that "increased insight" may or may not result in changes in their
symptomatology. It seems to me that many clients seek therapy precisely because
they are suffering from certain symptoms and/or behavioral difficulties. If statistical
studies do not adequately -- even to STD therapists requirements for adequacy -demonstrate that changes in symptomatology do occur, it would seem that a therapist

must assume the obligation to inform clients of this fact.

As I have shown, STD

therapists are eager to talk about establishing a "joint agreement" with the client
regarding the "central focus" of the therapy, to encourage a client's motivation in the
course of therapy, to require that the client make "sacrifices" for therapy, etc.
Unfortunately, there is a noted absence in the literature regarding a STD therapist's

obligations to inform the client both of the possibilities and the very real limitations of
this form of treatment. 65

64

65

Ibid., 40.

Unfortunately, space does not permit a complete development of the ethical
importance of this observation. My thesis is limited to a demonstration of where
normative assumptions might occur in STDT in virtue of examining its theoretical
commitments. The reader, however, should bear in mind that by saying therapists
have an obligation to tell clients of the limitations of this form of treatment, the
justification for this obligation arises from a therapist's knowledge of this panicular
paradigm. It may be the case that therapists with other theoretical orientations may not
have this obligation (i.e. clients who seek treatment from behavioral therapists may
experience better/more noticeable changes in their symptomatology. As such,
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Some therapists might object and argue that most clients who seeks STD
therapy will somehow "improve" at the end of treatment. That is to say, most clients
will benefit even though the actual benefits may not be capable of empirically
confirmation. This may be true; but, I would argue that one will never know the
extent to which a client benefits from this form of therapy so long as a therapist's
perspective is privileged in generating the data for the outcome studies. All too often,
STD therapists privilege their perspective. Consider the following claims:
Davanloo claims to have done systematic follow-up of his
patients, no systematic follow-up has really been published,
so that the true quality of the majority of his therapeutic results
is not accessible to us.
Hopefully, the potency of this model will be
confirmed also by outcome studies of the therapies carried
out by therapists (other than Davanloo) applying his method.
The lack of published clinical studies, reporting the relevant
material and a discussion of exactly what changed and what
did not change, is a shortcoming that should be filled. 66
Another important difference from psychoanalysis is that
technique, selection criteria, content of interpretations types
of interpretation, are more often based on direct cumulative
evidence from previous empirical observations and outcome
research data, rather than on purely metapsychological assumptions.
In a way, Malan's metapsychological position is that he neither
accepts passively nor thoroughly rejects some of the metapsychological
foundations of psychoanalysis, but rather, he bases his clinical

behavioral therapists may not be obliged in the same way as are STD therapists). This
is one important implication. But there is a second and more important consequence
that follows. Both therapists and philosophers who purport to write about "psychiatric
ethics" should recognize that the therapist's obligation in this context is not derived
from an abstract code of ethics. That is to say, there are obligations and
responsibilities in psychiatry that receive their specific content from the sch09l of
thought from which they are derived.
66
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judgement only on those metapsychological aspects which can be
empirically validated by virtue of clinical observations. 61
The issues concerning the criteria for assessment are, indeed, highly suspect.

On the

one hand, Davanloo, a founder of STDT, is portrayed as having no discemable
outcome studies. On the other hand, Malan, who has outcome studies available, bases
his clinical judgments on his own clinical observations. There is something oddly
circular about this criteria. The circularity that I see might be made clearer by an
analogy.

One might imagine a college professor who evaluates students' performance

based solely upon his own observations of individual students. Such a professor might
administer tests, quizzes or even assign papers; however, the method by which he
chooses to grade the assignments is his personal reaction to the work. If professors
determined students' grades in this way, I believe that students would scoff at the
unfairness of this approach.

In this example, there exists no objective measures that

both the student and professor could appeal to in order to evaluate the student's

performance (i.e. mastering the material in a textbook, following the assignment for
the paper, etc.).
I believe the above analogy pinpoints what is wrong with the criteria of
assessing STDT. Clinical judgments of a therapist based on clinical observations that
issue from the therapist create a radical subjectivity in the domain of STDT. Outcome
of a client's success is again, a matter of therapist interpretation.
In his book, Short-Term Anxiety Provoking Therapy, Sifneos offers the

67
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following account of judging "successful/non-successful" outcomes. In some sense, it
could be considered a way of circumventing the radical subjectivity involved in
Malan's technique. He says:
During the past fifteen years, I have had the opportunity
to present in workshops, conferences, and seminars all
over North and South America and Europe, my work
about a kind of short-term dynamic psychotherapy called
STAPP (short-term anxiety-provoking psychotherapy).
I am pleased to find that a great deal of interest has
been aroused among the participants. There are two
reasons for this. The first has to do with the many years
of investigation surrounding this kind of psychotherapy of
brief duration, as well as the systematic studies of the
results obtained. Second, we have made extensive and
systematic use of video-tapes to demonstrate this work,
allowing evaluation and techniques to be observed and
outcome findings to be assessed objectively by the
participants. It is they who watched critically the nature
of the patient-therapist relationship and it is they who
could decide whether the patients had improved. 68
Video-taping has transformed the hitherto private therapeutic relationship into a
publicly observable event. But, while the use of video-tapes is a step in the right
direction toward infusing STDT with a modicum of objectivity, the fact of the matter
is that the criteria of success or failure of STAPP is still highly infused with
subjectivity. Community consensus of therapists determines the overall sense of the
client's improvement. An equally disturbing notion is that "improvement" here defined
is limited to the number of video-taped therapy sessions -- leaving it a completely
unexplored issue as to whether or not "improvement" transcended the confines of
therapy.

68
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Given the above, I maintain that evaluating the outcome of STDT by using the
criterion of a therapist's own clinical observations or a community of therapists'
observations (as in the case with video-taping) is highly suspect. The reader should
note that I do not believe that any paradigm of psychotherapy admits of the kind of
measures of objectivity that one might expect in other sciences. However, in order to
ensure the disciplinary viability of STDT as a paradigm of psychotherapy, I do believe
that something less subjective or something that takes into account more than simply
the therapist's perspective is desperately needed.
In her recent book, Intensive Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy, Patricia

Coughlin Della Selva would appear to agree with that claim. Discussing the
importance of outcome data, she says: "Such data are essential to determine whether
our interventions are truly curative. "69 At the close of her book, she summarizes two
methods for evaluation which do take into account the client's perspective. These
methods were proposed by Malan and Davanloo respectively:
The Tavistock group developed a rating scale to
categorize patient response to treatment both at
termination and follow-up. (Malan, 1963) The criteria for
success were as follows: 0 indicated no change; a score
of 1 represented some symptomatic improvement but no
evidence of greater coping skills in the area of the core
conflict; a score of 2 reflected meaningful symptomatic
improvement plus evidence of new coping strategies for
dealing adaptively in previously conflictual situations;
and a score of 3 indicated broad change beyond the
specific conflictual area to reflect greater coping in
relationships with both men and women and better
performance at work.
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Davanloo (1978) reported that of 130 patients deemed
suitable for ISTDP, 115 were successfully treated in an
average of 20 sessions. These positive results were
maintained in follow-up interviews conducted between 2
and 7 years posttreatment. Davanloo engaged patients in
active reassessment of the process at follow-up. Both
patient and therapist watched videotaped segments of
treatment. Davanloo engaged patients in an active
reassessment of the process at follow-up. Both patient
and therapist watched videotaped segments of treatment.
Davanloo asked for feedback from patients and elicited
their comments about what they had found helpful. Of
significance was a frequently reported perception that the
patients had done most of the work themselves. They
tended to report feeling "free" or "like a new person,"
attesting to the dramatic changes that had occurred as a
result of their hard work. 70
While both of these kinds of evaluation represent a move toward greater objectivity in
STDT by taking into consideration the client's perspective, the reader should still be
wary of both kinds of these methods.. A careful consideration indicates that the
client's perspective is solicited only with respect to what he/she found "helpful" about
therapy. In short, both the questionnaire and the follow-up interviews ask clients to
address what worked about therapy. Only in the first example is the client asked to
report about aspects of his/her life in which there is "no change." However, one must
wonder: should not the client's perspective be required about aspects of his/her life
which might have been "negatively" affected?

Posing the questions in this way

makes it seem as if therapy can either "affect no change in the client's life" or "affect
change for the better."

I believe that there is a third category that is woefully missing

from the methods of evaluation, namely: "negative affect." With "negative affect" not

70

Ibid., 226-227.

235
even being an option, it is no wonder why STDT reports such a high percentage of
successful outcomes.

Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter, I compared the paradigm of STDT to
functioning like a game. I did so in order to see where and how the normative force
of this paradigm's assumptions might enter into treatment. Having analyzed the many
rules of this game: the meaning of the many selection criteria of clients, the kinds of
illnesses treated, the treatment techniques and the goals/outcomes of therapy, it seems
rather obvious that all of these categories encourage the therapist's personal values to
enter into treatment. Any attempt to generalize what these values are would be risky;
for, as we have seen, they literally depend upon each individual therapist's
interpretation of the rules. An implication of this is that any attempt to generate a
coherent, rational plan of action that benefits the client is sadly out of reach. The
theory of this paradigm itself demonstrates that the utterly powerless players in their
own treatment -- the clients -- must literally make a leap of faith in their therapist and
hope that he/she is a good soul.
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